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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The existing rules in the United States governing the ques-
tioning of suspects in custody are based on the Supreme Court's
five to four decision in Miranda v. Arizona.' The Court in Mi-
randa promulgated a new, code-like set of rules for custodial
questioning, including the creation of a right to counsel in con-
nection with custodial questioning, a requirement of warnings, a
prohibition of questioning unless the suspect affirmatively
waives the rights set out in the warnings, and a prohibition of
questioning if the suspect asks for a lawyer or indicates in any
manner that he is unwilling to talk. These admittedly nonconsti-
tutional standards impede the search for truth by conditioning
inquiry, no matter how brief and restrained, on a suspect's con-
sent to be questioned, and by excluding a suspect's statements
at trial, though fully voluntary and reliable, if obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda's "prophylactic" procedures. Beyond their costs
,to the truth-finding process, the Miranda rules can also validly
be criticized as inept and ineffective means of promoting fair
treatment of suspects. Their imposition by judicial fiat has effec-
tively precluded the development of superior alternative
,procedures.
This Report carries out a comprehensive review of the devel-
opment of the law of pretrial interrogation from its medieval ori-
gins to the time of the Miranda decision; analyzes the Miranda
decision itself; describes the practical effects of Miranda's stan-
dards and subsequent legal developments; and examines the le-
,gal rules and practices of several foreign jurisdictions relating to
-the questioning of suspects and defendants. The Report recom-
mends that the Department of Justice seek to secure a decision
by the Supreme Court overruling or abrogating the Miranda de-
cision and that the Department develop and implement an ad-
ministrative policy governing the conduct of custodial question-
.ing by the Department's agencies.
In greater detail, the main findings and recommendations of
the Report are as follows:'
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. A condensed version of this Report's review of historical issues and its analysis of
the Miranda decision and subsequent developments appears in Markman, Miranda v.
Arizona: A Historical Perspective, 24 AM. CrM. L. REV. 193 (1987).
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I. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION
The right against compelled self-incrimination came into be-
ing as part of the reaction to governmental inquisitions in Eng-
land against political and religious dissidents in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries. While the right had emerged in
a recognizable form by the mid-seventeenth century, it was un-
derstood in connection with pretrial interrogation as not ex-
tending beyond a prohibition against actually forcing a person to
incriminate himself. Suspects accordingly could not be tortured
or required to answer questions under oath, but were subject to
pretrial interrogation by justices of the peace with no right to
warnings or counsel and no right to prevent questioning from
taking place. Statements made in response to such question-
ing-as well as any refusal to respond to the magistrate's ques-
tions-were admissible in evidence at trial.
The materials associated directly with the formulation of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not suggest any purpose
of extending the self-incrimination right beyond its common law
scope. Rather, they show a primary concern with the most ex-
treme inquisitorial abuses, and particularly with the possibility
that the federal government might use torture to obtain confes-
sions in the absence of a constitutional prohibition of compelled
self-incrimination.
In the course of the nineteenth century, the common law insti-
tution of pretrial interrogation by judicial officers passed into
history, and the focus of the law shifted to the new institution of
police interrogation. Between the late nineteenth century and
the late 1950s, the Supreme Court reviewed numerous cases
which raised questions concerning the procedures that were later
imposed by the Miranda decision-such as warnings and a right
to counsel-and held uniformly that such procedures were not
required in pretrial interrogation. Only statements obtained
through actual coercion or compulsion ("involuntary" confes-
sions) were held to be constitutionally inadmissible.
The traditional standards began to break down in the early
1960s when the Supreme Court entered a phase in which history
and precedent counted for little. In Escobedo v. Illinois,- the
Court indicated for the first time that a warning to the suspect
or the assistance of counsel would in some circumstances be re-
quired in police interrogations. The Court also borrowed from
3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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extra-judicial sources in its creative efforts, appropriating the
warnings that the FBI gave to suspects in 1966 as a matter of
administrative policy, and transforming them into nationally ap-
plicable requirements in the Miranda decision. The same period
was characterized by intense interest by law reform bodies and
legislatures in defining new standards for police interrogations,
but this legal ferment was cut off when the Court imposed its
own standards in Miranda.
II. THE DECISION IN Miranda v. Arizona AND SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS
In general character, the Miranda decision stood somewhere
between a code of procedure with commentary and a judicial de-
cision in the conventional sense. Chief Justice Warren, who de-
vised the detailed set of rules announced in the decision, ini-
tially drafted the opinion of the Court so as to make these rules
constitutional requirements. However, he was forced to accom-
modate Justice Brennan, who insisted that the federal govern-
ment and the states should have the option of developing alter-
native rules counteracting the pressures of custodial
interrogation. The final version of the opinion took the position
that compelled self-incrimination would necessarily occur if
statements were obtained from a suspect without special safe-
guards, but acknowledged that the specific procedures pre-
scribed by Miranda were dispensable if it could be shown that
other rules were equally effective.
Empirical findings following the Miranda decision indicated
that compliance with its rules had a major adverse effect on the
willingness of suspects to provide information to the police. For
-example, District Attorney (now Senator) Arlen Specter re-
ported that an estimated 90% of arrested persons made state-
ments to the police in Philadelphia prior to Miranda and Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, but that after Miranda only 41% did so. A
study in Pittsburgh indicated that Miranda had roughly cut in
half the number of suspected killers and robbers who con-
fessed-a reduction from about 60% before Miranda to about
30% afterward.
Congress quickly repudiated the Miranda decision, and some-
what later the Supreme Court rejected its underlying rationale,
following a change in the Court's membership. The legislative
Pretrial Interrogation
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response was a statute4 (18 U.S.C. § 3501) enacted in 1968 to
overturn the Miranda decision and restore the pre-Miranda vol-
untariness standard for the admission of confessions in federal
prosecutions. The Department of Justice attempted to establish
the validity of this statute in litigation for several years with in-
conclusive results, but ultimately terminated this litigative effort
after an initial appellate decision' which upheld the statute.
The Supreme Court's rejection of Miranda's rationale oc-
curred in Michigan v. Tucker,6 which took the position that no
violation of the fifth amendment occurs if statements are ob-
tained from a suspect without observing Miranda's rules or any
other safeguards, so long as actual coercion is avoided. This
view-which has been reiterated and relied on in such later deci-
sions as New York v. Quarles7 and Oregon v. Elstad8-removed
any intelligible doctrinal basis for applying Miranda's rules to
the states, or for failing to give 18 U.S.C. § 3501 effect in federal
proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court continues to apply Mi-
randa's standards in its decisions, apparently because no case
has yet required the Court to confront the full implications of its
rejection of Miranda's essential premise.
III. THE QUESTIONING OF THE ACCUSED IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS
The Miranda decision attempted to bolster its innovations by
pointing to a number of foreign jurisdictions that allegedly had
adopted restrictive rules concerning the questioning of suspects
without any marked detrimental effect on law enforcement.
However, an independent examination of the law in these juris-
dictions and others-England, Scotland, Canada, India, France,
and Germany-shows that the Miranda decision's discussion of
this issue was superficial and misleading. When all relevant fea-
tures of these foreign systems are considered, the Miranda rules
appear to be unique among the jurisdictions surveyed in their
restrictiveness and rigidity.
For example, while suspects cannot be forced to answer ques-
tions in these other systems, this prohibition is not construed to
4. The statute was part of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act.
5. United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
6. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
7. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
8. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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mean that they can prevent questions from being asked. At trial,
the critical question in determining the admissibility of a de-
fendant's pretrial statements is likely to be whether they are vol-
untary in some specified sense and not whether the police ob-
served the procedural rules governing interrogations. Warnings
may not be required at all prior to police questioning, and any
warnings that are required may be quite different from Mi-
randa's. The countries surveyed also show that a substantive
right to counsel may not be recognized at all in connection with
police interrogation, and that any right that is recognized may
be much narrower than the counsel right created by Miranda.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
In light of the foregoing facts and findings, the Office of Legal
Policy recommends that the Department (1) seek to persuade
the Supreme Court to abrogate or overrule the decision in Mi-
randa v. Arizona, and (2) adopt an administrative policy gov-
erning the conduct of custodial interrogations by the Depart-
ment's agencies, to be put into effect concurrently with the
renewal of litigation challenging the validity of the Miranda
decision.
The considerations supporting the recommendation that the
Department seek to have Miranda overruled include the Mi-
randa system's inconsistency with the constitutional separation
of powers and basic principles of federalism, its adverse effect on
government's ability to protect the public from crime, and its
inadequacy as a means of ensuring fair trcatment of suspects in
custodial questioning. The Supreme Court's decisions in Michi-
gan v. Tucker, New York v. Quarles, and Oregon v. Elstad,
which held that noncompliance with Miranda does not entail
any violation of the Constitution, imply that the Court would
now uphold the statute9 which directs that pretrial statements
be admitted under the traditional voluntariness standard.
In formulating an administrative policy concerning custodial
questioning, issues that could appropriately be considered would
include the desirability of a regular requirement that interroga-
tions be videotaped or recorded; the desirability of rules relating
to the permissible duration and frequency of questioning; and
the desirability of other rules concerning behavior and demeanor
in questioning suspects. The promulgation of such a policy con-
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
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currently with the Department's renewal of a litigative challenge
to Miranda would ensure that the enhanced freedom to make
reforms resulting from Miranda's demise will be exercised
responsibly, increase the likelihood of judicial acceptance of an
abrogation of Miranda, and make the point effectively that the
replacement of Miranda with superior alternative rules offers
major advantages in relation to the legitimate interests of sus-
pects and defendants, as well as major gains in promoting effec-
tive law enforcement.
Following an abrogation of Miranda, a wide range of funda-
mental issues that have been foreclosed by the Miranda decision
would once again become amenable to study, debate, negotia-
tion, and resolution through the democratic process, restoring
"the initiative in criminal law reform to those forums where it
truly belongs."10 Achieving such an abrogation would accord-
ingly be among the most important objectives the Department
could pursue in seeking constitutionally to restore the power of
self-government to the people of the United States in the sup-
pression of crime.
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 524 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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"The Constitution is not at all offended when a guilty man stubs
his toe. On the contrary, it is decent to hope that he will ....
Thus the Fifth Amendment does not say that a man shall not be
permitted to incriminate himself, or that he shall not be per-
suaded to do so. It says no more than that a man shall not be
'compelled' to give evidence against himself."
-State v. McKnight"
"In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a
killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the envi-
ronment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it
pleases him. As a consequence there will not be a gain, but a
loss, in human dignity. . . .There is, of course, a saving factor:
the next victims are uncertain, unnamed and unrepresented in
this case."
-Justice Byron White, dissenting in Miranda v. Arizona 2
"[C]rime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals who
have voluntarily confessed their crimes are released on mere
technicalities. The traditional right of the people to have their
prosecuting attorneys place in evidence before juries the volun-
tary confessions and incriminating statements made by defend-
ants simply must be restored . .. ."
-Committee Report on 18 U.S.C. § 3501"8
"In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by
the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given . .. .
-18 U.S.C. § 350114
11. 52 N.J. 35, 52, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (1968).
12. 384 U.S. at 542-43.
13. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 37 (1968).
14. Enacted by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
Pretrial Interrogation

SPRING AND SUMMER 1989]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .......................................... 451
I. History of the Law of Pretrial Interrogation ..... 453
A. The Original Understanding of the Right
Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination ..... 453
1. The Common-Law Background ......... 453
a. The Right Prior to the Seventeenth
C entury .......................... 453
b. The Later Development of the Gen-
eral R ight ........................ 455
c. The Right in Pretrial Interrogation. 457
2. Formulation and Adoption of the Fifth
Am endm ent ......................... . 459
a. The State Ratification Conventions. 460
b. Proceedings in Congress ........... 461
B. Historical Practice and Case Law Under the
Fifth Amendment Prior to Miranda ........ 462
1. The General Development ............. 463
a. The Transition from Judicial Inter-
rogation to Police Interrogation .... 463
b. The Fifth Amendment and Coerced
Confessions ...................... 465
c. The Inapplicability of the Fifth
Amendment to the States ......... 471
2. Specific Issues ........................ 475
a. W arnings ........................ 475
b. The Right to Counsel ............. 478
c. Adverse Inferences from Silence .... 482
d. The Right Not to be Questioned ... 484
3. The Prelude to Miranda ............... 484
a. Massiah and Escobedo ............ 485
b. The Interrogation Policy of the FBI 488
c. The ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure .................. 489
II. The Decision in Miranda v. Arizona and Subse-
quent Developm ents .......................... 491
A. The Miranda Decision .................... 492
1. The General Argument ................ 493
a. The Fifth Amendment Standard and
the Voluntariness Standard ........ 494
b. The Fiction of Inherent Coerciveness 496
Pretrial Interrogation
Journal of Law Reform
c. Precedent in Existing Interrogation
System s .......................... 500
2. Arguments for Particular Rules ........ 502
a. Application of the Fiction of Inher-
ent Coerciveness .......... . 502
b. The Requirement of a Knowing and
Intelligent W aiver ................ 503
c. The Argument from Equity ........ 505
d. The Exclusion of Pretrial Silence... 506
3. The Expressed Openness to Alternatives 506
B. The Aftermath of Miranda ................ 510
1. Evidence of Damage to Law Enforcement 510
2. The Congressional Reaction-Enactment
of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 ................ 512
a. Proceedings in Congress ........... 512
b. The Statute ...................... 515
3. The Abortive Implementation of Section
3 5 0 1 ................................. 5 1 9
C. Case Law Development Subsequent to Mi-
ra n d a ..................... .............. 5 2 1
1. The Non-Constitutional Status of Mi-
randa's System ....................... 523
a. The Decisions in Michigan v.
Tucker, New York v. Quarles, and
Oregon v. Elstad ................. 523
b. The Anomaly of Miranda's Survival 526
2. The Use of Pretrial Silence ............ 527
3. The Right to Counsel ................. 531
III. The Questioning of the Accused in Foreign Juris-
d ictio n s ...................................... 5 34
A . E ngland ................................. 535
B . S cotland ................................. 536
C . C anada .................................. 537
D . In d ia .................................... 5 38
E . F rance ....................... .......... 539
F . G erm any ................................ 540
G . C onclusion ............................... 541
IV. Recommendations for Reform .................. 542
A. Reasons for Abrogating Miranda ........... 543
B. Challenging Miranda in Litigation ......... 549
C. Administrative Rules for Interrogations by
the Department's Agencies ................ 551
D. After M iranda .................. . ..... 553
1. W arnings ............... . .......... . 554
[VOL. 22:3 & 4
SPRING AND SUMMER 1989] Pretrial Interrogation
2. The Assistance of Counsel ............. 556
3. Questioning Uncooperative Suspects .... 560
4. The Admission of Pretrial Silence ...... 560
C onclusion ........................................... 564
Addendum of January 20, 1987, Concerning Subsequent
D ecision s ... ... ...................................... 566
Appendix: Miscarriages of Justice Resulting From
Miranda and Related Decisions ........................ 568

SPRING AND SUMMER 1989]
THE LAW OF PRETRIAL
INTERROGATION
INTRODUCTION
At the direction of the Attorney General, the Office of Legal
Policy has carried out a comprehensive review of the law of pre-
trial interrogation, with particular attention to the rules promul-
gated by the Supreme Court in the decision of Miranda v. Ari-
.zona, 1 5 and related legal doctrines. The results of this review are
set out in this Report.
Part I of this Report examines the development of the law
relating to self-incrimination and pretrial interrogation from its
,origin in the sixteenth century to the time of the Miranda deci-
sion. The topics covered include the development of self-incrimi-
nation law in England and the American colonies; the practice of
pretrial interrogation at the time of the ratification of the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights; and subsequent historical devel-
opments in this area, including the development of the Supreme
Court's case law prior to Miranda. The general conclusion that
may be derived from this review of history is that the Miranda
rules are inconsistent with the original understanding of the
right against self-incrimination, and with the Supreme Court's
resolution of the same issues in its pre-Miranda case law.
Part II analyzes the Miranda decision and subsequent devel-
opments. Two findings in this part stand out: First, Congress en-
acted a statute in 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501,11 with the specific pur-
pose of overruling the Miranda decision and restoring the pre-
Miranda voluntariness standard as the criterion governing the
admissibility of a defendant's pretrial statements in federal pro-
ceedings. Second, the Supreme Court has rejected the underly-
ing rationale of Miranda v. Arizona through its decision in
Michigan v. Tucker,17 which characterized Miranda's rules as
merely "recommended" procedures, and which made it clear
that departures from Miranda do not entail any violation of the
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. The history of the statute is reviewed infra Parts II.B.2-3.
17. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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Constitution."e The same position has been reiterated and relied
on in more recent decisions, including New York v. Quarles9
and Oregon v. Elstad2
These decisions imply that there is no longer any doctrinal ba-
sis for applying Miranda's admittedly nonconstitutional rules to
the states, and that, in connection with federal prosecutions, the
Supreme Court would now uphold the validity of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501. These implications have been evident to legal writers on
the Miranda decision,2" and have been endorsed by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which held in United States v.
Crocker22 that "Michigan v. Tucker. . . did, in effect, adopt and
uphold the constitutionality of the provisions [of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501]. ' 12s As a result of these developments, Miranda is now
the legal equivalent of the smile of the Cheshire cat, which lin-
gers in the air with nothing to support it.
Part III of this Report examines the rules relating to the ques-
tioning of suspects and defendants in a number of foreign juris-
dictions-England, Scotland, Canada, India, France, and Ger-
many. These include the countries whose interrogations systems
were cited in Miranda2" as evidence that restrictive interroga-
tion rules are not detrimental to law enforcement, as well as
others. Our independent review of foreign law indicates that
other nations recognize the importance of obtaining information
from persons suspected or accused of crime, and provide effec-
tive means for doing so. The rules imposed in the United States
by Miranda and related decisions appear to be unique among
the countries surveyed in their restrictiveness and rigidity.
Part IV of this Report sets out recommendations for reform.
The principal recommendations are that the Department seek to
secure a decision by the Supreme Court upholding the validity
of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 or otherwise overruling Miranda v. Arizona,
and that the Department promptly develop and implement a set
of rules or guidelines for the conduct of custodial interrogations
by the Department's agencies. Part IV also discusses the possi-
bility of more far-reaching reforms that would be opened up by
an abrogation of Miranda. The recommendations section in Part
18. Id. at 443-446.
19. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
20. 470 U.S. 298, 306-309 (1985).
21. See Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13
Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 405, 407, 425-428 (1982); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 118-20, 123.
22. 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
23. Id. at 1137.
24. See 384 U.S. at 486-89.
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IV is fairly self-contained, and could be read in advance of the
rest of the Report.
I. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION
This part of the Report reviews the history of the law of pre-
trial interrogation from its beginning in the sixteenth century to
the time of the Miranda decision. Part A covers the period pre-
ceding the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Part B covers the
post-constitutional development.
A. The Original Understanding Of The Right Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination
The right against self-incrimination came into being as part of
the reaction to governmental inquisitions in England against po-
1litical and religious dissidents in the sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries. While the right had emerged in a recognizable
'form by the mid-seventeenth century, it was understood in con-
nection with pretrial interrogation as not extending beyond a
prohibition of actually forcing a person to incriminate himself.
Suspects accordingly could not be tortured or required to answer
questions under oath, but were subject to pretrial interrogation
'by justices of the peace, without warnings or counsel. State-
ments made in response to such questioning-as well as any re-
fusal to respond to the magistrate's questions-were admissible
in evidence at trial.
The materials associated directly with the formulation of the
'Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not suggest any purpose
of extending the right against self-incrimination beyond its com-
mon-law scope. Rather, they show a primary concern with the
most extreme inquisitorial abuses, and particularly with the pos-
sibility that the federal government might use torture to obtain
confessions in the absence of a constitutional prohibition of
compelled self-incrimination.
1. The Common-Law Background
a. The right prior to the seventeenth century- An under-
standing of the roots of the fifth amendment right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination requires some preliminary explana-
Pretrial Interrogation
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tion of English criminal procedure prior to the seventeenth
century.
In that period, offenses were adjudicated in the regular crimi-
nal courts (the "common-law courts") by means of jury trials
which exhibited both significant similarities to and basic differ-
ences from the contemporary institution. The government would
present evidence in these proceedings through the depositions
and oral testimony of witnesses, but the most important element
of the trial was the questioning ("examination") of the defend-
ant by the prosecutor and judge. Various features of trial proce-
dure in that period resulted in virtually irresistible pressures on
a defendant who hoped to avoid conviction to answer such ques-
tions and to respond in his own voice to the charges against him.
These included the uniform amenability of defendants to persis-
tent questioning, whether or not they wished to be questioned;
the preclusion of counsel in felony cases; and the fact that felony
defendants could not call witnesses to give evidence in their be-
half. Nevertheless, defendants did not testify under oath, and
the common-law courts had no power to punish a defendant for
refusing to answer questions.2"
Quite different methods were employed in the courts that fol-
lowed the ecclesiastical-as opposed to the common-law-mode
of procedure. These included the Court of High Commission,
which was active in the persecution of religious and political dis-
sidents in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. A
person brought before such a tribunal could be required to take
an oath-the oath ex officio-to answer truthfully all questions
that might be put to him. Although refusing to take the oath
could result in fines, imprisonment, corporal punishment, or
even occasionally death, many defendants asserted a right to do
so, citing the maxim: "nemo tenetur prodere seipsum"-"no one
is bound to accuse himself.
2 6
25. See L. LEvy, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 31-32, 37-38, 215-16, 264-65,
282-84, 320-23 (1968); L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 9-12 (1959);
1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 325-26, 440 (1883); G. WIL-
LIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 5-7, 42-43 (1963).
26. See L. LEvY, supra note 25, at 3-4, 23-24, 44-51, 55, 66-67, 77-78, 101-05, 127, 130-
33, 141-43, 154-59, 166, 174-79, 250, 266-71, 274-77.
The phrase nemo tenetur prodere seipsum originated as part of a canon law maxim
which stated that a person is not bound to accuse himself, but that a person accused by
common repute is bound to show whether he can establish his innocence and purge him-
self. In the course of the development of the right against self-incrimination, the "nemo
tenetur" principle was extracted from this qualifying context and given progressively
broader applications. See id. at 95-97.
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At this stage of history, the right asserted under this maxim
was not a general right to refrain from giving incriminating evi-
dence against oneself, but only a right not to be the source of
the initial accusation against oneself. In contrast to the com-
mon-law courts' reliance on grand jury indictment and charges
of specific offenses made by identifiable witnesses, these inquisi-
torial courts could initiate proceedings against a person on the
basis of information provided by anonymous accusers, or on the
basis of rumor or suspicion that a person may have lapsed in
some manner from orthodoxy or loyalty to the crown. Their pro-
ceedings were accordingly in many cases open-ended fishing ex-
peditions which could elicit from defendants charges against
themselves for which evidence had not previously been provided
by any identifiable witness. While the claimed right to refuse the
oath was initially predicated on this particular feature of ecclesi-
astical procedure-the absence of a limitation on the scope of
inquiry to specific charges supported by the evidence of identifi-
able witnesses-the resistance of the victims of these inquisi-
tions laid the groundwork for the broader developments that
were to follow.2
b. The later development of the general right- The Parlia-
ment convened in 1640 acted broadly against these instruments
of oppression, adopting statutes that abolished the Court of
High Commission and its ally in the persecution of dissidents,
the Court of Star Chamber. The legislation further provided
that all trials were thereafter to be determined "in the ordinary
Courts of Justice and by the ordinary course of the law," and
prohibited use of the oath ex officio by any person exercising
ecclesiastical authority. These reforms did not directly affect the
procedure of the common-law courts, which had never ques-
tioned defendants under oath. However, a general revulsion
against inquisitorial practices persisted, and was fed by political
prosecutions under the new regime.28
This ultimately led to a basic transformation in the character
of criminal trials. The earlier-asserted right against compulsory
self-accusation now became a true right against compulsory self-
incrimination. Defendants and witnesses in the middle and late
seventeenth century claimed a right to refuse to answer incrimi-
nating questions, and these contentions were accepted by the
courts. At the same time, the questioning of the defendant at
trial took on a less antagonistic character. Around the start of
27. See id. at 3-4, 64-67, 130-31, 142-43, 154-59, 177-79, 193-96, 215, 250.
28. See id. at 278-82, 288-313.
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the eighteenth century, this trend reached its culmination, and
the practice of examining the accused at trial abated in the En-
glish courts.29
Concurrent with this development, the traditional exemption
of the defendant in the common-law courts from testimony
under oath acquired a new rationale. In the 1630s judges began
to allow felony defendants to call witnesses to give unsworn
statements on their behalf, and testimony under oath by defense
witnesses in felony cases was authorized by statute in 1701.
However, the defendant was not allowed to be sworn as a wit-
ness for himself on the ground that he was disqualified to testify
as an interested party. The preclusion of the defendant from
testifying under oath as a witness, taken together with the cessa-
tion of the practice of conducting an examination of the un-
sworn defendant, meant that there was no longer any regular
means of eliciting information from the accused in the course of
trial. Defendants retained opportunities to make known their
version of the events in the course of presenting a defense and in
their closing statements to juries, but these opportunities dimin-
ished with the increased availability of counsel and the broaden-,
ing scope of counsel's role at trial. Overall, these developments
had unfortunate consequences both for the protection of the in-
nocent and the conviction of the guilty which were not ade-
quately addressed until the enactment of statutes abrogating the
testimonial incapacity of defendants in the late nineteenth
century.30
While the general tendency of the development in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was to silence the defendant at
trial-whether or not he wished to talk-the defendant never-
theless remained a highly important source of evidence because
he was amenable to pretrial interrogation, and the results of
such interrogations were admissible at trial. The practice of pre-
trial interrogation in this period provides the proper historical
counterpart to the practice of custodial police interrogation ad-
29. See L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 283-85, 313-20, 323; L. MAYERS, supra note 25, at
14-16; Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 9-11
(1949).
30. See L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 321, 324; L. MAYERS, supra note 25, at 16-18; 1 J.
STEPHEN, supra note 25, at 440-46; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 43, 45-48.
As the sources cited in this note indicate, the exemption of defendants from testimony
under oath originated as a means of maintaining the distinction between jury trials and
the older institution of trial by compurgation, under which a person could meet a crimi-
nal charge by swearing to his innocence and finding a sufficient number of "compurga-
tors" who were willing to do the same. The disqualification-for-interest rationale was
initially applied to this exemption in the seventeenth century.
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dressed in Miranda, and sheds significant light on the historical
understanding of the right embodied in the fifth amendment.
c. The right in pretrial interrogation- The formulation of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights preceded the rise of pro-
fessional police forces in England and the United States by
about half a century. The constables who made arrests in that
period were not authorized to question the suspects they took
into custody. Rather, that function was carried out in the pre-
liminary examination of the accused, which was normally con-
ducted by justices of the peace or other judicial officers.
The legal basis for such examinations was initially provided
by statutes enacted in 1554 and 1555 which directed that per-
sons accused of felonies be brought before justices of the peace
for questioning. The use of such examinations became the gen-
eral practice in both England and the American colonies, and
confessions and other statements obtained from defendants in
the course of these examinations were important sources of
evidence."1
The applicability of the right signified by the maxim nemo
tenetur prodere seipsum at the preliminary examination was
clearly recognized. A magistrate was forbidden to question a sus-
pect under oath at his examination, and early strictures also ap-
peared against inducing a suspect to talk by such means as tor-
,ture or imprisonment."s
As a later historical development, a rule or practice emerged
in eighteenth century English decisions limiting the admissibil-
ity of pretrial confessions obtained by threats or promises ("in-
voluntary" confessions). This was understood specifically to
render inadmissible confessions obtained by threats of punish-
ment or false promises of immunity."s Like the prohibition of
31. See J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 134,
339-41, 565, 633-36, 653-56 (1944); L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 29-30, 35, 325; L. MAYERS,
supra note 25, at 16, 175-76, 179-80; A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 48-
49, 55-56, 59-60 (1930); G. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 44; Kauper, Judicial Examination
of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1231-33, 1235-
36 (1932); Morgan, supra note 29, at 14, 19.
32. See J. GoEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 31, at 339-40, 653; L. LEVY, supra note
25, at 33-36, 107, 325-28, 341-42, 345-48, 354-56, 375, 406; A. ScoTT, supra note 31, at 55-
56 & n.29.
33. See L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 325-29; Morgan, supra note 29, at 15-18.
Defendants were granted immunity in the eighteenth century for the same reason as
,today-to induce them to confess and give evidence against suspected accomplices. See
J. GoEEgL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 31, at 639-41; L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 384-85,
388-89; see also id. at 399-400, 402-04. As the sources cited at the beginning of this note
indicate, English courts became willing in the course of the eighteenth century to enter-
tain challenges to the admissibility of a confession on the ground that it had been ob-
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compelling a person to answer potentially incriminating ques-
tions (the nemo tenetur right, in its later signification), this evi-
dentiary rule served as an inhibition on coercive interrogations.
It was, however, predicated on the distinct rationale that the un-
reliability of coerced confessions as evidence of guilt barred their
use at trial."
In all of these rules, the occurrence of actual compulsion or
coercion was an essential requirement.3 5 The questioning of sus-
pects at the preliminary examination could have an aggressive
character, and a defendant's statements were not rendered inad-
missible by the magistrate's failure to observe an elaborate set of
prophylactic rules or by the presence of other psychological
pressures or incentives that might induce a suspect to talk.
There was no right on the part of the suspect to refuse to be
questioned, no right to counsel, no requirement that the suspect
be advised that he was not required to answer questions, and no
insulation of the suspect who had refused to answer questions at
the preliminary examination from disclosure of that fact at
trial.36 The author of the most comprehensive historical study of
the fifth amendment has summarized the general position of the
common law on this point as follows:
The fact must be emphasized that the right in question
was a right against compulsory self-incrimination, and,
tained in return for a promise of relief from the risk of punishment which had not been
kept.
34. See L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 327-28; Morgan, supra note 29, at 17-18.
In contrast, rationalizations of the "nemo tenetur" right in common law sources com-
monly related to the supposed cruelty of forcing a person to act against his own penal
interest, regardless of any question of jeopardy to the innocent. In line with the coerced
confession doctrine's purpose of safeguarding the reliability of the factfinding process at
trial, it was held that evidence discovered or obtained as the result of such a confession
was admissible, since the coercion that rendered the confession itself too unreliable to
use would not affect the reliability of evidence derived from it. See Morgan, supra note
29, at 17.
35. From a contemporary perspective, this point may appear less evident in connec-
tion with the rule barring examination of a suspect under oath than in connection with
the rules barring the use or threatened use of torture or criminal purnishment as a
means of extorting confessions. However, as at present, refusal to take an oath which
could lawfully be administered would result in liability for contempt, and exposure to
punishment for contempt or perjury would result from a violation of an oath to answer
all questions truthfully once such an oath had been taken. Moreover, the oath was re-
garded as a particularly fearsome form of compulsion by the members of a conventional
religious society, who would expect damnation as the price for forswearing God by violat-
ing an oath to answer an interrogator's questions truthfully. See L. LEVY, supra note 25,
at 23-24, 63-64, 101-105, 127, 134, 151, 154-55, 166, 176-78, 215, 250, 275-76.
36. See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B.& C. 37, 107 Eng. Rep. 15 (1822); L. LEvY, supra note
25, at 325; L. MAYERs, supra note 25, at 10, 16, 175, 188, 223-24; Morgan, supra note 29,
at 14, 16-18.
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excepting rare occasions when judges intervened to pro-
tect a witness against incriminating interrogatories, the
right had to be claimed by the defendant. Historically it
has been a fighting right: unless invoked, it offered no
protection. It vested an option to refuse answer but did
not bar interrogation nor taint a voluntary confession as
improper evidence. Incriminating statements made by a
suspect at the preliminary examination or even at ar-
raignment could always be used with devastating effect
at his trial. That a man might unwittingly incriminate
himself when questioned in no way impaired his legal
right to refuse answer. He lacked the right to be warned
that he need not answer, for the authorities were under
no legal obligation to apprise him of his right. That re-
form did not come in England until Sir John Jervis's Act
in 1848, and in the United States more than a century
later the matter was still a subject of acute constitutional
controversy. Yet if the authorities in eighteenth-century
Britain and in her colonies were not obliged to caution
the prisoner, he in turn was not legally obliged to reply.
His answers, although given in ignorance of his right,
might secure his conviction, but by the mid-eighteenth
century the courts, at least at Westminster, were willing
to consider the exclusion of confessions that had been
made involuntarily or under duress.
3 7
2. Formulation and Adoption of the Fifth Amendment
With the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1776, the
states adopted constitutions, which incorporated to varying de-
grees enumerations of the rights of defendants in criminal cases.
The Virginia constitution contained the prototype on the right
-against self-incrimination, providing in its Declaration of Rights
that "in all capital or criminal prosecutions" a man cannot "be
compelled to give evidence against himself." Eight other states
incorporated similar provisions in their constitutions, albeit with
variations in wording in some instances.3 8
Thus, when the time came to formulate a Bill of Rights for
the federal Constitution, there was ample precedent for regard-
37. L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 375.
38. See id. at 405-06, 409-10.
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ing the right against compulsory self-incrimination as a principle
of constitutional stature. For the contemporaneous understand-
ing of the nature and scope of this right, one must look primar-
ily to its common-law background. No records have been pre-
served of the debates in the state legislatures relating to the
ratification of the Bill of Rights which shed any light on this
question. However, some relevant information does appear in
the records of the state ratification conventions concerned with
the original Constitution, and of the debates in Congress relating
to the proposal of the Bill of Rights.
a. The state ratification conventions- The federal Consti-
tution as originally proposed did not, of course, contain any ex-
tensive enumeration of rights. The adverse reaction to this omis-
sion that was evident in the course of the ratification process led
to the addition of the Bill of Rights, which became effective in
1791. Four of the state conventions that ratified the original Con-
stitution-those in Virginia, New York, Rhode Island, and
North Carolina-had called for the addition of an amendment
relating to self-incrimination, in each case in substantially the
same terms as the corresponding provision in the Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights. 9 Significant discussion of the issue occurred
only in the Virginia convention, though it was also briefly men-
tioned in the Massachusetts convention.
In the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry delivered a fiery
speech concerning the need for a bill of rights raising, among
other concerns, the objection that in the absence of such
restrictions:
Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in
preference to that of the common-law. They may intro-
duce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany-of tor-
turing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say
that they might as well draw examples from those coun-
tries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that
there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of gov-
ernment, that they must have a criminal equity, and ex-
tract confession by torture, in order to punish with still
more relentless severity.4
Another delegate, George Nicholas, responded to this oration
by expressing skepticism concerning the utility of paper barriers
39. See III ELLIOT'S DEBATES 658 (Virginia); I ELLIOT'S DEBATES 328 (New York); I
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 334 (Rhode Island); IV ELLIOT'S DEBATES 243 (North Carolina).
40. III ELLIOT'S DEBATES 447-48.
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to governmental abuses, including torture. The author of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, George Mason, misunderstood
Nicholas as claiming that there was no prohibition of torture in
the state constitution. He pointed to the provisions of the Vir-
ginia constitution relating to self-incrimination and cruel and
unusual punishment as showing the contrary, noting that evi-
dence was extorted from defendants in countries that used tor-
ture. Nicholas responded that Mason was right that confessions
were extorted in countries that used torture, but reiterated his
belief that a bill of rights would not provide security against
such abuses. This concluded the discussion.4"
In the Massachusetts convention, a delegate opposing the
Constitution objected that Congress would be free under the
proposed document to emulate the Spanish Inquisition. In sup-
port of this contention, he pointed out that there was no limita-
tion on the imposition of inhuman punishments on persons con-
victed of crimes, and that "[t]here is nothing to prevent
Congress from passing laws which shall compel a man, who is
accused or suspected of a crime, to furnish evidence against him-
self."'42 However, the Massachusetts convention was evidently
not persuaded, and did not propose any relevant amendments.
Beyond the discussions in the Virginia and Massachusetts
conventions described above, and a passing reference to poten-
tial "Star Chamber Court" abuses in the New York conven-
tion,43 no other recorded allusion to the right against self-incrim-
ination occurred in the debates at the state conventions.
b. Proceedings in Congress- In 1789, James Madison intro-
duced proposed amendments to the Constitution in the House
of Representatives in response to the grievances that had been
expressed in the ratification process relating to the original Con-
stitution. As originally proposed by Madison, the self-incrimina-
tion provision provided that "[n]o person . . . shall be com-
pelled to be a witness against himself." Following referral to a
committee, Madison's proposals were taken up on the House
floor. A representative from New York, John Laurence, objected
that the provision relating to self-incrimination should "be con-
fined to criminal cases." The probable purpose of this change
was to make it clear that a person could be compelled to give
evidence that would expose him to civil liability. Laurence's
41. See id. at 451-52.
42. II ELLIOrr'S DEBATES 111.
43. II ELLIOTT'S DEBATES 400.
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amendment was adopted by the House without recorded
debate."
In the Senate, the provisions of the proposed Bill of Rights
relating to the trial stage of criminal proceedings were grouped
into the sixth amendment. The placement of the right against
self-incrimination in the fifth amendment may accordingly have
reflected a purpose to make it applicable at pretrial stages, a
point that would be consistent with the common-law scope of
the right."5
In sum, the limited direct evidence associated with the formu-
lation of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights shows a concern
with the possibility of the grossest inquisitorial abuses, and par-
ticularly with the possibility that the federal government might
resort to torture to extract confessions in the absence of a con-
stitutional inhibition on doing so. Further illumination of the
historical understanding of the fifth amendment's right against
compelled self-incrimination must depend on its relationship to
the common-law right from which it was derived. In relation to
pretrial interrogation, this right, as noted above, was nothing
more than a prohibition of actually compelling a person to in-
criminate himself.
B. Historical Practice And Case Law Under The Fifth
Amendment Prior To Miranda
In the course of the nineteenth century, the common-law in-
stitution of preliminary examinations by judicial officers passed
into history, and the focus of the law shifted to the new institu-
tion of police interrogation. Salient features of the Supreme
Court's case law prior to the 1960s included a consistent position
that the fifth amendment does not apply to the states, and a
preference for resolving questions of the admissibility of pretrial
statements in federal proceedings on the basis of non-constitu-
tional evidentiary doctrines. The Court did, however, consider
cases which raised questions concerning the procedures that
were later imposed by the Miranda decision-such as warnings
and a right to counsel-and held uniformly that such procedures
were not required in pretrial interrogation.
The traditional standards began to break down in the early
1960s, when the Supreme Court entered an activist phase in
44. See L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 422, 424-26.
45. See id. at 426-27; see also supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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which history and precedent counted for little. In Escobedo v.
Illinois, s the Court indicated for the first time that a warning to
the suspect or the assistance of counsel would in some circum-
stances be required in police interrogations. The Court also bor-
rowed from extra-judicial sources in its creative efforts, appro-
priating the warnings that the FBI gave to suspects in 1966 as a
matter of administrative policy, and conferring quasi-constitu-
tional status on them in the Miranda decision. The same period
was characterized by intense interest by law reform bodies and
legislatures in defining new standards for police interrogations,
but this legal ferment was cut off when the Court imposed its
own standards in Miranda.
1. The General Development
a. The transition from judicial interrogation to police inter-
rogation- The termination of pretrial questioning by magis-
trates was the decisive post-constitutional event that has deter-
mined the contemporary character of pretrial interrogation and
has shaped the legal issues presented in its practice. With the
organization of police forces in the nineteenth century, the
detective and investigative functions that had previously been
discharged by justices of the peace were taken up by the police,
and the role of magistrates was confined to adjudicatory func-
tions. By the middle of the nineteenth century, most jurisdic-
tions had terminated pretrial interrogation by judicial officers,
and the remainder followed suit in succeeding decades. The pre-
liminary examination or hearing, which had previously been the
essential vehicle for obtaining information from suspects, was
transformed into an optional proceeding at which the defendant
could avail himself of the opportunity to respond to the charges
against him, but was under no pressure to do so. The locus of
interrogation moved from the courtroom to the stationhouse.47
The early consequences of this shift in institutional responsi-
bility were not benign. The use of "third degree" methods by
46. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
47. See L. MAYERS, supra note 25, at 16, 86-87, 100-02, 175-76, 223-24; G. WILLIAMS,
supra note 25, at 44-45; Kauper, supra note 31, at 1235-39.
While most jurisdictions had terminated pretrial interrogation by judicial officers by
the mid-nineteenth century, it persisted in some for several decades thereafter. In the
federal jurisdiction in the United States this practice apparently continued at least until
the end of the nineteenth century. See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896)
(interrogation of murder suspect by United States commissioner).
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the police to obtain confessions became common, and persisted
as a widespread practice until at least the 1930s. These abuses
were documented in 1931 in the Report on Lawlessness in Law
Enforcement of the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement (the eleventh report of the "Wickersham Com-
mission"). The consultants' report for the Commission on this
issue concluded:
I. EXISTENCE- The third degree-the inflicting of
pain, physical or mental, to extract confessions or state-
ments-is widespread throughout the country.
II. PHYSICAL BRUTALITY- Physical brutality is exten-
sively practiced. The methods are various. They range
from beating to harsher forms of torture. The commoner
forms are beating with the fists or with some implement,
especially the rubber hose, that inflicts pain but is not
likely to leave permanent visible scars.
III. PROTRACTED QUESTIONING- The method most
commonly employed is protracted questioning. By this
we mean questioning-at times by relays of question-
ers-so protracted that the prisoner's energies are spent
and his powers of resistance overcome. At times such
questioning is the only method used. At times the ques-
tioning is accompanied by blows or by throwing continu-
ous straining light upon the face of the suspect. At times
the suspect is kept standing for hours, or deprived of
food or sleep, or his sleep is periodically interrupted to
resume questioning.
IV. THREATS- Methods of intimidation adjusted to
the age or mentality of the victim are frequently used
alone or in combination with other practices. The threats
are usually of bodily injury. They have gone to the ex-
treme of procuring a confession at the point of a pistol or
through fear of a mob.
V. ILLEGAL DETENTION- Prolonged illegal detention is
a common practice. The law requires prompt production
of a prisoner before a magistrate. In a large majority of
the cities we have investigated this rule is constantly
violated.48
48. NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESS-
NESS IN LAW ENPORCEMENT 153 (1931).
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The corrective to these abuses proposed by the Wickersham
Commission was a return to a variant of the common law system
of pretrial interrogation by judicial officers:
Probably the best remedy for [the third degree] would be
the enforcement of the rule that every person arrested
[and] charged with a crime should be forthwith taken
before a magistrate, advised of the charge against him,
given the right to have counsel and then interrogated by
the magistrate. His answers should be recorded and
should be admissible in evidence against him in all subse-
quent proceedings. If he choose[s] not to answer, it
should be permissible for counsel for the prosecution and
for the defense, as well as for the trial judge, to comment
on his refusal. The existing rule in many jurisdictions
which forbids counsel or court to comment on the failure
of the accused to testify in his own behalf should be
abolished."'
Neither the Wickersham Commission's proposal nor any other
basic institutional changes in pretrial interrogation took place
following the issuance of its report. Nevertheless, the practice of
police interrogation ameliorated in the course of time, and the
extreme abuses addressed by the Commission had generally dis-
appeared by the time of the Miranda decision. In 1967, the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice reported that "today the third degree is almost
nonexistent" and referred to "its virtual abandonment by the
police.
'50
b. The fifth amendment and coerced confessions- Since
the fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
did not apply to the states until 1964, 51 the question of its rele-
vance to the admissibility of a defendant's pretrial statements
was limited to federal proceedings throughout most of the na-
tion's history. Even in relation to federal proceedings, however,
the Court rarely approached this issue in fifth amendment terms
prior to the 1960s. In the earliest cases, starting in the late nine-
teenth century, questions of admissibility were resolved on the
basis of the traditional rule of evidence excluding involuntary
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967). See F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED
WOUND 22 (1970).
51. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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confessions. In a later line of cases, running from the early 1940s
to the late 1950s, questions of this sort were approached in
terms of an exclusionary rule that the Supreme Court created to
enforce the requirements of federal statutory law that an ar-
rested person be brought promptly before a magistrate.
Sparf v. United States2 exemplifies the approach of the earli-
est cases. The case involved the disappearance of the second
mate of an American vessel on the high seas. Three members of
the crew, who were suspected of killing him and throwing the
body overboard, were kept in irons on the way back to the
United States. At trial, the captain and two crew members testi-
fied concerning admissions made to them by one of the defen-
dants while under restraint during the voyage back. The Court
found that this testimony was proper on the ground that the
confession was voluntary in the legally relevant sense. The dis-
cussion in the decision suggested that the confession would have
been considered involuntary, and hence inadmissible, only if it
had been obtained by threats of punishment or by violence, or
by representations calculated to create hope in the suspect that
he would escape punishment if he talked."
In 1897, however, the Court rendered a decision that departed
sharply from prior and subsequent decisions both in its reliance
on a constitutional rationale and in its expansive view of the
types of pressures on a suspect that would make a confession
inadmissible. Brain v. United States" involved a triple mur-
der-of the captain, the captain's wife, and the second mate-on
an American vessel on the high seas. The first mate, Bram, was
seized and put in irons after being inculpated by a crew member,
Brown, who had also come under suspicion. When the ship
reached Halifax, Bram was taken into custody by the police and
questioned by a police detective. The detective was later allowed
to testify at trial concerning the results of that questioning as
follows:
When Mr. Brain came into my office I said to him:
"Bram, we are trying to unravel this horrible mystery." I
said: "Your position is rather an awkward one. I have had
Brown in this office and he made a statement that he saw
52. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
53. See id. at 55-56. The other nineteenth century cases that approached the admissi-
bilitv of a defendant's pretrial statements purely as a question of the law of evidence
were Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355
(1896); and Hopt v. Utah Territory, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
54. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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you do the murder." He said: "He could not have seen
me; where was he?" I said: "He states he was at the
wheel." "Well," he said, "he could not see me from
there." I said: "Now, look here, Brain, I am satisfied that
you killed the captain from all I have heard from Mr.
Brown. But," I said, "some of us here think you could not
have done all that crime alone. If you had an accomplice,
you should say so, and not have the blame of this horri-
ble crime on your own shoulders." He said: "Well, I
think, and many others on board the ship think, that
Brown is the murderer; but I don't know anything about
it." He was rather short in his replies. 55
The Court found the admission of this testimony to be error
and reversed Brain's conviction. The Court asserted that:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States,
wherever a question arises whether a confession is incom-
petent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by
that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, commanding that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."56
The Court further stated that "the generic language of the
'[Fifth] Amendment was but a crystallization of the doctrine [ex-
cluding involuntary] confessions. "" The Court found that this
doctrine had been violated under the facts of the case: Brain's
remarks were a confession in the relevant sense, since his state-
ment that Brown "could not see me from there," if not just a
matter of careless wording, could be understood as an inadver-
tent admission of guilt. The confession had been improperly ob-
tained by placing Brain in fear since reminding him of Brown's
accusation against him, in the context of a custodial interroga-
tion, would "produce upon his mind the fear that if he remained
silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, and therefore
render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty
person."58
In reaching these conclusions, the Court made a number of
critical errors:
55. Id. at 539.
56. Id. at 542.
57. Id. at 543.
58. Id. at 562-64.
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First, the Court's characterization of the fifth amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination as a codification of
the coerced confessions doctrine was simply wrong as a matter of
history. The obvious common-law antecedent of the fifth
amendment right was not the evidentiary doctrine excluding in-
voluntary confessions, but the rule against compelling a person
to answer potentially incriminating questions ("nemo tenetur
prodere seipsum"). The latter rule had emerged in a fairly ma-
ture form a century and a half before the formulation of the Bill
of Rights. The confessions doctrine, in contrast, is only known to
have existed in the period preceding the Constitution from a few
eighteenth century English sources, and there is no direct evi-
dence of its application by any American court in that period. 9
Second, the interrogation Brain was subjected to would not
have been regarded as improperly coercive under any relevant
legal doctrine at the time of the ratification of the fifth amend-
ment. While the Court found an impermissible threat in the
conditions of Bram's interrogation that supposedly created an
apprehension on his part that he would be thought guilty and
prosecuted if he did not respond to the accusation against him,
such a "threat" was implicit in every pretrial interrogation in
the common-law period. If a suspect brought before a justice of
the peace for examination failed to give answers that were suffi-
cient to rebut the charges of the complaining witnesses and to
persuade the justice to discharge him, then he would be commit-
ted or bailed and a prosecution against him would proceed.
Moreover, any refusal on the part of the suspect to answer the
magistrate's questions would be disclosed to the jury when the
results of the examination were reported at trial and could count
against him heavily in the final determination of guilt or
innocence.6 0
The anomalies of the Brain decision are sufficiently great that
no explanation of it in purely legal terms seems possible. Per-
haps the most plausible explanation is that a majority of the
59. See supra Parts I.A.1.b-c.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. The Court in Brain also discerned an
impermissible "promise" in the detective's exhortation to Brain to identify accomplices
so as not to bear the blame "on (his] own shoulders." The ground was that Bram might
have understood the remark as indicating that he would obtain a mitigation of punish-
ment if he complied. See 168 U.S. at 564-65. However, this remark came after Brain's
arguably inculpatory statement that his accuser "could not see me from there", Since
Brain's only subsequent statement was his purely exculpatory assertion that he and
others considered Brown the guilty party, it could not rationally be believed that the
detective's exhortation compelled Brain to be a witness against himself. See id. at 570-71
(dissenting opinion).
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Justices doubted Brain's guilt and, considering that he was
under sentence of death, felt impelled to contrive some rationale
for overturning his conviction. In reaching this result the Court
did, however, rely on some real doctrinal developments in the
law of confessions.
From its meager eighteenth century origins, the rule excluding
involuntary confessions had expanded enormously in the first
half of the nineteenth century, to the point where "the courts
were disposed to take almost any opportunity to exclude evi-
dence of confessions, almost anything being treated as an in-
ducement to confess.' This trend reversed itself in the mid-
nineteenth century, but the expansive notion of involuntariness
that emerged in the early nineteenth century decisions contin-
ued to exert a selective influence on judicial decisions for some
time thereafter.6
In explicating the voluntariness requirement, the Court in
Bram relied primarily on cases and treatises which reflected the
maximalist nineteenth century version of that doctrine-which
it mistakenly believed to be consistent with the corresponding
doctrine at the time of the Constitution-and was also appar-
,ently influenced by nineteenth century legislative developments
that abolished pretrial interrogation by judicial officers.6 3 Thus,
the analysis in Bram involved a referral back to the time of the
Constitution of post-constitutional developments in the involun-
tary confessions doctrine, taken together with the Court's mis-
taken belief that the fifth amendment was a codification of that
doctrine.64
61. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 25, at 447; see 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 819, 820
(Chadbourn rev. 1970).
62. See 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 25, at 446-47.
63. See 168 U.S. at 549-61.
64. The earliest known American decision that alluded to the doctrine excluding in-
voluntary confessions, Commonwealth v. Dillon, 4 Dall. 116 (Pa. 1792), is instructive
concerning the narrow ambit of that doctrine in the eighteenth century. The case in-
volved a twelve-year-old boy accused of arson, who had confessed in a preliminary exam-
ination before the mayor of Philadelphia. On the day of the examination at which he
confessed and on the preceding day, he had been visited and interrogated by "several
respectable citizens" who urged him to confess and represented that he would "proba-
bly" be pardoned if he did so. The report of the case further stated that the "inspectors
of the prison endeavored, likewise, to obtain from him a discovery of his offenses, and of
'his accomplices." The inspectors "carried him into the dungeon; . . . they said that he
would be confined in it dark, cold, and hungry, unless he made a full disclosure; but if he
did make a disclosure, he should be well accommodated with room, fire, and victuals,
and might expect pity and favour." Despite these appalling circumstances, the court held
that the confession "was freely and voluntarily made, was fairly and openly received,
before the mayor; and, therefore, it was regularly read in evidence."
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The writings of Wigmore and others subsequently exposed the
historically insupportable assumptions of the Brain decision,
and the Court did not rely on its constitutional rationale or its
expansive analysis of the notion of involuntariness in later cases.
It did, however, continue to be cited on the general proposition
that compulsion or coercion in pretrial interrogation would af-
fect the admissibility of resulting statements. In Hardy v.
United States,65 for example, Bran was cited for the proposition
that objection could be made to the admission of "statements
which are obtained by coercion or threat or promise". 6 In Wan
v. United States,67 the Court actually excluded a defendant's
statements on the authority of Bran. The case concerned the
admissibility of statements obtained from a seriously ill suspect
who had been detained and interrogated relentlessly over a pe-
riod of about two weeks. The Court held that the fact that the
defendant's statements were not induced by a promise or threat
did not necessarily mean that they were voluntary and stated,
citing Bran, that "a confession obtained by compulsion must be
excluded whatever may have been the character of the compul-
sion, and whether the compulsion was applied in a judicial pro-
ceeding or otherwise." The extreme facts of the case obviated
the need for any more detailed consideration of what types of
pressures in pretrial interrogation would constitute "compul-
sion."
Following the Wan decision in 1924, the Supreme Court did
not decide any coerced confession cases relating to federal pro-
ceedings until the 1940s. When the Court turned to this subject
again, it did so on the basis of a new doctrine that was ex-
pounded in a line of decisions running from McNabb v. United
States8 to Mallory v. United States.69
The cases in this line rejected reliance on both the fifth
amendment and the traditional voluntariness standard, and in-
stead assessed questions of admissibility by reference to provi-
sions of federal statutory law relating to the production of ar-
rested persons before magistrates. In McNabb, the Court, as an
exercise of its supervisory power to prescribe rules of evidence
for the lower federal courts, created a rule excluding confessions
obtained by the interrogation of detained persons who were not
brought promptly before a magistrate. Following the promulga-
65. 186 U.S. 224 (1902).
66. Id. at 229.
67. 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
68. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
69. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
[VOL. 22:3 & 4
SPRING AND SUMMER 1989]
tion of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the same doc-
trine was reasserted in relation to Rule 5(a)'s requirement that
an arrested person be brought before a magistrate without un-
necessary delay. Under the earlier cases in this line it was un-
clear whether delay in production before a magistrate was in it-
self a sufficient ground to exclude statements obtained during
the period of delay, or whether the exclusion sanction would
only apply in the presence of additional unlawful or coercive
practices. Later decisions indicated, however, that "unnecessary
delay" alone was a sufficient basis for excluding resulting
statements.70
These decisions were widely perceived by members of Con-
gress to be excessive constraints on police interrogation.7 They
provided no fully secure period of time during which a suspect
could be questioned following his arrest, and opportunities for
effective questioning were unlikely to arise following the initial
appearance before a magistrate, given the likelihood of release
on bail and the possibility of obtaining counsel at that stage of
the proceedings. Ultimately, the McNabb-Mallory rule was lim-
ited by a provision of the same legislation that overturned Mi-
randa. Section 3501(c) of Title 18, enacted as part of Title II of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,72 pro-
vides that a voluntary confession by a person in custody is not
inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing the person
before a magistrate if the confession is made within six hours of
the arrest.
7 3
c. The inapplicability of the fifth amendment to the
states- The Supreme Court initially made the fifth amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination applicable to the
states in 1964.1' In earlier decisions, the Court had repeatedly
held that the fifth amendment did not apply to the states. Prior
to the 1960s, the Court had approached the admissibility of pre-
trial statements in state proceedings as a question of general
70. See id.; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); United States v. Mitchell,
322 U.S. 65 (1944); Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See generally 0. STEPHEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFES-
SIONS OF GUILT 63-67, 73-77 (1973); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 935, 984-96 (1966).
71. See generally F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 173-74 (veto by President Johnson in
1965 of legislation overturning Mallory in District of Columbia); 0. STEPHEN, supra note
70, at 68-72, 74-75, 81-89 (history of legislative proposals directed against McNabb-Mal-
.lory line).
72. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 88 Stat. 197, 210-11.
73. See generally infra Part II.B.2.
74. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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fourteenth amendment due process, using standards related to
the traditional rule of evidence barring involuntary confes-
sions.75
The Court first considered this question in Twining v. New
Jersey.7 6 The case involved a judge's comment at trial on the
defendants' failure to take the stand, which was permitted under
New Jersey procedure. The Court found it unnecessary to decide
whether adverse comment at trial on a defendant's silence would
violate the right against self-incrimination, because it concluded
that the fourteenth amendment did not make the fifth amend-
ment right applicable to the states.
The next relevant case was Palko v. Connecticut,77 in which
the Court considered whether the fifth amendment right against
double jeopardy applied to the states. In an opinion by Justice
Cardozo joined by seven other Justices, including Justice Black
(!) and Justice Brandeis, the Court held that it did not, stating
that the fourteenth amendment only made applicable to the
states rights which are "of the very essence of a scheme of or-
dered liberty. 7 8 In furnishing examples of rights that did not so
qualify, the Court singled out the right against compelled self-
incrimination:
Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that
a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impos-
sible without. . . the immunity from compulsory self-in-
crimination [citing Twining v. New Jersey]. This too
might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as
in the past there are students of our penal system who
look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a bene-
fit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy it alto-
gether. No doubt there would remain the need to give
protection against torture, physical or mental . . . .Jus-
tice, however, would not perish if the accused were sub-
ject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry.79
75. While the Supreme Court rejected the "incorporation" of the Self-Incrimination
Clause against the states prior to 1964, it bears emphasizing that the Miranda decision
rested on misinterpretations and misapplications of the fifth amendment itself. Its un-
soundness is independent of any question of the merits of the incorporation doctrine.
See generally infra Part II.A.
76. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
77. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
78. Id. at 325.
79. Id. at 325-26.
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In Adamson v. California," the Court again addressed the
question of adverse inferences from silence at trial. The case in-
volved a prosecutor's adverse comment-permitted under the
law of California-on the defendant's failure to take the stand
and respond to the evidence against him. The Court found it
unnecessary to reach the fifth amendment question because the
fifth amendment right was inapplicable to the states, but
strongly implied that comment of this type did not involve com-
pulsion in a sense offensive to any constitutional provision:
However sound may be the legislative conclusion that an
accused should not be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, we see no reason why com-
ment should not be made upon his silence. It seems quite
natural that when a defendant has opportunity to deny
or explain facts and determines not to do so, the prosecu-
tion should bring out the strength of the evidence by
commenting upon defendant's failure to explain or deny
it. The prosecution evidence may be of facts that may be
beyond the knowledge of the accused. If so, his failure to
testify would have little if any weight. But the facts may
be such as are necessarily in the knowledge of the ac-
cused. In that case a failure to explain would point to an
inability to explain.81
Finally, a number of decisions in the years preceding Malloy
v. Hogan reaffirmed the inapplicability of the fifth amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination to the states. In
Knapp v. Schweitzer,82 for example, the Court considered
whether the fifth amendment banned compulsion of testimony
in state grand jury proceedings under a grant of immunity, on
the ground that the immunity granted by the state would not
bar a federal prosecution based on that testimony. The Court
answered this question in the negative, holding again that the
fifth amendment is only a restraint on compulsion of testimony
by the federal government, and stating that "[i]t is plain that
the [fifth] amendment can no more be thought of as restricting
action by the States than as restricting the conduct of private
citizens."'83 In a still later decision reviewing a state proceeding,8"
.80. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
81. Id. at 56.
82. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
83. Id. at 380.
.84. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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the Court remarked that "[i]t is of course settled that a fifth
amendment privilege was not available to petitioner in the pre-
sent case.""8
The inapplicability of the fifth amendment to the states prior
to 1964 did not, however, mean that interrogation practices in
the states were entirely free of federal judicial oversight. Suffi-
ciently extreme coercive practices were held to render resulting
confessions inadmissible as a matter of fourteenth amendment
due process. The seminal decision was Brown v. Mississippi,86 in
which the Court overturned a murder conviction based on con-
fessions that had been obtained through torture (hanging and
whipping) as a violation of fourteenth amendment due process.
Between the time of Brown and the time of Miranda, the due
process standard was applied in dozens of cases. The general ap-
proach that emerged involved considering the intensity of the
pressures to which the suspect had been subjected, and factors
relevant to his capacity to resist such pressures, to determine
whether he had been deprived of the capacity for choice in mak-
ing the confession. Factors relating to the method of interroga-
tion that weighed against a finding of voluntariness and admissi-
bility included physical abuse, threats of violence, relentlessly
protracted and repeated interrogation, questioning during
lengthy periods of unlawful detention, deprivation of food and
sleep, and isolation of the suspect. Characteristics of the suspect
that weighed in the same direction included youth, lack of edu-
cation or intelligence, membership in a racial minority, poverty,
and psychological disabilities. The fact that a suspect was una-
ware of or had not been advised of his rights, and denial of ac-
cess to counsel, were also noted in a number of cases, but only as
two factors among many others bearing on the general determi-
nation of voluntariness.87
85. Id. at 118 n.1.
86. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
87. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49 (1962); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156
(1953); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55
(1951); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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2. Specific Issues
The procedural system for police interrogations created by the
Miranda decision involved four key elements-warnings, a right
to counsel, a right to have a defendant's pretrial silence con-
cealed from the trier, and a right to cut off questioning at will.
Each of these requirements was inconsistent with the position of
the common law and with case law preceding Miranda.
a. Warnings- At common law, there was no requirement
that a suspect be advised in pretrial interrogation that he could
remain silent or that his statements could be used against him.
The use of warnings of this type did, however, come into play in
connection with the abatement of judicial interrogation. As
noted earlier, most jurisdictions had terminated the preliminary
examination of suspects by magistrates by the mid-nineteenth
century, and the remainder followed suit in succeeding decades.
At the conclusion of this development, the only remaining ves-
tige of the once central institution of pretrial questioning by a
magistrate was a general practice of advising a suspect that he
could make a statement on his own behalf at a preliminary hear-
ing, but that he was not required to say anything and that any-
thing he did say could be used against him. In this context, the
function of the warnings was not to advise a suspect of his rights
prior to interrogation, but to make effective a judgment that
suspects should not be interrogated at all by judicial officers at
preliminary hearings.88
In England, the "Judges' Rules" have required since 1912 that
similar warnings be given to suspects in police interrogation,
though courts are not required to exclude statements obtained
in violation of the rules. 89 No comparable rules in police interro-
gation emerged in the United States. Prior to the 1960s, there
was no state or federal precedent supporting a requirement of
warnings in police interrogation."
88. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37, 47; FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) ("The magis-
trate . . .shall inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and
that any statement made by him may be used against him."); L. MAYERS, supra note 25,
at 100-01, 223-24; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 45.
89. See generally infra text accompanying notes 291-94.
90. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 n.9 (1943); L. MAYERS. supro
note 25, at 84 n.4 ("No American case has been found holding that admissions made hy
the defendant in response to questions of police or prosecutor must be excluded I.m
evidence at his trial on the ground that he had not been informed that he wed 1i,1
answer questions").
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The Supreme Court had considered the question of whether
warnings were required in pretrial interrogation as a matter of
federal law in two early cases, and had held that they were not.
Wilson v. United States" arose from a murder committed in
Indian country. The defendant Wilson, in response to question-
ing by a United States commissioner, gave exculpatory answers,
but these answers were used at trial to attack his defense on
grounds of inconsistency.
The defendant challenged the admission of these pretrial
statements. In essence, his complaint was that his interrogation
had violated most of the rules that were imposed seventy years
later in the Miranda decision. He had not been advised that he
need not answer; he had not been advised that his statements
could be used against him; he had not been advised of a right to
representation by counsel; and he had not in fact been afforded
counsel. The Supreme Court responded that the admissibility of
a defendant's statements depended on their voluntariness, and
that the absence of warnings and counsel would not warrant
their exclusion:
The . . . rule that the confession must be voluntary is
applied to cases where the accused has been examined
before a magistrate, in the course of which examination
the confession is made . . . . The fact that he is in cus-
tody and manacled does not necessarily render his state-
ment involuntary. . . . And it is laid down that it is not
essential to the admissibility of a confession that. . . the
person was warned that what he said would be used
against him, but on the contrary, if the confession was
voluntary, it is sufficient though it appears that he was
not so warned . ...
In the case at bar defendant was not put under oath,
and made no objection to answering the questions pro-
pounded. . . . He testified merely that the commissioner
examined him "without giving him the benefit of counsel
or warning him of his right of being represented by coun-
sel, or in any way informing him of his right to be thus
represented." He did not testify that he did not know
that he had a right to refuse to answer the questions, or
that, if he had known it, he would not have answered.
His answers were explanations, and he appeared not to
be unwilling to avail himself of that mode of averting
91. 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
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suspicion. It is true that, while he was not sworn, he
made the statement before a commissioner who was in-
vestigating a charge against him, as he was informed; he
was in custody but not in irons; there had been threats of
mobbing him the night before the examination; he did
not have the aid of counsel; and he was not warned that
the statement might be used against him or advised that
he need not answer. These were matters which went to
the weight or credibility of what he said of an incriminat-
ing character, but as he was not confessing guilt but the
contrary, we think that, under all the circumstances dis-
closed, they were not of themselves sufficient to require
his answers to be excluded on the ground of being invol-
untary as [a] matter of law.2
The Supreme Court again discussed the warnings question,
this time in explicitly constitutional terms, in Powers v. United
States,93 a prosecution for illegal distilling. At the preliminary
hearing before a United States commissioner, "the defendant,
without counsel and not having been instructed by the commis-
sioner, voluntarily, in his own behalf, testified . . . .- After the
defendant had given his account of the pertinent events, he was
asked by a deputy marshal who was present at the hearing
whether he had worked at a still on another occasion. The de-
fendant initially refused to answer the question, but answered in
the affirmative after being advised that he would be committed
to jail if he did not respond. The deputy marshal recounted this
admission at trial.
The Supreme Court held that requiring the defendant to an-
swer under threat of contempt at the preliminary hearing was
unobjectionable, since he had waived his fifth amendment right
by voluntarily testifying on his own behalf. The Court, relying
on Wilson v. United States, also had no problem with the fact
-that the defendant had not received warnings prior to his testi-
mony and had not had counsel:
The chief objection contended for in argument con-
cerns the admission in the District Court of the testi-
mony of the defendant before the commissioner. The ad-
mission of this testimony is claimed to have worked a
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under
92. Id. at 623-24.
93. 223 U.S. 303 (1912).
94. Id. at 311.
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the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which protects
him against self-incrimination. It appears from the bill of
exceptions that the defendant voluntarily took the stand
and testified in his own behalf. . .. We are of the opin-
ion that it was not essential to the admissibility of his
testimony that he should first have been warned that
what he said might be used against him. In Wilson v.
United States, Wilson was charged with murder. Before
a United States commissioner, upon a preliminary hear-
ing, he made a statement which was admitted at the trial.
He had no counsel, was not warned or told of his right to
refuse to testify, but there was testimony tending to show
that the statement was voluntary ....
In the present case . . the record shows that [the de-
fendant's] testimony was entirely voluntarily and under-
standingly given. Such testimony cannot be excluded
when subsequently offered at his trial. 5
Following these early decisions, it was taken as settled that
warnings were not required in pretrial interrogation as a condi-
tion on the admission of a defendant's statements.96 No contrary
suggestion appeared in the Supreme Court's decisions prior to
the case of Escobedo v. Illinois.7
b. The right to counsel- In Miranda v. Arizona, the Su-
preme Court created a right to counsel in police interrogations.
While this right was ostensibly based on the fifth amendment,
the Court cited precedents relating to the sixth amendment
right to counsel, and to counsel rights in state proceedings that
had been imposed as a matter of fourteenth amendment due
process. A brief review of developments in these areas is accord-
ingly relevant to an analysis of Miranda.
Under early English practice, the procedure in misdemeanor
prosecutions was similar to that in civil cases. Defendants were
allowed to retain counsel to represent them and to present a full
defense at trial. In felony cases, however, where the crown had a
stronger interest in conviction, the procedural deck was heavily
stacked against the accused. This included a narrowly limited
role for defense counsel, whose function in felony cases prior to
95. Id. at 313-14. See also Bilokumsky v. Todd, 263 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1923) (interro-
gation by law enforcement officer without admonition that person interrogated is enti-
tled to refuse to answer and to have counsel would not have rendered answers inadmissi-
ble in criminal case) (dictum).
96. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 509 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
97. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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the mid-eighteenth century did not extend beyond arguing
points of law. This approach was not repudiated by a formal en-
actment until a statute of 1836 authorized the presentation of a
defense at felony trials by retained counsel. Practice outstripped
theory in this development, however, and defense counsel in
England were actually allowed to perform most functions in the
presentation of a defense by the end of the eighteenth century."'
Throughout this period, the right to counsel in English proce-
dure was almost exclusively a right to retained counsel. The only
English enactment creating a right to appointed counsel prior to
the time of the American Constitution was a statute enacted in
1695, which required the appointment of counsel in treason
cases. This was plausibly a self-protective measure by members
of Parliament, who could readily imagine themselves and their
associates in the position of treason defendants if the political
winds should blow the wrong way.99
The English practice, and its adoption or modification by stat-
utory or constitutional enactments in most of the states, pro-
vided the background for the right to counsel that was incorpo-
rated in the sixth amendment. The original understanding of
this right differed from its contemporary interpretation in two
basic respects.
First, the right was a right to retained-not appointed-coun-
sel. This point appears, for example, from the original federal
statute relating to appointment of counsel. Enacted in
1790-seven months after Congress's proposal of the sixth
amendment and over a year and a half prior to its ratifica-
tion-the statute expressly limited its requirement of appointed
counsel to capital cases. The same point appears from state en-
actments preceding the Constitution. Only three states had pro-
visions requiring appointment of counsel-Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Delaware-and all three limited the requirement
to capital cases.100
Second, the sixth amendment right of the accused "to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense" was a right to retain
counsel for the purpose of assisting in a defense at trial. It did
not indiscriminately create a right to have counsel at any pre-
trial stage in which a defendant might find such assistance use-
98. See L. LEVY, supra note 25, at 320-23; W. BEANEY. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS 8-12, 24 (1955).
99. See W. BEANEY, supra note 98, at 9.
100. See id. at 16-18, 25, 28-29. Connecticut, however, had a unique practice of ap-
-pointing counsel for any defendant who could not retain counsel, and of advising defend-
ants of their right to counsel. See id. at 16, 25.
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ful, and did not, in particular, create a right to counsel at the
stage of pretrial interrogation. There was no right to counsel
under the common-law procedure of preliminary examinations,
and nothing in the history of the Bill of Rights or the colonial
enactments that preceded it suggested a purpose to extend such
a right to an early investigative stage at which it had not con-
ventionally been recognized.'0° Rather, the contrary appears
from the placement of the right to counsel in the sixth amend-
ment, which was formulated by the Senate as a compilation of
post-indictment and trial rights. 102
The Supreme Court had little occasion to consider the con-
tours of the sixth amendment right to counsel in the first cen-
tury and a half after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. It be-
came common in this period for federal judges to appoint
counsel for indigent defendants, but this was regarded as a mat-
ter of custom and discretion, rather than as one of constitutional
compulsion.
The historical understanding of the sixth amendment right
was altered by the Supreme Court in the decision of Johnson v.
Zerbst.k0 3 The decision, which was authored by Justice Black,
created a uniform right to appointed counsel in federal prosecu-
tions, and also created a novel constitutional rule that a defend-
ant must "competently and intelligently" waive his right to
counsel if a trial is to proceed without such representation.'"
Judge Friendly, characterizing the decision in Johnson v. Zerbst
as a "coup de main," has attributed its occurrence to the Justice
Department's sympathy with the results reached in the case as a
101. See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B.& C. 37, 107 Eng. Rep. 15 (1822) (no right to counsel
at preliminary examination). None of the state provisions preceding the Bill of Rights
referred to a right to counsel at that stage, and a number of them definitely character-
ized the right as a right to counsel at trial. The point is illustrated by the provisions of
the states whose ratification conventions had proposed an amendment to the Federal
Constitution safeguarding the right to counsel. These were Virginia, North Carolina, and
New York. See W. BEANEY, supra note 98, at 22-23. A Virginia statute of 1786 allowed
the accused to retain counsel to assist him at trial. Id. at 19. The New York Constitution
of 1777 stated that "in every trial . . . for crimes or misdemeanors, the party . . . in-
dicted shall be allowed counsel, as in civil practice." Id. at 20. North Carolina, by an act
of 1777, provided that "every person accused of any crime or misdemeanor whatsoever,
shall be entitled to counsel, in all matters which may be necessary for his defense as well
as to facts as to law." Id. at 19. The obvious purpose of the statute was to reject the
earlier English rule limiting the role of counsel in felony trials to argument of points of
law. The provisions of the remaining states are surveyed in id. at 18-22.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45; L. MAYERS, supra note 25, at 200 n.42.
103. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
104. See W. BEANEY, supra note 98, at 32-33, 36-44.
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matter of policy, and its resulting failure to advocate the con-
trary historical understanding effectively before the Court.'
In relation to state proceedings, the Supreme Court also pro-
ceeded to create federal rights to counsel in a line of decisions
running from Powell v. Alabama'l o to Gideon v. Wainwright.1
0 7
The earlier cases in this line, relying on fourteenth amendment
due process, established rights to counsel in capital cases and
other cases presenting "special circumstances." The concluding
decision in Gideon made the sixth amendment right to counsel
applicable to the states.
In relation to pretrial interrogation, however, the Court con-
sistently rejected a right to counsel prior to the 1960s. A claimed
right to counsel had initially been rejected in the context of a
preliminary examination by a judicial officer in Wilson v. United
States,08 which also rejected a requirement of warnings. 0 9 A
number of decisions reviewing state cases in the late 1950s held
ispecifically that there was no right to counsel in connection with
pretrial interrogation by law enforcement officers. Thus, in In Re
Groban,10 the Court held that counsel could be denied to per-
sons summoned by compulsory process to testify under oath
before a fire marshal concerning the circumstances of a possible
arson, where the testimony obtained from them could provide
the basis for arrest by the marshal and subsequent prosecution.
In two murder cases reviewed by the Court in 1958, Crooker v.
California and Cicenia v. Lagay,"' the Court held that there
was no constitutional violation in denying specific requests by
suspects in the course of police interrogation that they be al-
lowed to consult with retained counsel.
Despite the recent vintage of these decisions, the Supreme
Court proceeded to cast doubt on their continued validity in the
105. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
.929, 944-45 (1965); see also W. BEANEY, supra note 98, at 40-42.
106. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
107. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
108. 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92. Although the Supreme Court subse-
quently recast the sixth amendment right to counsel as a right to appointed counsel in
federal proceedings in Johnson v. Zerbst, this remained a post-indictment right prior to
the 1960s. See the advisory committee note to the original version of FED. R. CRIM. P. 44
("This rule is a restatement of existing law in regard to the defendant's constitutional
,right to counsel . . . . [It] is intended to indicate that the right of the defendant to have
counsel assigned by the court relates only to proceedings in court and, therefore, does
-not include preliminary proceedings before a committing magistrate."); Beaney, The
Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REV. 771, 776 (1961).
110. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
111. 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
Pretrial Interrogation
Journal of Law Reform
early 1960s. Following two decisions that recognized rights to
counsel, in narrowly defined circumstances, in pretrial judicial
proceedings at the state level,"' the Court took the major step
of extending the sixth amendment counsel right to purely non-
judicial pretrial contexts in Massiah v. United States' and Es-
cobedo v. Illinois."4 Crooker v. California and Cicenia v. Lagay
were finally overruled in Miranda.'
5
c. Adverse inferences from silence- In addition to creating
a requirement of warnings and a right to counsel in pretrial in-
terrogation, the Supreme Court in Miranda prohibited the ad-
mission at trial of a defendant's refusal to answer questions in
pretrial interrogation. The Court stated:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to
penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege when he is under police custodial interro-
gation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial
the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the
face of accusation."'
At the time of the Constitution, however, defendants were
subject to questioning before justices of the peace, and any fail-
ure to respond to the justice's questions could be admitted in
evidence.' In later times, courts in the United States ap-
proached this issue in terms of the general rule of evidence
which holds that a party's pretrial silence in the face of accusa-
tions or statements that he would naturally respond to can be
admitted at trial and made the basis for adverse inferences. The
majority rule in the states at the time of Miranda was that this
principle applied to the failure of a suspect in police custody to
respond to the evidence against him." 8
In relation to adverse comment on a defendant's failure to
take the stand at trial, the general resolution of this issue in the
112. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961). See generally Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 70, at 996-97;
Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illi-
nois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964).
113. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
114. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
115. 384 U.S. 436, 479 n.48 (1966).
116. Id. at 468 n.37.
117. See Morgan, supra note 29, at 14, 16-18; L. MAYERS, supra note 25, at 10, 16,
175, 180, 188; see also Kauper, supra note 31, at 1236 & n.67.
118. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 70, at 1038; Note,
Adoptive Admissions, Arrest and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Suggested
Constitutional Imperative, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 556, 557-58 & nn.11, 13 (1964).
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United States was decidedly in the other direction. In the com-
mon-law period, this question could not arise, as defendants
could not testify even if they wanted to."' With the enactment
of statutes abrogating the testimonial incapacity of defendants
in the second half of the nineteenth century, most states prohib-
ited adverse comment on a defendant's failure to avail himself of
the opportunity to testify. The same approach was followed in
the statute of 1878 eliminating testimonial incapacity in federal
proceedings,2 0 which includes a provision that a defendant's
failure to testify "shall not create any presumption against him."
The legislative history shows that this provision was meant to
preclude prosecutorial comment on a defendant's failure to take
the stand, and the Supreme Court later held that a defendant is
entitled under the statute to an affirmative instruction to the
jury that no adverse inference is to be drawn from his silence at
trial.''
The prohibition of adverse comment on a defendant's failure
to take the stand, though the predominant approach in the
United States, was frequently criticized by leading writers and
law reform commissions, and was rejected in the formulation of
model rules of evidence.' 2 2 By the 1960s, six states permitted ad-
verse comment on a defendant's silence at trial.'23
Throughout this period, the Supreme Court had no occasion
to rule on the consistency of this approach with the fifth amend-
ment. The constitutional issue did not arise in federal proceed-
ings, since the matter had been resolved by statute. In reviewing
state cases, the Court held that adverse comment on silence at
trial was consistent with general fourteenth amendment due
process, but did not reach the fifth amendment issue on the
ground that the amendment did not apply to the states.'2 4
The issue was brought to a head by the Court's "incorpora-
tion" of the fifth amendment against the states in Malloy v. Ho-
gan,'25 which made it possible to address the fifth amendment
issue in reviewing state cases. The Court did so in the following
119. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
120. Now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3481.
121. See L. MAYERS, supra note 25, at 21-23, 225; 7 CONG. REC. 385 (1878); Bruno v.
United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
122. See supra text accompanying note 49; Friendly, supra note 105, at 939 & n. 58;
L. MAYERS, supra note 25, at 22.
123. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272 n.2 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
124. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908); supra text accompanying notes 74-85.
125. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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year in Griffin v. California.126 In a decision remarkable for its
lack of any serious effort at justification, 27 the Court held in
Griffin that adverse comment on a defendant's refusal to testify
violated the fifth amendment right against compelled self-in-
crimination. Griffin provided the essential precedential basis for
Miranda's announcement in the following year of a correspond-
ing rule barring the use at trial of a defendant's pretrial silence
in custodial interrogation.
d. The right not to be questioned- A final innovation of the
Miranda decision was the creation of a right on the part of ar-
rested persons to prevent questioning. The Court stated: "If the
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or dur-
ing questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease . . If the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present."""8
The right not to be questioned was an addition to the tradi-
tional right to refrain from answering questions on grounds of
potential self-incrimination. At the time of the Constitution,
suspects had no right to cut off custodial interrogation, 29 and no
right of this sort was recognized in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions prior to Miranda. Crooker v. California130 and Cicenia v.
Lagay,"8I for example, involved suspects who stated in the
course of police questioning that they wanted to consult with
counsel, but were denied counsel and questioned anyway. The
Supreme Court held that their confessions resulting from the
questioning could properly be used against them.
3. The Prelude to Miranda
Changes in the Supreme Court's composition resulted in a pe-
riod of rapid innovation in the Court's constitutional case law in
the 1960s. The results of this development have continued to de-
termine the basic law of criminal investigation and adjudication
in the United States until the present. The salient features of
the Court's criminal procedure decisions in that period were (i)
indifference to history and precedent; (ii) a disposition to impose
126. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
127. See Friendly, supra note 105, at 938-40.
128. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
130. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
131. 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
[VOL. 22:3 & 4
SPRING AND SUMMER 1989
uniform federal standards precluding variation among the states
on specific procedural issues, as well as on broad questions of
principle; and (iii) the assumption of a de facto supervisory au-
thority over the executive, as well as the judicial, components of
the state and federal criminal justice systems, utilizing the ex-
clusion of evidence as the mechanism for enforcing the Court's
views concerning desirable procedures.
The law relating to self-incrimination provided fertile ground
for the expression of these tendencies. In Malloy v. Hogan,"2 for
example, the Court "incorporated" the fifth amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination against the states. The
practical effect of the decision in Malloy was to make the Su-
preme Court's prior and subsequent case law under the self-in-
crimination clause of the fifth amendment applicable to the
states in all of its particulars. Malloy overruled the contrary
holdings of various earlier decisions.1
33
Another case that departed from precedent in this area was
Jackson v. Denno.134 In that case the Court held unconstitu-
tional a common state procedure under which the judge would
submit the question of a confession's voluntariness to the jury in
cases in which the issue presented a fair question of fact, with
instructions to disregard the confession if it was found to be in-
voluntary, and otherwise to accord it such probative force as it
deserved. The Court held, in effect, that the judge must make an
affirmative finding of voluntariness with respect to a challenged
confession in a separate proceeding before the jury can hear of
it. This overruled the contrary holding of Stein v. New York. 35
In the area of police procedures two innovative decisions had
a particularly close relationship to the Miranda deci-
sion-Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois.
36
a. Massiah and Escobedo- Massiah was a narcotics traffick-
ing case. It turned on the admissibility of incriminating state-
ments made by the defendant Massiah to a confederate who, un-
beknownst to Massiah, was cooperating with the authorities.
The relevant conversation took place in the course of a continu-
ing investigation of the narcotics conspiracy in which Massiah
was believed to be involved. It occurred while Massiah was out
;132. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
133. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); supra text accompanying notes 74-
85.
134. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
135. 346 U.S. 156, 170-79 (1953).
.136. 377 U.S. 201 (1964) and 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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on bail, having retained counsel and having pleaded not guilty to
an indictment.
The Court reversed Massiah's conviction on the ground that
eliciting information from him in these circumstances violated
his sixth amendment right to counsel. The general import of the
decision was that statements obtained by a government agent
from an indicted defendant who has counsel are automatically
inadmissible against him if obtained without counsel present.
The Massiah decision was notable both as the initial exten-
sion of the right to counsel to the context of police investigation
or interrogation, and as an expression of the Court's willingness
in this period to impose debatable policy decisions in the guise
of constitutional interpretation. The police practice at issue in
the case obviously did not interfere with the ability of Massiah's
attorney to prepare his case and assist in his defense,'37 except
in the trivial and irrelevant sense that any successful effort to
obtain evidence against a suspect reduces the likelihood that he
can be successfully defended. The decision also cannot sensibly
be understood as resting on a principled objection to investiga-
tive methods of the sort employed in the case. Whatever dangers
might be thought to inhere in the use of undercover operatives,
it is difficult to see how they could be thought any greater in
connection with an indicted defendant who has counsel than in
connection with other persons suspected of crime. A more plau-
sible explanation of the decision is that it reflected a constitu-
tionalization and extension to a novel context of contemporary
conventions regarding dealings among attorneys:
Nothing goes quite as abrasively against the grain of law-
yers' thinking than efforts by one side of a controversy to
go behind the opposing attorney's back to weaken his
case through direct contacts with his client. In civil litiga-
tion it can lead to settlements that threaten the wronged
attorneys' fees as well as the strength of their cases, and
judges, having been lawyers themselves, consider it im-
propriety of the highest order. In Massiah's case the Su-
preme Court found it no less than a breach of the sixth
amendment's declaration that "in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." Potter Stewart,
who had once indicated his philosophical leanings by re-
137. See generally 377 U.S. at 209 (White, J., dissenting); Enker & Elsen, supra note
112, at 54-58.
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ferring to himself as "a lawyer," wrote the majority opin-
ion that overturned the conviction and declared the
statements inadmissible under the sixth amendment
. . . . [TIhe holding established the precedent that fully
voluntary admissions can be ruled out for failure of the
police to respect a suspect's right of counsel prior to
trial. ' 8
The final milestone on the road to Miranda was Escobedo v.
Illinois."39 Escobedo concerned the admissibility of statements
obtained from the defendant in police interrogation which
played a role in securing his conviction for murder. In the course
of questioning, Escobedo's repeated requests to consult with his
attorney were denied, in violation of state law.
The Court found the statements to be inadmissible on the
ground that, under the facts of the case, Escobedo had been de-
nied the sixth amendment right to counsel. This was an exten-
sion beyond the rule of Massiah,"° both because the interroga-
tion preceded indictment, and because it was a state case. The
Court formulated its holding in Escobedo as follows:
We hold . . . that where . . . the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has
been taken into police custody, the police carry out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting in-
criminating statements, the suspect has requested and
been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his ab-
solute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation
of the sixth amendment to the Constitution as "made ob-
ligatory upon the States by the fourteenth amendment"
[citing Gideon v. Wainwright], and that no statement
elicited by the police during the interrogation may be
used against him at a criminal trial."'
The Court did not set out the rationale for the various ele-
ments in the holding in a clear way, but some reasonable infer-
138. F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 163-64; see 377 U.S. at 210-11 (White, J.,
dissenting).
139. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
141. 378 U.S. at 490-91.
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ences can be drawn from the general discussion in the case. The
reference to the focus of the investigation on a particular suspect
and the fact of police custody reflected an effort to be consistent
with the sixth amendment's characterization of the right to
counsel as a right of "the accused" in "criminal prosecutions."
The reference to a process of interrogation that lends itself "to
eliciting incriminating statements" may have reflected a desire
to achieve some relationship to similar language in the Massiah
decision. The relevance to a sixth amendment violation of the
absence of an admonition concerning the suspect's "absolute
constitutional right to remain silent" is difficult to figure out.
However, the discussion suggested that it had something to do
with the fact that the defendant's lawyer could have advised him
of this right if he had been present.
The multiple conditions on the result in Escobedo and its en-
igmatic character prevented any certain predictions as to where
it would lead. It did, however, contain the first suggestion that
warnings might be a precondition to the admission of statements
given to the police, at least in certain circumstances, and the
first extension of some type of right to counsel to the earliest
stages of custodial police interrogation. The issues that had not
been resolved in Escobedo immediately became a focus of litiga-
tion in the lower courts, and cases raising these issues began to
pile up on the Supreme Court's docket. The Court directed its
clerk to hold the pending Escobedo cases, looking toward a later
major decision that would answer the questions that Escobedo
had raised. This set the stage for Miranda.42
b. The interrogation policy of the FBI- The centerpiece of
the Miranda decision was its imposition of a nationally uniform
requirement that suspects be advised of certain rights prior to
interrogation. It specifically required admonitions concerning a
right to remain silent; that any statement given might be used
against the suspect; that the suspect has a right to counsel; and
that free counsel will be provided if a suspect cannot afford to
hire an attorney. While some features of the Miranda system, as
discussed above, were foreshadowed to a limited degree by prior
decisions of the Court in the early 1960s, the warnings required
by Miranda were extra-judicial in origin. Specifically, they were
the warnings that Director J. Edgar Hoover had adopted as a
matter of administrative policy for use by the FBI in question-
ing suspects.
142. See F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 154-55, 172, 189.
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While the FBI warnings provided the model for Miranda's
central innovation, their interpretation and application were ba-
sically different from the Miranda system. The FBI policy re-
quired an admonition to suspects that they need not make a
statement, but there was no requirement that questioning cease
at once if a suspect expressed an unwillingness to talk. The only
counsel right relevant to interrogation that was recognized under
the FBI policy was the right to consult with retained counsel
mentioned in the third warning. The fourth warning, relating to
appointed counsel, was simply advice to indigent defendants
that they would be assigned counsel in subsequent judicial pro-
,ceedings.145 The warnings had no bearing on the admissibility of
the results of an interrogation, except as evidence that the sus-
pect had not been coerced. Errors and omissions were not pun-
ished by the exclusion of voluntary statements. Nevertheless,
the Court in Miranda characterized the FBI practice as "consis-
tent with" Miranda's procedure, and pointed to it as the princi-
,pal evidence that Miranda's requirements would not be difficult
to comply with or detrimental to law enforcement. " '
c. The ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure-
The years immediately preceding Miranda were characterized
by intense interest in the standards governing pretrial interroga-
tion on the part of public officials and members of the legal pro-
fession. This interest had been heightened by the Escobedo deci-
sion, which raised concerns that the Court in subsequent
decisions might prohibit all pretrial questioning without counsel
present, or might impose other restrictions that would effec-
tively end the practice of pretrial interrogation. Reform efforts
in this area had come to focus on the American Law Institute
(ALI), which was then at work on a Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure, with the cooperation of the American Bar As-
.sociation's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice.
The Reporters for this effort were James Vorenberg and Paul
Bator. The Associate Reporters were Charles Fried and Edward
Barrett.1"
143. See id. at 181-82; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 521 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
144. See 384 U.S. at 483-86.
145. See F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 173-74; ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MEN r PROCEDURE (Tentative Draft No. 1, March 1, 1966).
James Vorenberg was head of the Justice Department's Office of Criminal Justice, the
earliest predecessor office to the Office of Legal Policy, and executive director of the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. At the time
'this Report was written, Charles Fried was the Solicitor General.
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In early 1966, the ALl was presented, with the approval of its
Council, with a proposed draft of the Model Code that differed
significantly from the system that was imposed shortly thereaf-
ter in Miranda. It provided for a period of up to four hours in
which a suspect in custody could be questioned without counsel
present. This was subject to a number of safeguards against
abuse, including prohibitions against holding a suspect incom-
municado during that period, warnings to suspects that they
were not required to say anything and could only be detained for
a limited time, and a requirement that a sound recording be
made of the interrogation if it extended beyond a few brief ques-
tions. The ALl had taken no final action on this proposal at the
time of the Miranda decision. This was in part because the
Court's decision in that case was anticipated, and in part a re-
sult of the presence of Chief Justice Warren at the meeting at
which the proposal was considered.146
During oral argument in Miranda, it became apparent that a
majority of the Justices were unsympathetic to the position of
the thirty states that were participating in the case as parties or
amici curiae. Some hope remained that the legal ferment under-
way in'the area of pretrial interrogation and the likelihood of
legislative action would dissuade the Court from imposing its
own standards, but this hope was quashed:
[The] only chance seemed to lie in some thoughts that
Brennan had expressed in some speeches he had made,
back when the first protests were being heard against the
Court's criminal decisions. He had pointed out that the
Court had been forced to act because of the default of
everyone else. This was no longer true; interest was high
across the country on the subject of suspects' rights and
police authority, and the state legislatures could be ex-
pected to act as soon as the ALI completed its work on
the Pre-Arraignment Code. The lawyers urged the Court
to wait a while longer. Brennan maintained his silence,
but Hugo Black, speaking in soft, Southern tones that
carried to the rear of the hushed courtroom, dismissed
the subject with two questions: "What is that Model
Code? Is it in the Constitution?
147
146. See F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 174-75.
147. Id. at 178.
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Justice Black and the other members of the Miranda majority
apparently found it more logical to conclude that the warnings
used by the FBI in 1966 were "in the Constitution." The reason-
ing by which the Court reached this conclusion will be examined
in the next part of this Report.
II. THE DECISION IN Miranda v. Arizona AND SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS
In general character, the Miranda decision stood somewhere
between a code of procedure with commentary and a judicial de-
cision in the conventional sense. Chief Justice Warren, who de-
vised the detailed set of rules announced in the decision, ini-
tially drafted the opinion of the Court so as to make these rules
constitutional requirements. However, he was forced to accom-
modate Justice Brennan, who insisted that some latitude should
be left to legislatures to develop alternative rules counteracting
'the pressures of custodial interrogation.I 8 The final version of
-the opinion took the position that compulsion in violation of the
fifth amendment would necessarily occur if statements were ob-
tained from a suspect without special safeguards, but acknowl-
edged that the specific procedures prescribed by Miranda were
dispensable if it could be shown that other rules were equally
effective.
Congress quickly repudiated the Miranda decision, and some-
what later the Supreme Court rejected its underlying rationale,
following a change in the Court's membership. The legislative
response was 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a statute enacted in 1968 to over-
turn the Miranda decision and restore the pre-Miranda volunta-
riness standard for the admission of confessions. The Depart-
ment of Justice attempted to establish the validity of this
statute in litigation for several years with inconclusive results,
but ultimately snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by ter-
minating this litigative effort after an initial appellate decision " 9
which upheld the statute.
The Supreme Court's rejection of Miranda occurred in Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 50 which took the position that no violation of the
fifth amendment occurs if statements are obtained from a sus-
pect without observing Miranda's rules or any other safeguards,
148. See infra text accompanying notes 213-14.
149. United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
150. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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so long as actual coercion is avoided. This view, which has been
reiterated and relied on in later decisions, removed any intelligi-
ble doctrinal basis for applying Miranda's rules to the states, or
for failing to give 18 U.S.C. § 3501 effect in federal proceedings.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to apply Miranda's
standards in its decisions, apparently because no case has yet
required the Court to confront the full implications of its rejec-
tion of Miranda's essential premise.
A. The Miranda Decision
The title case in Miranda v. Arizona' 51 arose from Ernesto
Miranda's kidnapping and rape of an eighteen-year-old woman
in 1963. Miranda confessed to the crime shortly after being
taken in custody. He made no request to consult with counsel
while being interrogated, but was also not affirmatively advised
by the police that he had a right to do so. The confession was
admitted in evidence against him at trial.'52
The Supreme Court overturned Miranda's conviction, based
on the failure of the police to comply with a new set of rules that
were announced in the Miranda decision. The members of the
majority in the decision were Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Black, and Fortas. Justices White, Stewart,
Harlan, and Clark dissented. The specific rules promulgated by
the Court were as follows:
1. Warnings concerning a right to remain silent and poten-
tial adverse use of statements- A suspect in police custody
must be advised prior to questioning that he has a right to re-
main silent and that anything he says can be used as evidence
against him.
2. A right to counsel and related warnings- A suspect has a
right to have counsel present during questioning, and to free
counsel for that purpose if he cannot afford to retain counsel. A
suspect must also be advised of these rights prior to questioning.
3. Waiver- An interrogation cannot proceed unless the sus-
pect makes a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the
rights described in the required warnings. The government has a
heavy burden of proof in establishing that such a waiver
occurred.
151. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-93; L. BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS
3-14, 17, 22-24, 49, 191-94 (1983).
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4. A right not to be questioned- If a suspect indicates in
any manner, at any time, that he does not want to be ques-
tioned, then questioning must cease immediately. Likewise, if a
suspect indicates that he wants to consult with counsel, ques-
tioning must cease immediately and may not resume until coun-
sel is present.
5. Enforcement by the exclusion of statements- Violation
of any of the foregoing rules automatically bars the admission of
a suspect's statements against him at trial, whether the state-
ments are exculpatory or inculpatory in character.
6. No adverse use of silence- The fact that a suspect re-
mained silent or refused to answer questions may not be used by
the prosecution at trial.
In supporting these requirements, the Court adduced three
broad types of arguments. First, the decision purported to estab-
lish the constitutional necessity of a system of rules of this sort,
based on the applicability of the fifth amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination to custodial police interrogations,
and the contention that such interrogations invariably involve
violations of this right if such rules are not observed. Second,
the decision attempted to support the specific rules prescribed
by Miranda through reasoning from constitutional precedents,
most of which related to the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Third, the Court responded to the objection that it was foreclos-
ing legitimate legislative options by asserting that the specific
rules it had prescribed were not necessarily the only acceptable
means of complying with the fifth amendment. These three lines
of argument merit separate analysis.
1. The General Argument
The steps in Miranda's basic argument supporting the need
for its system of rules were as follows:
i. The fifth amendment's prohibition of compelled self-incrim-
ination governs the admissibility of pretrial statements obtained
in police interrogation at both the state and federal levels. The
constraints imposed by the fifth amendment's prohibition of
compulsion are broader than those imposed by the voluntariness
requirement under which such questions have been assessed in
prior decisions.
ii. Custodial police interrogation invariably involves compul-
sion in violation of the fifth amendment, unless its coerciveness
is negated by the observance of a set of rules like those set out
Pretrial Interrogation
Journal of Law Reform
in the decision. The need for such rules is demonstrated by the
occurrence of torture in police interrogation and by the abusive
methods that "police manuals" recommend for inducing sus-
pects to confess. Exculpatory, as well as inculpatory, statements
obtained in violation of these rules are inadmissible, since incon-
sistencies between facially exculpatory statements and other
statements or evidence may effectively incriminate a suspect.
iii. These rules will not be difficult for the police to follow or
unduly harmful to law enforcement. This is shown by the FBI's
existing practice of following the same rules, and by the obser-
vance of restrictive rules governing police interrogation in Eng-
land and other foreign jurisdictions.
a. The fifth amendment standard and the voluntariness
standard- The first step in the Court's general argument in
Miranda was its invocation of a fifth amendment standard in
assessing the admissibility of pretrial statements. The Court's
assertion that the fifth amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination applied to the state cases under review was based
on its decision two years earlier in Malloy v. Hogan,153 which
had overruled numerous contrary precedents on that point. The
Court's assertion that the fifth amendment right applies in po-
lice interrogations, as well as in judicial proceedings, and its as-
sumption that compulsion in violation of the amendment re-
quires the exclusion of resulting statements at trial, were
supported in part on the authority of Brain v. United States.
54
The applicability of the fifth amendment at this stage is in fact
consistent with the historical understanding of the fifth amend-
ment right. Police interrogation is the functional equivalent in
contemporary criminal justice systems of the common-law insti-
tution of preliminary examinations before justices of the peace,
at which the applicability of the right against compelled self-in-
crimination was recognized.'55
None of these propositions would have been practically impor-
tant if the Court had taken the notion of "compulsion" under
the fifth amendment as narrower than, or equivalent to, the no-
tion of "coercion" or "involuntariness" which had provided the
touchstone for the admissibility of confessions under the Court's
prior decisions.'56 However, the Court took the position that the
fifth amendment requires something more than voluntariness. It
153. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
154. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). See 384 U.S. at 461-62. See generally supra text accompa-
nying notes 51-67.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37, 47.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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stated that in the cases under review it "might not find the de-
fendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional
terms,"'57 but excluded them anyway on the basis of a new set of
rules-ostensibly required to safeguard the fifth amendment
right-none of which had been imposed in prior case law under
the voluntariness standard.
As a matter of history and precedent, this view of the relation-
.ship of the fifth amendment standard and the voluntariness
standard was wrong. Common-law sources bearing on the under-
standing of the right against compelled self-incrimination in the
context of pretrial interrogation only support a prohibition of
eliciting response by such blatant forms of coercion as question-
ing under oath, torture, or criminal punishment.
15 8
The Supreme Court's prior fifth amendment decisions also did
not support the proposition that fifth amendment "compulsion"
is broader than the notion of "coercion" or "involuntariness"
that had traditionally governed the admission of confessions. In-
deed, this view was explicitly contradicted by two earlier deci-
sions, Malloy v. Hogan and Brain v. United States,15 9 that the
Supreme Court cited in Miranda' as authority on the meaning
of compulsion under the fifth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan
stated that "the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal
prosecution [under the voluntariness standard] is tested by the
same standard applied in federal prosecutions since. . . Brain v.
United States . . . held that . . . the issue is controlled by...
the Fifth Amendment."'' Brain v. United States, in turn, had
proceeded under the assumption that the fifth amendment is a
codification of the evidentiary rule excluding involuntary
confessions.
62
Finally, neither these decisions nor any other decision of the
Court construing the fifth amendment had stated or suggested
that any of the rules imposed by Miranda were required for con-
formity with the amendment. In Brain, for example, the Court
had assessed the admissibility of a defendant's statements under
an expansively defined notion of involuntariness, which it took
to be congruent with the fifth amendment standard,' " but did
157. 384 U.S. at 457.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
159. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
160. 384 U.S. at 460-62.
161. 378 U.S. at 7.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
163. As discussed earlier, this approach involved reading into the fifth amendment a
,temporary, post-constitutional development in the evidentiary rules governing the ad-
,mission of confessions. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
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not even mention the interrogator's failure to comply with the
Miranda rules as a relevant factor in this assessment.1
64
b. The fiction of inherent coerciveness- The second step in
Miranda's general argument was the assertion that custodial po-
lice interrogations necessarily involve compulsion in violation of
the fifth amendment, unless Miranda's rules or equally effective
alternative rules negate their "inherently compelling" charac-
ter.'68 The Court cited two types of evidence in support of this
conclusion:
First, the Court noted that physical abuse of suspects by the
police had been commonplace at the time of the Wickersham
Commission's report in 1931, and that incidents of torture had
continued to occur up to the time of the Miranda decision. The
Court recognized that such occurrences were now exceptional,
but asserted that, in the absence of rules like those imposed in
Miranda, "there can be no assurance that practices of this na-
ture will be eradicated in the foreseeable future."'66
However, the information presented by the Court on this
point did not relate to a problem that could be addressed
through Miranda's reforms. Torture already was grounds for the
automatic exclusion of a defendant's statements in the pre-Mi-
randa case law under the due process voluntariness standard ,'
and none of the new rules announced in Miranda had any obvi-
ous value in inhibiting an officer who was disposed to resort to
physical abuse from doing so.' 8
Second, the Court cited and quoted from a number of works
that it characterized as "police manuals." These "manuals" rec-
ommended a variety of practices-some arguably abusive and
some plainly so-that could be used to get suspects to confess.
These included isolation of the suspect in unfamiliar surround-
ings; projecting an attitude of unshakable confidence in the sus-
pect's guilt; relentlessly interrogating an apparently guilty sus-
pect, subject only to necessary breaks for food and sleep, for
however long may be necessary to break his resistance and se-
164. Other cases from the same period as Brain had considered directly whether Mi-
randa-like rules were required, and had held that they were not. See supra text accom-
panying notes 91-95.
165. See 384 U.S. at 457-58, 467.
166. See 384 U.S. at 445-48. See generally supra Part I.B.l.a.
167. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 285-86 (1936).
168. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The new rules are not
designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of coer-
cion. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and
destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.").
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cure a confession; making a false show of sympathy for the sus-
pect's circumstances or criminal actions; play-acting by two of-
ficers in which one assumes a menacing, belligerent role and the
other a sympathetic, ingratiating role; presenting the suspect
with fabricated assertions that others have incriminated him or
staging scenarios in which "witnesses" make false accusations
against the suspect; and a number of other ploys."0 9
While the "police manuals" material constituted the essential
empirical justification for Miranda's reforms, the Court failed to
present and analyze evidence concerning the actual incidence of
the recommended practices. 170 Justice Tom Clark, a former At-
torney General, observed in his dissent in Miranda:
[I cannot] join in the Court's criticism of the present
practices of police and investigatory agencies as to custo-
dial interrogation. The materials it refers to as "police
manuals" are, as I read them, merely writings in this field
by professors and some police officers. Not one is shown
by the record here to be the official manual of any police
department, much less in universal use in crime detec-
tion. Moreover, the examples of police brutality men-
tioned by the Court are rare exceptions to the thousands
of cases that appear every year in law reports.1
7 '
The Court's reliance on this material was undercut in another
way by the absence of any reasonable "fit" between the rules
announced in the decision and the "police manual" abuses they
were supposed to guard against. The point may be illustrated by
considering the recommended practice of relentlessly interrogat-
ing a suspect until his resistance is worn down and he confesses.
The proposed ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
had addressed this potential abuse in a straightforward way by
setting a limit on the time during which a suspect could be ques-
tioned without counsel present, and also stated some additional




In comparison, Miranda's rules were not tailored in any sensi-
ble way to meeting this concern. The right to cut off questioning
immediately was overly broad as a response to the risk of mara-
thon interrogations, since it would enable a suspect to insulate
169. See id. at 448-55.
170. See generally id. at 533 (White, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 499-500.
172. See ALI. supra note 145, at xxiii-xxiv, §§ 4.04(1), 5.01 and Note, 5.04 and Note.
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himself from all inquiry, however brief and restrained. Con-
versely, for a suspect who had waived his rights, Miranda im-
posed no limit on the duration of questioning. A suspect could,
in theory, thereafter stop questioning whenever he wanted to,
but this right was not likely to be of value to a suspect who did
not happen to be aware of it from his own knowledge, 73 or who
lacked the presence of mind to assert it at a later time.
The "evidence" presented by the Court in Miranda was still
more inadequate as support for the Court's broader contention
that statements obtained in custodial interrogations, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, are necessarily the product of gov-
ernmental compulsion unless Miranda's rules or an equivalent
set of safeguards are observed.1 74 Empirical data alone, even if
far more persuasive and extensive than that presented in Mi-
randa, could at most establish that existing practices involved
coercion or compulsion in a certain proportion of cases. This
would not explain why statements should be excluded in cases in
which warnings were omitted or other features of Miranda's sys-
tem were not observed, but in which no actual coercion took
place.
As a practical matter, suspects in custody may respond to in-
terrogation for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with
being pressured or intimidated. A guilty suspect, for example,
may go along with questioning as a means of finding out how
much the police know or what evidence they have against him,
or to bolster the credibility of a fabricated defense by presenting
it on the earliest possible occasion. For an innocent person who
has been mistakenly accused, submitting to questioning and giv-
ing exculpatory responses reflects the natural impulse to rebut
false charges and clear oneself as promptly as possible. Admis-
sions of guilt and other inculpatory responses by a suspect may
also reflect a variety of motives, including relief from guilt, a de-
sire to explain mitigating or justifying circumstances, a belief
that denial or resistance is futile in light of the suspect's appre-
hension or the strength of the evidence against him, or a desire
to clear relatives or associates who might otherwise also come
under suspicion. The absurdity of asserting that statements ob-
tained in custodial interrogation are necessarily compelled is
173. Miranda did not require an admonition stating that the suspect could stop
questioning after it had started, most likely for reasons of conformity with the FBI warn-
ings. See generally infra text accompanying notes 180-82.
174. See 384 U.S. at 457-58, 467, 476-77; id. at 532-33, 535 (White, J., dissenting).
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aptly portrayed by an example in the journalist Fred Graham's
book on the Miranda decision:
One famous incident was the interrogation of Senator
Edward M. Kennedy by the Chief of Police of Edgar-
town, Massachusetts, on the day after the tragic drown-
ing of a young secretary in Kennedy's car in the summer
of 1969. Senator Kennedy was a lawyer himself, and a
companion was a former United States Attorney. The po-
lice chief was so abashed by the necessity of questioning
Senator Kennedy that he did not give any of the Mi-
randa warnings. It was a vivid refutation of the Supreme
Court's view that all statements made in police custody
must be presumed to be the product of an intimidating
atmosphere. If anyone was rattled it was the chief of po-
lice, and any concessions on Senator Kennedy's part were
prompted by motives of his own. It would probably have
been superfluous to inform the Senator of his right to
counsel, but the Miranda opinion makes it clear that
even lawyers must be told, before they are questioned "in
custody," that they may remain silent and that anything
they say may be used against them. Later, when Senator
Kennedy appeared in court to plead guilty to leaving the
scene of the fatal accident, his lawyer mentioned that
there were defenses that could have been raised. Pri-
vately, the Senator's lawyers expressed the belief that in
a case with no public opinion considerations, a successful
effort to quash the statement might have been made.'75
In short, the Court's notion that all statements obtained with-
out observance of Miranda's rules are secured through unconsti-
tutional compulsion was simply a fiction. The purpose of this
fiction was apparently to justify an inflexible rule excluding
statements when Miranda's requirements were not followed, so
that their effectiveness could not be undercut by case-by-case
argumentation over the occurrence of coercion in particular
interrogations.176
The Court might have achieved the same result by acknowl-
edging candidly that Miranda's exclusionary rule required the
exclusion of statements in some cases in which admitting them
would not violate the fifth amendment, and justifying this ap-
175. F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 311.
176. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-72; id. at 535 (White, J., dissenting).
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proach by its value in ensuring the effectiveness of the decision's
requirements as a safeguard against abusive interrogations. The
Court had in fact approached the issue of coerced confessions in
federal proceedings in this manner prior to Miranda, exercising
its supervisory power in the McNabb-Mallory line of decisions
to create a rule excluding statements obtained in periods of un-
necessary delay prior to the initial appearance before a magis-
trate, whether or not actual coercion or compulsion had taken
place.177
However, this approach would have appeared unattractive in
the context of Miranda for two reasons. First, the McNabb-Mal-
lory decisions had rested on the Supreme Court's supervisory
authority over the lower federal courts. The Court had never
claimed any corresponding authority to impose extra-constitu-
tional requirements on the state courts, but without doing so it
could not have made Miranda applicable in state proceedings as
an exercise of supervisory authority. Second, because rules im-
posed by the Court in the exercise of its supervisory authority
are non-constitutional, they can be overturned by legislation. In
fact, the McNabb-Mallory line of cases had been a frequent tar-
get of remedial bills in Congress, which had come close to enact-
ment on a number of occasions."7 8 Miranda would have been
vulnerable to legislative repeal in the same manner if cast as an
exercise of supervisory power.
In the context of the Miranda decision, reliance on the notion
of inherent coerciveness served to provide the Court with the
best of both worlds-the breadth and creative freedom of an ex-
ercise of supervisory power, accompanied by the immunity from
legislative repeal of constitutionally based requirements. How-
ever, since the notion was nothing more than a fiction, it pro-
vided no secure long-term basis for Miranda's system. This as-
pect of Miranda was overruled once changes in the Court's
composition produced a majority that was not committed to the
uniform application of the rules that Miranda had enacted.179
c. Precedent in existing interrogation systems- The final
step in the general argument in Miranda was the Court's con-
tention that the rules it had created would be easy to implement
and not too harmful to law enforcement, based on the experi-
177. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
178. See supra note 71.
179. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (no violation of fifth amendment
in admitting voluntary statement obtained in custodial police interrogation in the ab-
sence of Miranda warnings or any other safeguards); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 4;13
(1974) (same principle).
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ence with comparable rules in existing interrogation systems.
The Court placed primary emphasis on the FBI practice, repre-
senting it as being the same as Miranda's system. It noted that
the FBI had "compiled an exemplary record of effective law en-
forcement" while giving Miranda-like warnings to suspects, and
stated that "[t]he practice of the FBI can readily be emulated
by state and local enforcement agencies."1 80 The Court also
pointed to the rules of a number of foreign countries, including
England, Scotland, and India."s'
The FBI practice was not only cited as an important prece-
dent in the Miranda decision, but was also of practical impor-
tance in mustering a majority of the Justices behind Chief Jus-
tice Warren's proposed interrogation rules:
According to former Justice Fortas, the Miranda decision
"was entirely his"-i.e., [Chief Justice] Warren's. At the
March 4, 1966, conference, Warren left no doubt where
he stood. As at the argument, the Chief stressed that no
warning had been given by the police. In such a case, the
police must warn someone like Miranda of his right to
silence, that anything he said could be used against him,
that he could have a lawyer, and that he could have
counsel appointed if he could not afford one. Warren said
that such warnings had been given by his staff when he
was district attorney. He placed particular emphasis
upon the practice followed by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and explained how it worked. The "standard"
F.B.I. warning covered the essential requirements War-
ren had posited. The F.B.I.'s record of effective law en-
forcement showed that requiring similar warnings in all
police interrogations would not impose too great a bur-
den. Another Justice who was present says, "the state-
ment that the F.B.I. did it. . . was a swing factor. I be-
lieve that was a tremendously important factor, perhaps
the critical factor in the Miranda vote.
'1 82
As noted earlier, however, the similarities of the FBI system
and the Miranda system were largely verbal. FBI agents were
not required to obtain an affirmative waiver of the rights re-
counted in the warnings prior to interrogation and were not re-
180. See 384 U.S. at 483-86.
181. See id. at 486-90.
182. B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL
,BIOGRAPHY 589 (1983).
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quired to desist from questioning if a suspect expressed an un-
willingness to talk. The only right to counsel in connection with
interrogation that was recognized in the FBI system was a right
to consult with retained counsel prior to questioning, and ques-
tioning could be continued even where counsel was requested if
the request was "indecisive" in the judgment of the interviewing
agent. Compliance with the requirement of warnings was not a
litigable issue, and the omission of warnings did not affect the
admissibility of a suspect's statements.18
The rules of the foreign jurisdictions cited in Miranda are also
actually less restrictive than the Miranda system.8 4 The rules of
these countries and other foreign jurisdictions are described in
Part III of this Report.
2. Arguments for Particular Rules
The arguments given in the Miranda decision for the particu-
lar elements in its system can be classified as followed:
a. Application of the fiction of inherent coerciveness- The
Miranda decision grounded its basic rules on the premise that
compulsion in violation of the fifth amendment would invariably
occur if such rules were not observed.'8 5 Thus, the Court stated
that a warning that a suspect has a right to remain silent "is an
absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of
the interrogation atmosphere," and that "a warning at the time
of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pres-
sures."1 In relation to the right to have counsel present, the
Court stated that it "is indispensable to the protection of the
Fifth Amendment privilege" under the Miranda system, since
"[t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can
operate very quickly to overbear the will" of the suspect, and
because "[w]ith a lawyer present the likelihood that the police
will practice coercion is reduced."' 87 As justifications for uniform
rights to warnings and counsel based on the fifth amendment,
these arguments were simply invocations of the fiction that cus-
183. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 484-86.
184. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 521-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting); F. GRAHAM,
supra note 50, at 132, 171, 181-82.
185. See 384 U.S. at 467.
186. Id. at 468-69.
187. Id. at 469-70; see id. at 466 ("The presence of an attorney, and the warnings
delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling circum-
stances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in
the interrogation process.").
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todial police interrogations are inherently coercive, and stipula-
tions that the rights specified are necessary to negate their
coerciveness.""8
The right of the suspect to prevent questioning and to stop
questioning after it has started was similarly justified in Mi-'
randa on the ground that "any statement taken after the person
invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of com-
pulsion," and that "[wlithout the right to cut off questioning,
the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual
to overcome free choice." 89 Although these assertions related to
a narrower context-that of a suspect who indicates at some
point that he does not want to be questioned, but is subse-
quently questioned anyway-the notion of inherent compulsive-
ness relied on by the Court in support of this right must also be
regarded as a fiction. A suspect who is initially unwilling to talk
may change his mind for reasons that have nothing to do with
being pressured or compelled, such as the presentation of addi-
tional evidence by the police in the course of questioning which
affects the suspect's judgment whether it is in his interest to re-
spond. Of course no comparable right under the fifth amend-
ment is recognized in other contexts, including those involving
overt compulsion to testify or respond. A witness subpoenaed to
testify at trial or before a grand jury may refuse to answer po-
tentially incriminating questions, but may not decline to be
questioned.190 A defendant who decides to testify at trial is
deemed to have waived his fifth amendment right, and cannot
selectively answer some questions but later cut off questioning if
things are not going his way.
b. The requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver-
Miranda also attempted to support its system by invoking the
doctrine requiring a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of certain
constitutional rights. The Court stated a general rule that such a
waiver of the rights described in the Miranda warnings must be
obtained from a suspect before questioning can take place. 91
The Court also relied on this waiver standard in supporting
other elements of the Miranda system. In relation to the warn-
ing concerning the right to remain silent, for example, the Court
stated that "[flor those unaware of the privilege, the warning is
needed simply to make them aware of it-the threshold require-
188. See generally supra text accompanying notes 165-179.
189. 384 U.S. at 474.
190. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572-75, 580-81 (1976) (plurality
opinion), and cases cited therein.
'191. See 384 U.S. at 444, 475.
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ment for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. "192 In relation
to the second warning-"anything you say can be used against
you"-the Court stated that "[i]t is only through an awareness
of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real
understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege."' 93 In re-
lation to the required admonitions concerning the right to coun-
sel, the Court stated that "[n]o effective waiver of the right to
counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifi-
cally made after the warnings we here delineate have been
given."'"94
Although Miranda's rules were ostensibly predicated on the
fifth amendment, the Court relied on precedents relating to the
sixth amendment right to counsel in supporting Miranda's
waiver standard. 9 5 In doing so, the Court effectively nullified a
portion of the language of the fifth amendment, which does not
create a right to remain silent, but only a right not to be com-
pelled to talk. As a matter of history, failure to advise a suspect
that he could refrain from answering questions, and that his an-
swers could be used against him, was not regarded as a circum-
stance that compelled him to respond.'a Moreover, outside the
ambit of Miranda, the Supreme Court has never held that the
absence of warnings or a "knowing and intelligent waiver"
amounts to compulsion in the sense of the fifth amendment.
Rather, both before and after Miranda, that proposition has
been consistently rejected in the Supreme Court's fifth amend-
ment case law.
97
192. Id. at 468.
193. Id. at 469.
194. Id. at 470.
195. See 384 U.S. at 475. Some of the cited cases related to the fourteenth amend-
ment due process right to counsel, which had absorbed sixth amendment standards, and
which was fully assimilated to the sixth amendment right by the decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). A waiver requirement for the sixth amendment right to
counsel was initially created in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See supra text
accompanying note 104.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. Of course the historical right against
self-incrimination had nothing to do with representation by counsel, and did not entail a
substantive right to counsel or admonitions concerning a right to counsel. See supra text
accompanying notes 31-37, 91-111.
197. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-39 (1984) (in questioning of proba-
tioner by probation officer, as in questioning of witness at trial or before a grand jury,
fifth amendment right affords no protection unless asserted on the initiative of the per-
son questioned; Miranda warnings are not required); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.
648, 654 n.9 (1976) ("an individual may lose the benefit of the [fifth amendment] privi-
lege without making a knowing and intelligent waiver"); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367 (1951) (answer to incriminating question constituted waiver of the fifth amend-
ment right by grand jury witness who was unaware of the existence of the right); Powers
v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912) (fifth amendment does not require that warnings
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c. The argument from equity- As discussed above, the Mi-
randa decision predicated its creation of a uniform right to
counsel in pretrial interrogation and the related warning re-
quirements on the fiction of inherent coerciveness and on a
waiver standard abstracted from sixth amendment case law. 198
The Court also suggested that considerations of equity required
that this new counsel right be defined to include a right to ap-
pointed counsel and a rule that the police must affirmatively ad-
vise suspects of their right to have counsel present. A narrower
definition would be objectionable as discriminating against sus-
pects who could not afford to retain counsel, or who did not hap-
pen to be aware of their right to counsel at that stage. In sup-
port of this conclusion, the Court cited precedents relating to
the right to counsel in judicial proceedings under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments, which had similarly been defined to in-
clude a right to appointed counsel for indigents and affirmative
advice to defendants concerning the right.'"9
Concerns over equity of this sort could be met equally well by
holding that no one has a right to counsel in custodial police
interrogation, as the Court did in Crooker v. California20 0 and
Cicenia v. Lagay.20' It may also be noted that the considerations
of equity that the Court invoked in support of a broad definition
of Miranda's fifth amendment right to counsel are not given
controlling effect in other fifth amendment contexts. For exam-
ple, a witness summoned to testify at trial or before a grand jury
has a right to refuse to answer incriminating questions, but he
must assert that right on his own initiative. This can result in an
advantage for witnesses who happen to know something about
the fifth amendment, or who can afford to hire counsel to inform
them about their rights prior to testifying, but the resulting in-
equity has not been regarded as constitutionally objectionable. 202
In terms of policy, the desirability of a broadly defined right
to counsel at trial does not depend on concerns over discrimina-
tion against defendants based on knowledge or wealth, but is ad-
equately supported by the consideration that few defendants
be given to defendant at preliminary hearing); supra text accompanying notes 93-95
(description of same case).
198. A footnote in Miranda also declared that preventing an attorney from consult-
ing with his client violates the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel, inde-
pendent of any fifth amendment issue. See 384 U.S. at 465 n.35.
199. See 384 U.S. at 470-73.
200. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
201. 357 U.S. 504 (1958). See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
202. See generally supra note 197.
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could be assured of a fair trial without such representation.20 In
contrast, a right to counsel defined with the same breadth is not
indispensable to the conduct of fair interrogations.2 04
d. The exclusion of pretrial silence- One of the innovations
of the Miranda decision was the creation of a rule barring the
use of a defendant's silence in custodial interrogation against
him at trial. The majority rule in the states prior to Miranda
had been to the contrary. 0 5 This new doctrine was announced in
a footnote in Miranda20 6 without supporting argumentation. The
only significant authority cited in support of it was Griffin v.
California,0 7 which had held in the preceding year that the fifth
amendment bars adverse comment on a defendant's silence at
trial.208
Miranda's rule on this point was inconsistent with the regular
practice in criminal cases at the time of the Constitution, under
which a defendant's refusal to answer questions at the prelimi-
nary examination could be disclosed at trial. Even assuming
Griffin v. California to be valid on its own terms, the basic dif-
ferences between the constitutional history relating to the ques-
tioning of defendants at trial and suspects prior to trial would
suggest that something more than a citation to Griffin was called
for to justify Miranda's conclusory assertion that admitting pre-
trial silence unconstitutionally "penalizes" a defendant for re-
maining silent.2 0
3. The Expressed Openness to Alternatives
One of the criticisms raised at the time of the Miranda deci-
sion was that the Court's prescription of a procrustean set of
rules for interrogations would stifle the ferment that was then
203. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 514 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Under existing arrange-
ments, a defendant with superior knowledge or financial resources may use those advan-
tages to get better legal assistance at trial than a defendant who lacks them, but this
inequity has not been thought to require a prohibition of retaining defense counsel or
otherwise expending a defendant's own funds in preparing a defense. It is considered
sufficient if counsel arrangements provide reasonable assurance that defendants gener-
ally will have fair trials, though some, through fortunate personal circumstances, can get
better assistance than others.
204. See generally supra text accompanying notes 145-46 (regarding pre-Miranda
ALI proposal); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 535 (White, J., dissenting).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 116-118.
206. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
207. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
208. See generally supra Part I.B.2.c.
209. See supra Parts I.A.1.b.-c & Part I.B.2.c.
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underway in that area of the law, and foreclose the possibility of
obtaining experience with alternative systems. This point was
developed at some length in Justice Harlan's dissent in
Miranda:
In closing this . . . discussion of policy considerations
attending the new confession rules, some reference must
be made to their ironic untimeliness. There is now in
progress in this country a massive reexamination of crim-
inal law enforcement procedures on a scale never before
witnessed. Participants in this undertaking include a
Special Committee of the American Bar Association,
under the chairmanship of Chief Judge Lumbard of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; a distinguished
study group of the ALI, headed by Professors Vorenberg
and Bator of the Harvard Law School; and the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice, under the leadership of the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States. Studies are also being
conducted by the District of Columbia Crime Commis-
sion, the Georgetown Law Center, and by others
equipped to do practical research. There are also signs
that legislatures in some of the States may be preparing
to re-examine the problem before us ....
Of particular relevance is the ALI's drafting of a Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, now in its first ten-
tative draft ....
It is no secret that concern has been expressed lest
long-range and lasting reforms be frustrated by this
Court's too rapid departure from existing constitutional
standards. Despite the Court's disclaimer, the practical
effect of the decision made today must inevitably be to
handicap seriously sound efforts at reform, not least by
removing options necessary to a just compromise of com-
peting interests. Of course legislative reform is rarely
speedy or unanimous, though this Court has been more
patient in the past. But the legislative reforms when they
come would have the vast advantage of empirical data
and comprehensive study, they would allow experimenta-
tion and use of solutions not open to the courts, and they
would restore the initiative in criminal law reform to
those forums where it truly belongs.210
210. 384 U.S. at 523-24 & n.22
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The Miranda majority responded to this objection as follows:
It is also urged upon us that we withhold decision on this
issue until state legislative bodies and advisory groups
have had an opportunity to deal with these problems by
rule-making. We have already pointed out that the Con-
stitution does not require any specific code of procedures
for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination
during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States
are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege,
so long as they are fully as effective as those described
above in informing accused persons of their right of si-
lence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exer-
cise it. In any event, however, the issues presented are of
constitutional dimensions and must be determined by
the courts . . . . Where rights secured by the Constitu-
tion are involved, there can be no rule-making or legisla-
tion which would abrogate them.2 1
This response had two elements. One of them was the asser-
tion that the Court should not be expected to defer to legisla-
tures or advisory groups on matters of constitutional interpreta-
tion. This point would have had greater force if the Court's
activity in Miranda had actually constituted interpretation of
the Constitution in some serious sense. However, Miranda's sys-
tem was inconsistent in every particular with the historical un-
derstanding of the fifth amendment right and repudiated the
whole course of the Court's prior case law relating to self-incrim-
ination. The Miranda majority did not promulgate a code of
procedure for interrogations because the Constitution required
that, but because it wanted to. It was reasonable to ask the
211. 384 U.S. at 490-91. Another long statement along the same lines appeared earlier
in the decision:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of
their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitu-
tion necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our deci-
sion in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound
efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress
and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways
of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement
of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are
at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the [Miranda] safeguards must
be observed.
Id. at 467.
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Court to defer in the enactment of legislation to the bodies that
exercise that power legitimately.
The second element in the response was the assertion that the
Court would not insist on compliance with the particular proce-
dures it had delineated, but would accept equally effective alter-
natives. Language to the same effect appeared at some other
points in the decision. However, this show of openmindedness
was illusory for a number of reasons.
First, while the Court stated explicitly that Congress and the
state legislatures could depart from Miranda, the terms of the
invitation suggested that they could not safely stray too far. It
would not clearly be enough to adopt an alternative system that
was as effective as Miranda's in ensuring that suspects were not
subjected to coercive interrogations and that the statements ob-
tained from them were voluntary and reliable. Rather, any ac-
ceptable alternative would apparently have to compare favor-
ably with Miranda's system in "informing accused persons of
their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity
to exercise it."
2 12
Second, the Court failed to offer any guidance concerning
what alternative safeguards it might consider equally effective.
Since the price of guessing wrong on this point could be the
wholesale reversal of convictions that were obtained through the
-use of statements secured under an alternative system, there
would have been a large element of risk involved in acting on the
Court's invitation.
Third, there were internal inconsistencies in the Miranda de-
cision that would have heightened the perceived risk of depart-
ing from the system it created. The final version of the opinion
of the Court in Miranda reflected a compromise between Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan. The Chief Justice had not
been disposed to tolerate any deviations from the procedural
system he had devised. However, Justice Brennan objected to
Warren's initial draft of the decision, stating that "I . . . do not
think, as your draft seems to suggest, that there is only a single
constitutionally required solution to the problems of testimonial
compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation . . . . [SIhould
we not leave Congress and the States latitude to devise other
means (if they can) which might also create an interrogation cli-
mate which has the similar effect of preventing the fettering of a
person's own will?"
213
212. Id. at 490.
213. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 182, at 590-91.
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Chief Justice Warren accommodated Justice Brennan by in-
serting language in the decision stating that equally effective al-
ternatives would be acceptable. However, he did not really agree
with this point, and the final opinion retained various arguments
and characterizations which treated the Miranda rules as if they
were constitutional requirements, or seemed to be designed to
establish them as such.2"'
Given the hedged terms of the invitation to adopt alternative
systems, the absence of any discussion of acceptable alterna-
tives, and the discrepancies between the Court's expressed open-
ness to alternatives and specific argumentation in the decision, it
is not surprising that no state acted on this invitation. When
Congress acted two years later, it did not attempt to enact a
substitute system of interrogation rules comparable to Mi-
randa's, but chose instead to overturn the decision.
B. The Aftermath Of Miranda
1. Evidence of Damage to Law Enforcement
Following the Miranda decision, before-and-after studies or
surveys were carried out in a number of cities which indicated
that the implementation of Miranda's system had a major ad-
verse effect on the willingness of suspects to respond to police
questioning.
For example, District Attorney (now Senator) Arlen Specter
reported that an estimated 90% of arrested persons made state-
ments to the police in Philadelphia prior to Miranda and Esco-
bedo v. Illinois. Following Escobedo and a related appellate de-
cision that resulted in the giving of certain warnings to arrestees,
the proportion of arrestees making statements declined to 68%.
Following the implementation of Miranda's full system, the cor-
responding figure was 41%. In reporting these findings to a Sen-
ate Subcommittee, District Attorney Specter indicated that his
office was looking for a suitable test case to secure a reconsidera-
tion of Miranda by the Supreme Court, and endorsed the enact-
ment of legislation limiting or overruling Miranda as a means of
obtaining such a reconsideration. '
214. See id. at 589-93; supra text accompanying notes 185-99.
215. See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 200-19 (1967) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
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A second study, conducted by faculty members of the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Law School, observed a substantial reduction
in the number of confessions."1 6 Police detectives in Pittsburgh
had for many years advised suspects of a right to remain silent,
and shortly after the Escobedo decision they also began to ad-
vise suspects of a right to counsel. Notwithstanding this partial
compliance with Miranda's requirements prior to the Miranda
decision, the proportion of suspects confessing in the crime cate-
gories studied fell from 48.5% prior to Miranda to 32.3% after
Miranda.1 7 Particularly great decreases occurred in the catego-
ries of homicide and robbery, in each of which the number of
confessions was roughly cut in half. Prior to Miranda, about
60% of suspected killers and robbers had confessed. After Mi-
randa, about 30% did s0.218
216. See Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1967).
217. See id. at 8, 12. The pre-Miranda interrogation policy had differed from Mi-
randa's system in not including an offer of free counsel and in providing the required
information in the course of conversation with the suspect, rather than as a separate set
of formal warnings at the start of the interrogation. Also, detectives would attempt to
persuade a suspect who indicated that he wanted to remain silent or to be assisted by
counsel to change his mind and make a statement.
The changes following Miranda included the new requirement that suspects be ad-
vised clearly of their rights prior to any questioning, and the rule that all questioning
must cease if the. suspect says that he wishes to remain silent or wants counsel. Once the
new policy was in place, suspects in over 40 percent of the cases prevented themselves
from being questioned at all by standing on their "right to remain silent." See id. at 10,
13.
218. The results of other before-and-after studies and surveys were consistent with
the conclusion that compliance with Miranda's rules causes major reductions in the inci-
dence of confessions and other statements. District Attorney Aaron Koota of Kings
County, New York, reported that before Miranda, approximately 10% of suspects in the
categories of homicide, robbery, rape, and felonious assault refused to make any state-
ment, but that after Miranda the corresponding figure was 41%. See Senate Hearings,
supra note 215, at 223. District Attorney Frank Hogan of New York County reported
that in the six months preceding Miranda, 49% of the cases surveyed in his jurisdiction
involved confessions or admissions of guilt, but in the six months following Miranda only
15% involved such statements. These figures related to almost all nonhomicide felony
cases in New York that reached the grand jury stage. See id. at 1120.
District Attorney Evelle Younger of Los Angeles County reported that the percentage
of felony complaints involving confessions, admissions, or other statements following Mi-
randa was greater than the percentage of felony complaints involving confessions or ad-
missions in a pre-Miranda survey. However, these findings had no significance because
(1) the relevant utterances by suspects were characterized differently in the pre-Miranda
and post-Miranda surveys, ("confessions or admissions" versus "confessions, admissions,
or other statements"), (2) the pre-Miranda survey explicitly cautioned against relying on
its results because of its small sample and because of misunderstandings by the officers
who filled out the survey forms, (3) the police in Los Angeles County were already advis-
ing suspects of a right to counsel and right to remain silent before Miranda on account
of Escobodo v. Illinois and a related state decision, (4) the post-Miranda survey was
limited to a three week period that almost immediately followed the Miranda decision,
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Public attention was particularly focused on the Miranda de-
cision by its effect on cases in which an interrogation had oc-
curred prior to the decision, but in which the case had not been
tried when Miranda was decided. Miranda was applied retroac-
tively in these cases,2"9 so that confessions and statements ob-
tained in interrogations preceding Miranda could not be used in
trials occurring after Miranda. This affected a large body of
pending cases, and resulted in widely publicized instances in
which killers, rapists, and other serious offenders were freed.22 °
For example, one case of this sort involved a Brooklyn resident,
Jose Suarez, who had slaughtered his wife and five small chil-
dren with a knife, but had to be let go when his confession be-
came inadmissible. The judge stated as he released Suarez:
"This is a very sad thing. It is so repulsive it makes one's blood
run cold and any decent human being's stomach turn to let a
thing like this out on the street."22
2. The Congressional Reaction-Enactment of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501
a. Proceedings in Congress- In Congress, hearings on the
Miranda problem were held in 1967 before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.222 Senator McClellan played the leading role in the hearings,
and in promoting the legislation that was ultimately enacted as
18 U.S.C. § 3501. The legislation was designed to overrule Mi-
randa v. Arizona and certain other decisions that were perceived
to be detrimental to law enforcement. It directed the courts, in
federal and District of Columbia prosecutions, to admit confes-
and (5) the surveys only related to cases that reached the complaint stage, and did not
obtain any direct information concerning the incidence of statements in police interroga-
tions. See Senate Hearings, supra note 215, at 341-52.
Empirical studies were also carried out in New Haven and the District of Columbia.
The New Haven study obtained no comparable figures on the incidence of statements
before and after Miranda. Both studies found that the police did not comply with Mi-
randa in most of the cases in their post-Miranda samples, and were of no real value in
assessing the effects of Miranda's system. See Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The
Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967); Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, Custodial
Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968).
219. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966).
220. See Senate Hearings, supra note 215, at 8-9, 201-02, 207-08, 225-26, 343, 573-74,
620-25, 679-80, 871-72; F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 184-92.
221. See Senate Hearings, supra note 215, at 8-9.
222. See Senate Hearings, supra note 215.
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sions under the pre-Miranda voluntariness standard. Whether a
person had been advised of his rights prior to questioning was to
be considered by the court as evidence in determining whether
coercion had occurred, but would have no significance beyond
that. The rationale of this reform was stated as follows in the
Senate Committee Report:
[C]rime will not be effectively abated so long as
criminals who have voluntarily confessed their crimes are
released on mere technicalities. The traditional right of
the people to have their prosecuting attorneys place in
evidence before juries the voluntary confessions and in-
criminating statements made by defendants simply must
be restored ....
The case of Escobedo v. Illinois . . . set the stage for
another most disastrous blow to the cause of law enforce-
ment . . . . This case-. . . formed the basis for . . . Mi-
randa v. Arizona. . . . In Miranda, the Supreme Court
held that an otherwise voluntary confession . . . could
not be used in evidence unless a fourfold warning had
been given ....
The committee is convinced . . . that the rigid and in-
flexible requirements of the majority opinion in the Mi-
randa case are unreasonable, unrealistic, and extremely
harmful to law enforcement . . . . The unsoundness of
the majority opinion was forcefully shown by the four
dissenting justices, who also predicted the dire conse-
quences of overruling what theretofore had been the law
of the land . ...
[The Miranda] decision was an abrupt departure from
precedent extending back at least to the earliest days of
the Republic. Up to the time of the rendition of this 5-to-
4 opinion, the "totality of circumstances" had been the
test in our State and Federal courts in determining the
admissibility of incriminating statements . . . . Mr. Jus-
tice White's dissent . . . demonstrates beyond question
that. . . warnings as to constitutional rights were not re-
quired by the Constitution, and that the sole test of ad-
missibility should be "totality of circumstances" as bear-
ing on voluntariness . . ..
The committee is of the view that the [proposed] legis-
lation . . . would be an effective way of protecting the
rights of the individual and would promote efficient en-
forcement of our criminal laws. By the express provisions
Pretrial Interrogation
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of the proposed legislation the trial judge must take into
consideration all the surrounding circumstances in deter-
mining the issue of voluntariness, including specifically
enumerated factors which historically enter into such a
determination. Whether or not the arrested person was
informed of or knew his rights before questioning is but
one of the factors ....
The committee is aware that a few have expressed the
view that legislation by Congress restoring the voluntari-
ness test to the admissibility of confessions and incrimi-
nating statements would be declared unconstitutional, on
the ground that the provisions do not measure up to the
rigid standards set forth in Miranda. The committee,
however, . . . is also aware that the opinions of the four
dissenting Justices clearly indicate that [none] of them
would consider these provisions unconstitutional ....
The committee feels that it is obvious from the opinion
of Justice Harlan and other dissenting Justices . . . that
the,-overwhelming weight of judicial opinion in this coun-
tri is that the voluntariness test does not offend the Con-
stitution or deprive a defendant of any constitutional
"right. No one can predict with any assurance what the
Supreme Court might at some future date decide if these
provisions are enacted. The committee has concluded
that this approach to the balancing of the rights of soci-
ety and the rights of the individual served us well over
the years, that it is constitutional and that Congress
should adopt it. After all, the Miranda decision itself was
by a bare majority of one, and with increasing frequency
the Supreme Court has reversed itself. The committee
feels that by the time the issue of constitutionality would
reach the Supreme Court, the probability rather is that
this legislation would be upheld.22
The Senate Judiciary Committee voted out the anti-Miranda
legislation as part of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, a broad criminal law reform package that in-
cluded the creation of a system of federal law enforcement assis-
tance for states and localities. The original version of Title II
was not limited to overruling Miranda in federal prosecutions,
but would also have divested the Supreme Court and other fed-
223. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2123-38.
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eral courts of jurisdiction to review state court decisions admit-
ting confessions, and would have abolished federal habeas
corpus review of state judgments.2 These proposals were de-
bated on the Senate floor over a period of three weeks.22
A compromise was eventually reached under which the por-
tions of the proposal limiting federal jurisdiction were deleted,
but the provisions repealing Miranda in federal cases were re-
tained. The proponents of the legislation were satisfied that this
would be adequate to achieve the essential objective of securing
a reconsideration of the Miranda decision by the Supreme
Court.2 2 Following passage by the Senate, the bill went directly
to the floor in the House of Representatives and was passed af-
ter relatively brief debate on two successive days.227
b. The statute- Section 3501 of title 18 reads as follows:
Section 3501. Admissibility of confessions
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as de-
fined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evi-
dence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is
received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the pres-
ence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness.
If the trial judge determines that the confession was vol-
untarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the
trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence
on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury
to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it
deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of volun-
tariness shall take into consideration all the circum-
stances surrounding the giving of the confession, includ-
ing (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment
of the defendant making the confession, if it was made
after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such de-
224. See 114 CONG. REc. 11189 (1968). Title II also contained provisions overruling
the McNabb-Mallory line of decisions, see supra text accompanying notes 68-73, and the
decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), which created a right to counsel
at police line-ups. These provisions were ultimately enacted as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501(c) and
3502.
225. See 114 CONG. REC. 11200-07, 11228-30, 11234-35, 11593-97, 11611-13, 11740-47,
11891-907, 12457-75, 12477-81, 12798-822, 12829-36, 13202-03, 13652-56, 13845-67,
13989-14084, 14129-59, 14162-84 (1968).
226. See F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 319-20, 327-29; 114 CONG. REC. 14156-57,
14171-84 (1968).
227. See 114 CONG. Rac. 16065-78, 16271-300 (1968).
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fendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was
charged or of which he was suspected at the time of mak-
ing the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was
advised or knew that he was not required to make any
statement and that any such statement could be used
against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been
advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance
of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was
without the assistance of counsel when questioned and
when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the abovementioned
factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need
not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or
by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given
by a person who is a defendant therein, while such per-
son was under arrest or other detention in the custody of
any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency,
shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bring-
ing such person before a magistrate or other officer em-
powered to commit persons charged with offenses against
the laws of the United States or of the District of Colum-
bia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have
been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the
confession is left to the jury and if such confession was
made or given by such person within six hours immedi-
ately following his arrest or other detention: Provided,
That the time limitation contained in this subsection
shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing
such person before such magistrate or other officer be-
yond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to
be reasonable considering the means of transportation
and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available
such magistrate or other officer.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the ad-
mission in evidence of any confession made or given vol-
untarily by any person to any other person without inter-
rogation by anyone, or at any time at which the person
who made or gave such confession was not under arrest
or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term "confession"
means any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or
[VOL. 22:3 & 4
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any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or
in writing.2 6
The first sentence of subsection (a) overrules Miranda and re-
stores the voluntariness standard for the admission of confes-
sions in federal and District of Columbia prosecutions. The re-
mainder of that subsection provides for an initial determination
concerning the voluntariness of a confession by the judge outside
the presence of the jury, consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Jackson v. Denno.'2 "
Subsection (b) lists various factors, including the giving of
warnings, which are to be considered by the trial judge. The sta-
tus of these factors under subsection (b) is the same as their
status under the pre-Miranda voluntariness case law. As the last
sentence of the subsection indicates, they are not preconditions
on the admission of confessions, but simply evidence relevant to
the determination of voluntariness. 2 0
Subsection (c) overrules the McNabb-Mallory line of deci-
sions, providing that delay of up to six hours in the production
of an arrested person before a magistrate does not require the
exclusion of a confession obtained in that period. 3 1 Subsection
(d) provides that the statute does not bar the admission of any
voluntarily given confession that is not the product of a custo-
dial interrogation. Subsection (e) defines "confession" to include
any self-incriminating statement.
228. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
229. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See generally supra text accompanying notes 134-35; Sen-
ate Hearings, supra note 215, at 297.
230. See infra text accompanying notes 232-38; S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMaN. NEws 2112, 2137 ("By the express
provisions of the proposed legislation the trial judge must take into consideration all the
surrounding circumstances in determining the issue of voluntariness, including specifi-
cally enumerated factors which historically enter into such a determination. Whether or
not the arrested person was informed of or knew.his rights before questioning is but one
,of the factors.").
As the Senate Committee Report noted, the factors listed in § 3501(b) entered into
the determination of voluntariness in the pre-Miranda case law. See, e.g., Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963) (absence of warnings concerning right to remain
silent, potential adverse use of statements, and entitlement to counsel relevant factors);
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958) (denial of counsel, admonition that sus-
pect need not answer questions, and knowledge of right to be silent relevant factors);
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185-87 (1953) (delay in arraignment and knowledge of
rights relevant factors); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 65 (1951) (detention without
:charge, delay in production before magistrate, and lack of counsel relevant factors); Ly-
ons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 604 (1944) (admonition that suspect need not make
statement and that anything said would be used against him relevant factor).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
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There was never any doubt concerning the purpose and mean-
ing of this statute. The enacted version of section 3501 was prac-
tically the same as the original anti-Miranda bill introduced by
Senator McClellan, S. 674.232 Throughout the Senate hearings on
this bill, Senator McClellan and other participants expressed the
understanding that the bill would overturn Miranda and restore
the pre-Miranda voluntariness standard." The Senate Commit-
tee Report's statement on proposed section 3501 was essentially
a lengthy attack on Miranda and related decisions. As noted
above, it contained numerous explicit statements that the point
of the statute was to restore the law to its pre-Miranda state.3
The Senators who dissented from the Committee Report had
the same view of the purpose and effect of the legislation: "The
Court emphasized in Miranda that the procedural safeguards es-
tablished in the case are in addition to the traditional voluntari-
ness test . . . . [Slection 3501 specifically dispenses with these
safeguards and in lieu thereof establishes voluntariness as the
sole test of the admissibility of a confession." 3 5
The same understanding of section 3501 was reiterated end-
lessly throughout the weeks of debate on Title II of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act on the Senate floor. " " The
same understanding was also reflected in numerous editorials,
articles, statements and letters relating to Title II that were gen-
232. See Senate Hearings, supra note 215, at 74. The only significant changes that
occurred in § 3501 on the way to enactment were the addition of a six hour time limit to
subsection (c)'s repeal of the McNabb-Mallory rule, see generally 114 CONG. REc. 14184-
86 (1968), and the addition of a second sentence to subsection (b) to ensure that the
Supreme Court would not be able to defeat the purpose of § 3501 by reading Miranda's
requirements into it, see Senate Hearings, supra note 215, at 925 (statement of Attorney
General Thomas C. Lynch of California).
233. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 215, at 110-11 (Senators Stennis and Mc-
Clellan), 185 (Senator McClellan), 194 (Senator McClellan), 269-70 (Judge Homer L.
Kreider), 579 (Senator McClellan), 619 (National District Attorneys Association), 849
(Senator McClellan), 1173 (American Civil Liberties Union), 1174-75 (Senator McClel-
lan), 1176-77 (American Civil Liberties Union); accord, 113 CONG. REc. 1583-85, 1590-91
(floor statement of Senator McClellan on introducing S. 674).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 222-23.
235. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2112, 22111. The discussion of proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)-(b) in the
dissenters' statement was entitled "Confessions-The Repeal of Miranda." The dissent-
ers noted that "[s]ection 3501(a) ... makes voluntariness the sole criterion of the ad-
missibility of a confession" and that "[slection 3501(a) and (b) are squarely in conflict
with the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona." They went on to defend the
Miranda decision. See id. at 2210-15.
236. See, e.g., 114 CONG. Rac. 11206-07 (Senator McClellan), 11594 (Senator Morse),
11611-13 (Senator Thurmond), 11740 (Senator Tydings), 11745 (Senators McClellan and
Brooke), 11891 (Senator Tydings), 11894 (Senator Tydings), 13202-03 (Senator Scott),
13846-49 (Senator McClellan), 13990-91 (Senator Tydings), 14082 (Senator Tydings),
14136 (Senator Fong), 14158-59 (Senator Hart), 14167 (Senator McIntyre).
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erated during Congress's consideration of the proposal, many of
which were put into the Congressional Record in the course of
the floor debates.28 7 The same understanding was presented to
the House of Representatives in the course of its relatively brief
consideration of the legislation."'
In short, it is clear beyond all question that 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
if valid, overrules Miranda v. Arizona and restores the pre-Mi-
randa voluntariness standard for the admission of incriminating
statements obtained in custodial interrogations.
3. The Abortive Implementation of Section 3501,
Section 3501 was not used immediately after its enactment as
a result of the hostility of the incumbent Administration. Presi-
dent Johnson's signing statement on the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act indicated that he did not believe that
237. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 12799, 13652-55 (editorials of Richmond News Leader,
Washington Daily News, New York Times, Salt Lake Tribune, and Washington Post;
articles from Washington Star and Christian Science Monitor); id. at 13851-66 (letters
from law school professors); id. at 16067-69 (analysis of Title H and memorandum of
Legislative Reference Service of Library of Congress).
238. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 16066 (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("Title II would turn
the clock backward to the day before Mallory and Miranda and make 'voluntariness' the
sole test as to the validity of a confession"); id. at 16074 (remarks of Rep. Corman)
("The language of [title II] attempts to abolish the rights and safeguards established in
the famed Miranda case"); id. at 16278 (remarks of Rep. Poff) ("[Tlitle II ... says that
the absence of warnings required by Miranda ... may be considered as one element in
determining the definition of voluntariness but that this need not be the controlling fac-
tor"); id. at 16279 (remarks of Rep. Taylor) ("In Miranda [v.] Arizona, the Supreme
Court ... strengthened the rights of the criminal and restricted the power of the police
.... The passage of the motion before us is a rebuke to the Supreme Court. It reverses
decisions which had virtually eliminated confession as a law enforcement instrument");
id. at 16296 (remarks of Rep. Randall) ("Title II simply provides that confessions may
be voluntarily given, notwithstanding the line of decisions announced by the U.S. Su-
preme Court"); id. at 16297-98 (remarks of Rep. Pollock) ("[Tlitle II will modify. . . the
1966 Miranda decision, by permitting the use of a 'voluntary' confession even if the sus-
pect had not been specifically warned of his constitutional rights").
Some of the participants in the House debate evidently knew less than their Senate
counterparts about the content of the proposed legislation or its relationship to prior
law, and made confused statements. See, e.g., id. at 16276 (remarks of Rep. MacGregor)
S(stating that § 3501 would return the law to its pre-Miranda state but stating inconsis-
tently that courts would have discretion to apply the Miranda rule in particular cases);
,id. at 16285 (remarks of Rep. Machen) (assuming that the jurisdiction-limiting provi-
sions had been retained in the Senate version of Title II). However, the House debate as
a whole, like the Senate debate, overwhelmingly expressed the understanding that the
effect of § 3501 was simply to overrule Miranda.
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the statute would be constitutional under its intended interpre-
tation, and stated disingenuously'3 9 that it was ambiguous:
Title II of the legislation deals with certain rules of evi-
dence only in Federal criminal trials-which account for
only 7 percent of the criminal felony prosecutions in this
country. The provisions of Title II, vague and ambiguous
as they are, can, I am advised by the Attorney General
[Ramsey Clark], be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution and Federal practices in this field will con-
tinue to conform to the Constitution.
Under long-standing policies, for example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and other Federal law enforce-
ment agencies have consistently given suspects full and
fair warning of their constitutional rights. I have asked
the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation to assure that these policies will
continue.240
Attorney General Clark then instructed the U.S. Attorneys to
offer in evidence only confessions that were obtained in con-
formity with Miranda.
2 41
This policy was reversed in the following year by Attorney
General Mitchell, who issued a directive to federal prosecutors
that stated that section 3501 could be invoked in certain circum-
stances in which Miranda was not complied with.2 42 A number
of U.S. Attorneys thereafter attempted to secure decisions up-
holding section 3501 as an overruling of Miranda, and a sub-
239. The Administration knew as well as everyone else what § 3501 was meant to do.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 215, at 81-82, 357-58 (letter of Attorney General Ram-
sey Clark noting conflict between S. 674 and Miranda; the bill would only be constitu-
tional if Miranda's requirements were "read into" it or added as a "constitutional gloss,"
but if this were done it would be superfluous).
240. 4 WEEKLy COMP. PRES. Doc. 983 (June 24, 1968).
241. See Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions: Implemen-
tation of Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officials and the Courts, 63 GEO. L.J. 305,
311-12 (1974).
242. See id. at 312. The memorandum is reprinted in 115 CONG. Razc. 23236-38
(1969). The memorandum took the position that Miranda warnings should be given as a
matter of standard practice, notwithstanding § 3501, and that proper use of the statute
would be confined to cases in which a person was aware of his fifth amendment rights
but in which there was "a less than perfect warning or a less than conclusive waiver."
According to Associate Deputy Attorney General Ronald Gainer, who drafted the Mitch-
ell memorandum, it was formulated in these restrictive terms because it seemed unlikely
at that time that the Supreme Court would countenance any greater departure from
Miranda. However, there was no basis for these restrictions in the statute or its legisla-
tive history, and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that the Court
would now uphold § 3501 under its intended interpretation.
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stantial number of reported decisions resulted. In most instances
the courts either found it unnecessary to address the question on
the ground that Miranda's requirements had been observed, or
side-stepped the issue in some other way.4
In United States v. Crocker,2 " however, the district judge had
not followed Miranda in determining the admissibility of a de-
fendant's pretrial statements, but had applied the standards of
section 3501 instead. In the preceding year, the Supreme Court
had indicated in Michigan v. Tucker24 5 that it no longer believed
that Miranda warnings are constitutional requirements even in
the contingent sense specified in the Miranda decision.24' Rely-
ing on Michigan v. Tucker, the Tenth Circuit in United States
v. Crocker found rather easily that section 3501 is valid and con-
cluded that the defendant's statements had been properly
admitted. 47
There has apparently been no effort to secure a judicial deter-
mination of the validity of section 3501's overruling of Miranda
following the initial favorable decision on this point in United
.States v. Crocker.
C. Case Law Development Subsequent To Miranda
Within a few years of the Miranda decision, most of the Jus-
tices who had subscribed to the opinion of the Court in that case
were gone, and a new majority arose in the Court that knew not
Miranda. Given the status of the Miranda decision as an expres-
sion of an activist temper that characterized a bare majority of
the Court during the 1960s, it is not surprising that the current
243. See United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Marrero,
450 F.2d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., concurring); Ailsworth v. United States,
448 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 377 (2d Cir.
1970); see also United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (3d Cir. 1974). See gener-
ally Gandara, supra note 241, at 313-16.
244. 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
245. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
246. The Miranda decision predicated its system on the fiction that the fifth amend-
ment would necessarily be violated if statements were obtained in a custodial interroga-
tion without observance of Miranda's rules or equally effective alternative rules. See
supra Part II.A.l.b & II.A.2.a. This fiction was repudiated by the Court in Michigan v.
Tucker, which characterized Miranda's rules as prophylactic, and found that the defend-
ant in the case, who had not received full Miranda warnings, had not been deprived of
any constitutional right.
247. See 510 F.2d at 1136-38. The court's finding that § 3501 is valid was an alterna-
tive holding. The court also found that Miranda had been complied with. See id. at
1,138.
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Court has been disinclined to extend Miranda, and has cut back
on its potential scope in a number of areas. The persistence of
Miranda's general system appears to be based on stare decisis
and institutional inertia, rather than on any positive commit-
ment of the Court to its particular set of interrogation rules."'8 A
number of the Court's restrictive decisions relating to Miranda
can be described briefly.
First, the Court has rebuffed efforts to extend Miranda be-
yond custodial interrogations. Miranda's rules have accordingly
been held to be inapplicable in connection with the questioning
of a probationer by a probation officer concerning a murder
committed by the probationer; the questioning of a targeted wit-
ness before a grand jury; the questioning of a suspected burglar
by a police officer, where the suspect would have been free to
leave the interview; and the questioning of a suspect at his home
by IRS officers concerning a criminal tax fraud.''
Second, the Court has held that a defendant's pretrial state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda can be used for purposes
of impeachment, if the defendant takes the stand and gives an
inconsistent story at trial. This rule was established by the deci-
sions in Harris v. New York, 50 in which the defendant was not
given full Miranda warnings, and in Oregon v. Hass,"1 in which
statements were obtained from the defendant after he requested
counsel. In finding such statements admissible for impeachment
in Harris,"' the Court rejected contrary dictum in the Miranda
decision. 58
Third, in Michigan v. Mosley,25' the Court showed some flexi-
bility about a later renewal of questioning after a suspect says
that he does not want to talk. The Miranda decision had stated
that questioning must cease immediately in such a case, but had
said nothing about whether it could be resumed later on. In
Mosley, the defendant initially refused to be questioned about
his involvement in a robbery. About two hours later, however, a
248. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. Rzv. 99,
99-101, 168-69.
249. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (questioning by probation of-
ficer); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (plurality opinion) (grand jury
witness); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (non-custodial police interrogation of
burglary suspect); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (questioning at sus-
pect's home by IRS investigators).
250. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
251. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
252. 401 U.S. at 224.
253. 384 U.S. at 476-77.
254. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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different officer presented Mosley with an alleged statement by
an accomplice that Mosley had been the trigger man in an unre-
lated homicide. Mosley then made an inculpatory statement.
The Court found this statement to be admissible under the facts
of the case.
Several post-Miranda developments merit more detailed anal-
ysis. The most important is the Supreme Court's rejection of the
essential premise of the Miranda decision in Michigan v.
Tucker15 and later decisions. There have also been significant
developments relating to the use of pretrial silence at trial and
to the right to counsel at pretrial interrogation.
1. The Non-Constitutional Status of Miranda's System
a. The decisions in Michigan v. Tucker, New York v.
Quarles, and Oregon v. Elstad- The Miranda decision did not
hold that the rules it promulgated were required by the fifth
amendment, but did hold that the fifth amendment would nec-
essarily be violated if statements were obtained in a custodial
interrogation in which Miranda's rules or equally effective alter-
native safeguards were not observed. The current Court, how-
ever, has rejected the view that compliance with Miranda is con-
stitutionally required even in this contingent sense.
The first case on this point was Michigan v. Tucker,256 which
arose from a rape and battery committed by the defendant
Tucker. Tucker was questioned without full Miranda warnings,
and gave exculpatory responses. 7 However, his statements led
the police to a witness, Henderson, who ultimately gave testi-
mony at trial that was damaging to Tucker. The question was
whether Henderson's testimony should have been excluded,
since it was obtained indirectly through an interrogation that
was not in compliance with Miranda.
In Wong Sun v. United States, " the Supreme Court had
held that evidence which is the "fruit" of a fourth amendment
violation is inadmissible. The Court distinguished this precedent
255. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
256. 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, Black-
mun, and Stewart, JJ.; Brennan, Marshall and White, JJ., concurring in the judgment;
Douglas, J., dissenting).
257. The warnings were incomplete because the interrogation occurred before the Mi-
randa decision. However, Tucker had not been tried by the time of the decision, and
Miranda was applied retroactively in such cases. See supra text accompanying notes
.219-20.
258. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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on the ground that despite the violation of Miranda, there had
been no violation of a constitutional right of the defendant
Tucker. The Court explained:
[T]he Court in Miranda, for the first time, expressly de-
clared that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable
to state interrogations at a police station . . . . To sup-
plement this new doctrine, and to help police officers
conduct interrogations without facing a continued risk
that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in Mi-
randa established a set of protective guidelines, now
commonly known as the Miranda rules . . . . [These
were a] series of recommended "procedural safeguards"
.... The Court recognized that these procedural safe-
guards were not themselves rights protected by the Con-
stitution but were instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected
. . A comparison of the facts in this case with the his-
torical circumstances underlying the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the
police conduct here did not deprive respondent of his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such,
but rather failed to make available to him the full mea-
sure of procedural safeguards associated with that right
since Miranda . ...
Our determination that the interrogation in this case
involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right
against compulsory self-incrimination does not mean
there was not a disregard, albeit an inadvertent disre-
gard, of the procedural rules later established in Miranda
S. .. This Court has also said . . . that the "fruits" of
police conduct which actually infringed a defendant's
fourth amendment rights must be suppressed. But we
have already concluded that the police conduct at issue
here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only
from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this
Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege. Thus, in
deciding whether Henderson's testimony must be ex-
cluded, there is no controlling precedent of this Court to
guide us.2 9
259. 417 U.S. at 443-46.
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The Court then went on to determine that, as a matter of policy,
the costs of applying Miranda's exclusionary rule in the type of
fact situation presented in the case would outweigh any benefit
from doing so.
The essential departure from Miranda in Michigan v. Tucker
was the Court's conclusion that the fifth amendment had not
been violated, though the police had not fully complied with Mi-
randa and had not observed any alternative system of safe-
guards. As discussed earlier, Miranda was predicated on the fic-
tion that compulsion in violation of the fifth amendment
necessarily occurs in such cases. Michigan v. Tucker accordingly
repudiated the doctrinal basis of the Miranda decision. 60
This changed perspective was given an application of greater
practical significance in the case of New York v. Quarles.21 In
Quarles, police officers were approached by a woman who told
them that she had been raped by an armed man, and that the
man had gone into a nearby supermarket. Quarles was appre-
hended in the supermarket, and the arresting officers, on finding
that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster, asked him where
his gun was. In a subsequent prosecution for criminal possession
of a weapon, the state courts excluded Quarles' response identi-
fying the location of the gun he had discarded because he had
not been given Miranda warnings.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the danger created
by an unlocated firearm justified the creation of a "public
260. See Sonenshein, supra note 21, at 407-08, 425-28 ("[T]he authority now exists to
overrule Miranda .... Seemingly, the Court [in Michigan v. Tucker] utterly destroyed
both Miranda's rationale and its holding .... Somehow, Miranda survived, even
though the Court left it no legitimate, articulable legal source or basis .... The Court
* . . ignored or rejected the core rationale of Miranda, that custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive and that only compliance with the Miranda warnings procedure or
its equivalent can dispel the coercion"); Stone, supra note 248, at 118-20, 123 ("Mr. Jus-
tice Rehnquist's conclusion that there is a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause only
if a confession is involuntary . . . is an outright rejection of the core premises of Mi-
randa. ... The implications of.. . the [Michigan v. Tucker] opinion are potentially
devastating for Miranda. The Court deprived Miranda of a constitutional basis but did
not explain what other basis for it there might be. Thus, Tucker seems certainly to have
laid the groundwork to overrule Miranda"); see also United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d
1129, 1137 (10th Cir. 1975) ("We believe that Michigan v. Tucker .... although not
involving the provisions of [18 U.S.C.] § 3501 . . . did, in effect, adopt and uphold the
constitutionality of the provisions thereof").
261. 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Rehnquist, J. joined by Burger, C.J. and White, Powell, and
Blackmun, JJ.; Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting; O'Connor, J. dissenting
in part). Justice O'Connor's dissent was based on the concern that a "public safety"
exception would not provide sufficiently definite guidance to the police and would foster
litigation. She subsequently authored the opinion in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985), which was emphatic about the non-constitutional status of Miranda's rules. See
id. at 306-09.
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safety" exception to Miranda under the facts of the case. As in
Michigan v. Tucker, the Court rejected the contention that the
absence of warnings implied that compulsion in violation of the
fifth amendment had taken place.
Finally, in Oregon v. Elstad,262 the Court held that a confes-
sion obtained after proper Miranda warnings are given is not
rendered inadmissible on the ground that it is derived from or
motivated by an earlier inculpatory statement that was obtained
without Miranda warnings. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court again expressly rejected the notion that a violation of Mi-
randa necessarily entails a violation of the fifth amendment. As
in Michigan v. Tucker, the Court distinguished earlier decisions
holding the "fruits" of constitutional violations to be inadmissi-
ble on the ground that the defendant had not been subjected to
compulsion in violation of the fifth amendment despite the non-
compliance with Miranda.
b. The anomaly of Miranda's survival- These decisions evi-
dence the Supreme Court's willingness to accept incremental re-
strictions of Miranda, and may portend a receptivity to further
limitations in the future. In New York v. Quarles, for example,
the Court found that the hazard created by an unlocated firearm
in a public place outweighs the value of applying Miranda's ex-
clusionary rule. Leaving a criminal's gun at large creates a dan-
ger to the public, but leaving the criminal who wields the gun at
large creates an even greater danger. Considerations of this sort
might be sufficient in the future to persuade the Court to recog-
nize other limitations on Miranda in light of countervailing con-
cerns for protection of the public.
There is, however, a more fundamental sense in which the
doctrinal changes reflected in these decisions make it mysterious
how Miranda can continue to be applied at all in a case in which
Miranda is violated in an interrogation, but no actual compul-
sion takes place. Under the Supreme Court's current case law,
no violation of the fifth amendment occurs at the interrogation
in such a case, and the trial judge would not violate the fifth
amendment in admitting the resulting statements. Nevertheless,
Miranda requires that they be excluded.
In connection with state proceedings, this result is incompre-
hensible in relation to the Supreme Court's traditional view of
its relationship to the state courts. The Court has always re-
jected the idea that it has the authority to impose extra-consti-
262. 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.; Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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tutional requirements on the state courts. Yet applying Miranda
in such a case requires a state court to refrain from an ac-
tion-the admission of the suspect's voluntary statements-that
the Constitution permits.
Superficially, this problem is less acute in relation to federal
proceedings, since the Supreme Court has asserted a supervisory
authority to prescribe non-constitutional rules of evidence for
the lower federal courts. However, the Court's supervisory au-
thority only operates in areas in which Congress has left the
Court with discretion, and is subordinate to Congress's exercise
of the legislative power. In 18 U.S.C. § 3501, Congress has man-
dated that voluntary statements be admitted despite non-com-
pliance with Miranda's rules. Applying Miranda in such a case
accordingly requires a federal court to violate an Act of Con-
gress, though complying with the Act would involve no violation
of a constitutional right of the defendant.
There is no real explanation for the persistence of Miranda in
light of these considerations, aside from the fact that the Su-
preme Court has not yet faced up to them. If the Court were to
address these issues, it could preserve Miranda only by avowing
,a supervisory power over the state courts, and by avowing an
authority superior to that of Congress to exclude evidence in
federal proceedings in which its admission is required by statute
and consistent with the Constitution.
2. The Use of Pretrial Silence
In Harris v. New York and Oregon v. Hass,2 8 the Supreme
Court held that pretrial statements obtained in violation of Mi-
randa can be used at trial for impeachment, despite contrary
dictum in the Miranda decision. This naturally raised the ques-
tion whether a defendant's silence in custodial interrogation can
be used for impeachment, notwithstanding the dictum in Mi-
randa21" that asserted that the prosecution cannot use such si-
lence at trial.26 5
The Supreme Court had been presented with an analogous
question, forty years before Miranda, in the case of Raflel v.
United States.2 6 Raffel involved a defendant who failed to take
263. See supra text accompanying notes 250-53.
264. 384 U.S. at 479 n.48.
265. See generally supra Part I.B.2.c and Part II.A.2.d.
266. 271 U.S 494 (1926).
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the stand at trial. On retrial for the same offense, Raffel did take
the stand, and the prosecutor used his silence at the earlier trial
to impeach him in the course of cross-examination. Although ad-
verse comment by the prosecutor at the initial trial on the de-
fendant's failure to take the stand would clearly have been im-
proper,6 7 the Court held that it was consistent with the fifth
amendment and federal statutory law to use Raffel's earlier si-
lence for impeachment at the later trial.
Nevertheless, the Court held in Doyle v. Ohio02 " that a de-
fendant's silence following the receipt of Miranda warnings can-
not be used even for purposes of impeachment. The Court did
not base this decision on Miranda's theory that the admission of
pretrial silence unconstitutionally "penalizes" a person for re-
maining silent. Rather, the Court took the position that the Mi-
randa warnings implicitly represent to a suspect that he will suf-
fer no adverse consequences of any sort for remaining silent.
Violating this representation by later using a defendant's silence
for impeachment would amount to a denial of due process:
The State pleads necessity as justification for the pros-
ecutor's action in these cases. It argues that the discrep-
ancy between an exculpatory story at trial and silence at
time of arrest gives rise to an inference that the story was
fabricated somewhere along the way, perhaps to fit
within the seams of the State's case as it was developed
at pretrial hearings. Noting that the prosecutor usually
has little else with which to counter such an exculpatory
story, the State seeks only the right to cross-examine a
defendant as to post-arrest silence for the limited pur-
pose of impeachment ....
[W]e have concluded that the Miranda decision com-
pels rejection of the State's position. The warnings man-
dated by that case, as a prophylactic means of safeguard-
ing fifth amendment rights . . . require that a person
taken into custody be advised immediately that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be
used against him, and that he has a right to retained or
appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation. Si-
lence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more
than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights.
267. Such comment is barred by statute in federal proceedings. See supra text -ac-
companying notes 119-21.
268. 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and by Brennan, Stewart,
White, and Marshall, JJ.; Stevens, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
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Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous
because of what the State is required to advise the per-
son arrested ....
Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings
contain no express assurance that silence will carry no
penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who re-
ceives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to
allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach
an explanation subsequently offered at trial. 69
Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted sensibly that a defendant
who remains silent in reliance on a representation he discerns in
the Miranda warnings is free to offer that explanation at trial,
but the majority was not persuaded.
Consistent with the rationale of the decisions in Doyle v. Ohio
and Raffel v. United States, the Court has subsequently held
that there is no problem with admitting pretrial silence for im-
peachment where the defendant has not been given Miranda
warnings. Thus, in Jenkins v. Anderson, 70 the Court held that
the defendant's failure to come forward to the police with his
story during a two-week period between the commission of the
crime and his arrest could be used to attack the credibility of his
trial testimony. Similarly, in Fletcher v. Weir,27' the Court held
that the silence of a suspect in custody prior to his receipt of
Miranda warnings can be admitted for impeachment:
The significant difference between the present case and
Doyle is that the record does not indicate that respon-
dent Weir received any Miranda warnings during the pe-
riod in which he remained silent immediately after his
arrest . . . . In Jenkins, as in other post-Doyle cases, we
have consistently explained Doyle as a case where the
government had induced silence by implicitly assuring
the defendant that his silence would not be used against
him ....
In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances em-
bodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that
269. 426 U.S. at 616-18.
270. 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist, JJ.). Justice Stewart concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented.
271. 455 U.S. 603 (1982). The decision was per curiam. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall objected to the disposition of the case without argument.
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it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-
examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant
chooses to take the stand. 7'
In sum, the use of a defendant's pretrial silence is currently
barred in most cases in which it might be useful by the Supreme
Court's decision in Doyle v. Ohio. However, since Doyle depends
on an implicit representation that the Court has discerned in the
Miranda warnings, it could be made inapplicable by reformu-
lating the warnings so that they could not reasonably be under-
stood as carrying such a representation, or by advising suspects
explicitly that refusals to answer can be admitted in evidence or
used against them.73
In light of Jenkins v. Anderson and Fletcher v. Weir, there
should then be no constitutional problem with using a defen-
dant's silence while in police custody to impeach his testimony
at trial.2 74 The question would remain whether pretrial silence
can be admitted if the defendant fails to take the stand. How-
ever, since the only contrary authority on this point is gratuitous
dictum in the Miranda decision, announced in a footnote with-
out supporting argumentation, there would be no direct prece-
dential impediment to finding that a defendant's pretrial silence
can be disclosed in such cases as well. 7
272. 455 U.S. at 605-07.
273. For example, an additional admonition along the following lines might be given:
"Whether or not you choose to talk, the occurrences at this interrogation may be dis-
closed at trial," or: "If you choose to remain silent, that fact may cast doubt on any story
or explanation you offer later on."
274. In United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), the Court excluded use of a fed-
eral defendant's pretrial silence following the receipt of Miranda warnings as an eviden-
tiary matter. This was a non-constitutional case decided under the Court's supervisory
power. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 617-18 n.8. A change in the warnings to avoid the
constitutional problem under Doyle v. Ohio would accordingly not necessarily change the
rule applied in federal proceedings. However, since the court in United States v. Hale
attached some weight to the fact that the defendant might have remained silent in reli-
ance on the Miranda warnings, the Court might be willing to reconsider or distinguish
Hale if the warnings were formulated differently.
275. The Supreme Court has not endorsed Miranda's dictum on this point in any
subsequent decision. In Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986), the Court held
that pretrial silence following Miranda warnings cannot be admitted as evidence in the
government's case in chief-in that case, as evidence of the defendant's sanity-but the
decision was based on the Doyle v. Ohio due process rationale.
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3. The Right to Counsel
The period following Miranda has also produced significant
developments in the right to counsel prior to trial. Cases have
been decided relating to Miranda's fifth amendment right to
counsel-which the Court now regards as a non-constitutional,
"prophylactic" right-and to the right to counsel under the
sixth amendment. The upshot of this development is that the
Supreme Court no longer recognizes any constitutional right to
counsel in connection with police interrogations, except when an
interrogation takes place after the commencement of adversarial
judicial proceedings.
The principal right-to-counsel case drawing on Miranda was
Edwards v. Arizona,' 6 which addressed the circumstances in
which questioning can be resumed after a suspect invokes his
right to counsel. The Miranda decision had stated that ques-
tioning cannot resume in such a case "until an attorney is pres-
ent," but had not considered the effect of an intervening waiver
of Miranda rights by a suspect. The Court in Edwards v. Ari-
zona held, in effect, that a repetition of Miranda warnings and a
normal waiver of rights following a request for counsel is not
enough, and that questioning can resume prior to the appear-
ance of counsel in such a case only if the suspect himself "initi-
ates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the
police."'277 While this case was unusual for the current Court, in
that statements were actually suppressed on the authority of
Miranda, it did not signal any renewed commitment to Mi-
randa's principles. Rather, the Court simply applied the Mi-
randa decision, and resolved one issue in the operation of its
system that Miranda itself had not decided.2 78
A second line of decisions has involved applications and ex-
tensions of the rule of Massiah v. United States,7 9 which recog-
nized a pretrial right to counsel under the sixth amendment, and
took an expansive view of what police practices would constitute
a violation of that right.2 80 Thus, in United States v. Henry
81
276. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
277. Id. at 484-85.
278. The Court has subsequently taken a generous view of the actions by a suspect
-that can be regarded as an "initiation" which justifies a renewal of interrogation under
the rule of Edwards v. Arizona. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
279. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
281. 447 U.S. 264 (1980)
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and Maine v. Moulton,82 the Court held inadmissible state-
ments obtained by informants from indicted defendants who
were not aware that they were dealing with government
operatives.
Another application of Massiah occurred in the case of Brewer
v. Williams," ' which arose from the defendant Williams' rape
and murder of a ten-year-old girl in 1968. Williams was arrested
and arraigned before a judge on an arrest warrant that had been
issued against him. In the course of Williams' subsequent trans-
portation to another city by police officers, one of the officers
urged him to disclose the location of his victim's body, and he
ultimately did so. Williams' conviction was later reversed in fed-
eral habeas corpus proceedings because of the admission of his
statements and derivative evidence at trial, and the Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal. The sixth amendment right had at-
tached, in the Court's view, because of Williams' arraignment in
court on the arrest warrant. This brought the rule of Massiah v.
United States into play and required the exclusion of Williams'
statements, since he made them without counsel present and
had not made an adequate waiver of his right to counsel.
However, in United States v. Gouveia,'" the Supreme Court
held squarely that the sixth amendment right to counsel can at-
tach no earlier than the filing of an indictment or information,
or the initial appearance of the defendant in court to answer
charges. Gouveia involved prisoners, suspected of murdering an-
other inmate, who had been held in administrative detention
units for a period of nineteen months, without counsel, prior to
the return of an indictment against them. In responding to the
prisoners' contention that this violated their right to counsel
under the sixth amendment, the Court held that "the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only when formal judicial
proceedings are initiated against an individual by way of indict-
ment, information, arraignment, or preliminary hearing.""'
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that earlier deci-
sions consistently supported the proposition that the sixth
amendment right does not attach until the initiation of adver-
sarial judicial proceedings, the only possible exceptions being
282. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
283. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
284. 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and O'Connor, White,
Powell, and Blackmun, JJ.). Justices Stevens and Brennan concurred in the judgment.
Justice Marshall dissented.
285. Id. at 185 (citing plurality opinion in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)).
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Miranda v. Arizona and Escobedo v. Illinois.2 8' However, Mi-
randa and Escobedo were held to be irrelevant to the sixth
amendment issue on the ground that they involved counsel
rights created to protect the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination.1
87
In sum, the decision in Edwards v. Arizona has no significance
independent of the Miranda decision because it simply involved
an application of Miranda's right to counsel. Like the other fea-
tures of Miranda's system, the Supreme Court now regards this
as a non-constitutional prophylactic rule. The Court has contin-
ued to engage in muscular applications of the rule of Massiah v.
United States, relating to the sixth amendment right to counsel,
but all of these applications have involved defendants who had
been indicted or brought into court to answer charges. The only
case which provided significant support for a sixth amendment
right to counsel in police interrogations at an earlier stage was
Escobedo v. Illinois. In Gouveia v. United States, however, the
Court characterized Escobedo's right to counsel, like Miranda's,
as a prophylactic measure designed to protect the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination. The Court further held in
Gouveia that the sixth amendment right does not attach prior to
the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings. Because
,police interrogations usually occur prior to that point, it would
286. The rule of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), which created a right to
counsel at police lineups, might also have appeared to be inconsistent with Gouveia's
holding that the sixth amendment right does not attach prior to the commencement of
adversarial judicial proceedings. However, Wade and its companion case, Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), involved post-indictment lineups. The opinion of the Court
in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), whose view of the sixth amendment was en-
dorsed by a majority of the Court in Gouveia, limited the application of Wade and Gil-
bert to identification procedures taking place after the commencement of adversarial ju-
dicial proceedings.
287. Gouveia's characterization of Miranda as irrelevant to sixth amendment ques-
tions was clearly accurate. Miranda's rules were justified as necessary to protect the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. Gouveia's characterization of Escobedo v.
Illinois as establishing a prophylactic right related to the fifth amendment was inconsis-
tent with the language of the holding in Escobedo, but consistent with its substance.
Escobedo premised its result on a finding that the sixth amendment had been violated,
but only held that such a violation would occur if a suspect's request to consult with
counsel is denied and he is not advised by the police of his right to remain silent. See
supra text accompanying notes 139-41. The only right to the assistance of counsel that
can be derived from Escobedo is accordingly a right to have counsel for the purpose of
,advising a suspect of his right to remain silent. This understanding would explain the
conjoint condition on the holding in Escobedo: If the police have already told a suspect
,that he need not talk, it would be superfluous to give him a lawyer for the purpose of
telling him the same thing. Viewed in these terms, Escobedo's right to counsel was a
;prophylactic measure designed to safeguard the right against self-incrimination, as the
Court in Gouveia stated.
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be accurate to say that the Supreme Court's current case law
generally rejects the existence of any constitutional right to
counsel in custodial police interrogations.
III. THE QUESTIONING OF THE ACCUSED IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS
The opinion of the Court in the Miranda decision pointed to
the laws of several foreign countries as evidence that Miranda's
rules would not be seriously detrimental to law enforcement.
Following a description of the most restrictive features of the
interrogation systems in these jurisdictions, the Court stated
that: "There appears to have been no marked detrimental effect
on criminal law enforcement in these jurisdictions as a result of
these rules." '
However, the Court's review of foreign law was both superfi-
cial and misleading. As Justice Harlan observed in his Miranda
dissent: "The law of the foreign countries described by the
Court. . . reflects a more moderate conception of the rights of
the accused as against those of society when other data are con-
sidered."' 89 This "more moderate conception" is evident when
consideration is given to foreign rules and practices regarding
such matters as: (1) the timing and content of required warn-
ings; (2) the scope and definition of the right to counsel; (3) the
existence of other opportunities, beside police interrogation, for
compulsory questioning of defendants; (4) the consequences of
failures by the police to observe the rules; (5) the admissibility
of evidence derived from improperly elicited confessions, and
the effect of the evidence on the admissibility of the confessions
themselves; and (6) the use against a person of his refusal to
answer questions.
The discussion in this part examines these issues and other
pertinent aspects of law in England, Scotland, Canada, India,
France, and West Germany.290
288. 384 U.S. at 489.
289. Id. at 521-22.
290. England, Scotland, and India are three of the countries that were cited as sup-
porting precedent in the Miranda decision. See 384 U.S. 486-89. The Court also pointed
to the law of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), but we have not attempted to obtain information
on interrogation practices in that country, since it was merely mentioned in passing as
having the same evidentiary provisions as India. Canada, France and Germany have been
included in our survey on account of their political and cultural similarities to the
United States, and the availability of adequate descriptive materials concerning their
legal systems.
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A. England
In England, standards for police questioning are set by the
"Judges' Rules."2 91 The Rules provide that when there are rea-
sonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an
offense, he is to be given the following caution prior to question-
ing: "You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do
so but what you say may be put into writing and given in evi-
dence." Once an officer has enough evidence to prefer a charge
against a person, he should "without delay cause that person to
be charged or informed that he may be prosecuted." At that
point a similar admonition is required, and further questioning
thereafter is limited to "exceptional cases."
The Rules do not require an admonition concerning a right to
counsel at any point. They do provide that "every person at any
stage of an investigation should be able to communicate and to
consult privately with a solicitor." However, this principle is
qualified by a provision that a person in custody need not be
allowed access to counsel if that would cause "unreasonable de-
lay or hindrance ... to the processes of investigation or the ad-
ministration of justice." As a practical matter, the police are free
to deny access to counsel, and to hold suspects incommunicado
for questioning. There is also no offer of, or right to, free counsel
for suspects who cannot retain counsel. 92
Superficially, the Rules might appear to establish a restrictive
standard for custodial police interrogations through the provi-
sions that a suspect is to be charged or advised that he may be
prosecuted without delay once there is sufficient evidence to do
so, and that thereafter he is not to be questioned outside of "ex-
ceptional cases." However, this Rule does not significantly limit
such interrogations in practice, since the police are free to make
arrests on reasonable suspicion without formally charging a per-
son or advising him of an intent to prosecute. As a practical
matter, suspects are routinely interrogated by the police at the
stationhouse following arrest. Few suspects remain silent in the
face of such questioning, and most confess or make incriminat-
ing statements as a result. 93
291. The Judges' Rules are reproduced in Kaci, Confessions: A Comparison of Exclu-
sion Under Miranda in the United States and Under the Judges' Rules in England, 10
AM. J. CrIM. L. 87, 109-12 (1982).
292. See id. at 88; Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAD. L. REV. 1417, 1441 n.118
'(1985); Zander, Access to a Solicitor in the Police Station, 1972 CRIM. L. RV. 342.
293. See Lidstone, Investigative Powers and the Rights of the Citizen, 1981 CraM. L.
Rav. 454, 463-65; Mitchell, Confessions and Police Interrogation of Suspects, 1983 CRm.
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The admissibility of pretrial statements at trial generally de-
pends on their voluntariness. The voluntariness standard is un-
derstood as excluding statements made as a result of a fear of
prejudice or hope of advantage held out by a person in author-
ity, or as a result of "oppression." In theory, judges also have a
discretionary authority to exclude voluntary statements ob-
tained through violations of the Judges' Rule, but rarely do so as
a practical matter."9 4
At trial, both the judge and the prosecutor may comment on
the defendant's pretrial silence. The judge, but not the prosecu-
tor, may comment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial.29
B. Scotland
At the time of the Miranda decision, Scotland followed a
highly restrictive approach to interrogation, effectively barring
police questioning of a person in custody.29 However, a statu-
tory interrogation procedure has subsequently been created by
the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act of 1980.
The Act authorizes the police to detain a person on reasonable
suspicion for up to six hours for purposes of interrogation and
other investigation. The police are required to advise a person
detained pursuant to this authority of the reason for the deten-
tion, and to inform him that he is not obligated to answer ques-
tions. The suspect must also be advised of the right to have a
solicitor and "one other person reasonably named by him" in-
formed of the fact that he is being detained and of the place of
detention. However, he has no right to speak to those persons
during the period of detention; they have no right of access to
him; and notice to outside parties may be delayed by the police
as long as necessary "in the interest of the investigation." This
L. REV. 596; Zander, The Investigation of Crime: A Study of Cases Tried at the Old
Bailey, 1979 CRIM. L. REv. 203, 211-16.
294. See Gerstein, The Self-Incrimination Debate in Great Britian, 27 Au. J. Coup.
L. 81, 88 & n.42 (1979); Schrager, Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Confes-
sions: England, Canada and Australia, 26 McGILL L.J. 435, 435-36, 452-53, 481-82
(1981).
295. See Greenawalt, Perspectives on the Right to Silence in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 235, 240, 243 (Hood ed. 1974).
296. See Hardin, Other Answers: Search and Seizure, Coerced Confession, and
Criminal Trial in Scotland, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 171-74 (1964). But cf. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 522 & n.21 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting countervailing advantages of prosecu-
tion under Scottish procedure).
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restrictive approach reflects the fact that an avowed purpose of
the detention is the isolation of the suspect.
During the authorized period of detention, the police may
search the suspect, take fingerprints and the like, and interro-
gate him concerning the suspected offense. At the end of six
hours, the suspect must be released or formally arrested.29
C. Canada
In Canada, the police are required to inform an arrestee of the
charge against him; to advise him of his right to "retain and in-
struct counsel"; and to bring him before a justice, if one is avail-
able, within twenty-four hours of his arrest. There is, however,
no required offer of appointed counsel for suspects who cannot
retain counsel and no right to refuse to be questioned.29
The admissibility of statements made to the police generally
depends on their voluntariness. The voluntariness requirement
is interpreted as barring the admission of statements obtained
through a fear of prejudice or hope of advantage held out by a
person in authority. However, if real evidence is discovered as
the result of an involuntary statement, the evidence is admissi-
ble along with the portion of the statement that it confirms.299
The Canadian constitution provides a right to trial by jury in
connection with offenses punishable by imprisonment for five or
more years. There is a statutory prohibition of comment on a
defendant's failure to testify, but this rule is taken loosely. Ob-
lique references to a defendant's silence are allowed-e.g., char-
acterizing the government's evidence as "uncontradicted"-and
297. Police Powers Falling Short of Arrest, 1981 ScoTs LAW TIMES 173, 174-77.
298. See Caswell, The Law Reform Commission of Canada: The Proposed Canada
Evidence Act and Statements by an Accused, 63 CAN. B. REv. 322, 324-25 (1985); Pye,
The Rights of Persons Accused of Crime Under the Canadian Constitution: A Compar-
ative Perspective, 45 LAW & CONTrEMP. PROBs. 221, 227, 231-33 (Autumn 1982);
Ratushny, Self-Incrimination: Nailing the Coffin Shut, 20 CraM. L. Q. 312, 321-22
(1978). See also Law Reform Comm'n of Canada, Questioning Suspects 56 (1984)
(Working Paper 32) (practice in Canadian police agencies is to give warning concerning
right to remain silent, though such a warning is not legally mandatory).
299. See Ratushny, supra note 298, at 318-21, 326-28; Schrager, supra note 294, at
495-96. But cf. Caswell, supra note 298, at 330-36 (arguing that voluntariness standard
may require exclusion of statements outside of "threat or promise" situations, such as in
those involving "oppression"); Pye, supra note 298, at 243-45 (constitutional provision
for exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights where admission
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute).
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both triers and reviewing courts are free to draw adverse infer-
ences from such silence.3 00
D. India
Indian law regulates police interrogations in an indirect way
through a general rule that limits the admissibility of confes-
sions to cases in which the confession was voluntarily given
before a magistrate, and that excludes the use of confessions
given to the police.30' However, the rule barring confessions
made to the police is subject to an exception in cases in which
other evidence is discovered as a result of a suspect's statement.
In such cases the portion of the statement that "relates dis-
tinctly to the fact thereby discovered" may be admitted at trial,
along with the evidence derived from it.
Trials in India are usually conducted by a, judge alone, but
juries are used in some restricted geographic areas .3 0 The de-
fendant is free to refrain from taking the stand and testifying
under oath, and comment is not allowed on his failure to do so.
However, the judge is allowed to question the unsworn defen-
dant at any time during the trial, and is required to do so-at
least if the defendant is not represented by counsel-at the end
of the presentation of the prosecution's case. This procedure
serves to enable the accused "to explain any circumstances ap-
pearing in the evidence against him," and the judge, to this end,
is required to question the defendant "separately about each
material circumstance which is intended to be used against
him." Questioning by the judge operates to the detriment of the
guilty-as well as serving as a shield to the innocent-since the
code of criminal procedure authorizes the court or jury to draw
adverse inferences from a refusal to answer or from a false
answer.
300. See Pye, supra note 298, at 237; Ratushny, supra note 298, at 342-46; Ratushny,
Is There a Right Against Self-Incrimination in Canada?, 19 McGILL L.J. 1, 33-41 (1973).
301. The account of Indian law in this section is generally based on Developments in
the Law-Confessions, supra note 70, at 1106-14.
302. See Sharma, "Law and Order" and Protection of the Rights of the Accused in
the United States and in India: A General Framework for Comparison, 21 BUFFALO L.
REV. 361, 398 (1972).
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E. France
Under French law, the police may detain suspects for a period
of twenty-four or forty-eight hours for purposes of investigation.
Suspects may be held incommunicado and interrogated during
that period. There is no right to warnings or counsel in such in-
terrogations. The French system also provides multiple opportu-
nities for judicial interrogation of defendants, and freely allows
adverse inferences to be drawn from a defendant's silence.
In greater detail, investigative detentions by the police of sus-
pects and other witnesses are permitted. The period of detention
is limited to twenty-four hours, but may be extended to forty-
eight hours with the permission of a prosecutor. The police are
required to include in the case report information showing the
duration and frequency of interrogations in this period, but are
otherwise generally free of formal constraints. A suspect is not
legally obligated to answer questions, but the police are not re-
quired to advise him of this fact and defense counsel do not par-
ticipate at this stage of the process. Confessions obtained
through physical abuse are inadmissible, but such abuse rarely
occurs. Lesser forms of pressure by the police do not affect the
admissibility of a suspect's statements.303
If police investigation fails to clear a suspect, he may be
charged and brought before a magistrate for further develop-
ment of the case. The magistrate is required to advise the de-
fendant of the charge against him and to inform him that he is
not required to talk. The magistrate also advises the defendant
that he may choose counsel or have counsel designated by the
court. If the defendant waives counsel, the interrogation may
proceed immediately. If the defendant requests counsel, further
proceedings are deferred so as to provide counsel with an oppor-
tunity to review the prosecution's evidence prior to the
examination.
While the defendant has a right to have counsel present when
questioning by the magistrate takes place, his attorney may not
question the defendant or other witnesses without the permis-
sion of the magistrate, and the defendant may not confer with
his attorney prior to answering particular questions. A refusal by
the defendant to answer questions would result in adverse infer-
303. Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REv.
131, 156-57, 158-59, 161, 167-68, 177-78 (1983); Developments in the Law-Confessions,
supra note 70, at 1115-16.
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ences being drawn by the magistrate, and later by the court at
trial.30'
French criminal cases are tried before judges alone, or before
mixed tribunals including both judges and laypersons in the case
of more serious offenses. The judges have at their disposal a dos-
sier containing the results of earlier investigative efforts, includ-
ing the pretrial interrogation of the defendant. The trial nor-
mally opens with the questioning of the defendant by the
presiding judge. The defendant may refuse to answer, but rarely
does so, since this would involve remaining silent in the face of
direct questioning in the presence of the trier, and since such




German procedure has historically been influenced by the
French system. However, its rules relating to the interrogation of
suspects and defendants have taken on a more restrictive char-
acter as a result of reaction to the practices of the Nazi regime
and other developments.
The German police are authorized to arrest a suspect for pur-
poses of interrogation and other investigation. Detention pursu-
ant to this authority cannot extend beyond the end of the day
following the arrest, after which the suspect must be released or
brought before a judge. Various forms of overreaching are pro-
hibited by the Code of Criminal Procedure, including eliciting
statements by "ill-treatment," fatigue, physical abuse, or decep-
tion. Statements obtained by these proscribed means are auto-
matically inadmissible at trial. However, the courts have given a
narrow reading to these provisions, and there is no "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine. Thus, evidence derived from an unlaw-
fully obtained confession can be used at trial.3 °
304. See Hrones, Interrogation Abuses by the Police in France-A Comparative So-
lution, 12 CRIM. L.Q. 68, 78 (1969); Tomlinson, supra note 303, at 171; Developments in
the Law-Confessions, supra note 70, at 1116-18.
305. Tomlinson, supra note 303, at 173-74; Developments in the Law-Confessions,
supra note 70, at 1118-19.
306. See Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1049-
51 (1983); Clemens, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations under Foreign Law:
Germany, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POL. Sci. 59, 59-63 (1961); Jescheck, Principles
of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison with American Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 239,
245-46 (1970).
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The police are also supposed to advise a suspect that he has a
right to respond to the accusation against him, or to refrain from
answering the charge, and that he has a right to consult with
defense counsel. However, violations of the warnings rule do not
make resulting statements inadmissible at trial. As a practical
matter, the police usually engage in informal conversation with a
suspect, without warnings, "to get his side of the story," and are
likely to defer giving the statutory warning until a later point in
the interrogation.so
Trials in Germany are conducted by judges or by mixed tribu-
nals including both judges and laypersons. Questioning is pri-
marily carried out by judges. The defendant is initially ques-
tioned concerning his personal history and general
circumstances, and then is advised that he has the option of re-
maining silent prior to the second phase of questioning, which
relates to the charge against him. This option is rarely elected,
however, since it would require an overt refusal in open court to
submit to questioning. Moreover, since there is no separate hear-
ing regarding the sentence, total silence by the defendant would
deprive him of the opportunity to testify concerning facts relat-
ing to the offense in mitigation of punishment. If the defendant
does answer some questions, but refuses to answer others, ad-
verse inferences may be drawn from the refusal.308
G. Conclusion
The foregoing review of foreign jurisdictions suggests some
common principles concerning the role of the police and the
rights of individuals in the investigative phase of criminal cases.
All agree that suspects should not be coerced into making in-
criminating statements, and more or less extensive procedural
rules are prescribed in most instances as safeguards against
overreaching. However, the critical question in determining the
admissibility of statements is likely to be whether they are vol-
untary or uncoerced in some specified sense, and not whether
the police observed the prescribed procedures. Moreover, most
of the jurisdictions surveyed clearly share the perception that
society's choice not to compel a person to answer incriminating
307. See Bradley, supra note 306, at 1051-52 & n.110; Schlesinger, Comparative
Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 361,
377 & n.74 (1977).
308. See Bradley, supra note 306, at 1052 & nn.105-06; Jescheck, supra note 306, at
-243-49; Schlesinger, supra note 307, at 379-80.
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questions does not require that it also permit him to remain si-
lent at no risk to himself, thereby-in effect-obstructing the
investigation. Rather, the common view is that the trier should
be allowed to draw adverse inferences from a defendant's failure
to tell what he knows at some stage in the process.
Beyond these common themes, the specifics of interrogation
law and practice differ from country to country. More to the
point of this Report, however, they differ from the rules that
have been imposed in the United States by the Miranda deci-
sion. Warnings may not be required at all at the initial stage of
police interrogation, and any warnings that are required may be
quite different from Miranda's. Even where warnings are re-
quired, their omission need not result in the exclusion of subse-
quent statements. The countries surveyed also show that a sub-
stantive right to counsel may not be recognized at all in
connection with police interrogation, and that any right which is
recognized may be drastically narrower than the counsel right
created by Miranda.
In sum, an examination of the law of other countries does not
support the view that any of the features of Miranda's system
are essential to fairness to suspects and defendants. The preva-
lence of practices prohibited by Miranda in other civilized na-
tions tends to substantiate the desirability of reconsidering the
system employed in this country.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Having reviewed the development of the law of pretrial inter-
rogation from its medieval origins to the present, and having
considered the corresponding legal doctrines of several foreign
nations whose political and cultural values are similar to our
own, we have a number of recommendations concerning the fu-
ture development of this law in the United States. In brief, our
advice is as follows:
First, the Department of Justice should seek to persuade the
Supreme Court to abrogate or overrule the decision in Miranda
v. Arizona. The most promising line of attack involves reliance
on the statute enacted in 1968 to achieve that end, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501. The Supreme Court's decisions in Michigan v. Tucker,
New York v. Quarles, and Oregon v. Elstad, which held that
non-compliance with Miranda does not entail any violation of
the Constitution, imply that the Court would now uphold the
validity of this statute.
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Second, we recommend that an administrative policy setting
standards for the conduct of custodial interrogations by the De-
partment's law enforcement agencies be formulated promptly
and put into effect concurrently with our renewal of litigation
challenging the validity of the Miranda decision. Promulgating
such a policy would increase the likelihood of judicial acceptance
of the abrogation of Miranda, ensure that the enlarged freedom
of action resulting from Miranda's demise will be exercised
responsibly, and demonstrate that implementing alternative pro-
cedures would promote fair treatment of suspects as well as fur-
thering effective law enforcement.
Third, we have a number of specific suggestions concerning
the directions our interrogation policy might take if and when
the Supreme Court confirms that Miranda is no longer binding.
A. Reasons For Abrogating Miranda
There are several considerations supporting the recommenda-
tion that we should seek to have Miranda overruled:
First, the continued application of Miranda violates the con-
stitutional separation of powers and basic principles of federal-
ism. Miranda's promulgation of a code of procedure for interro-
gations constituted a usurpation of legislative and
administrative powers, thinly disguised as an exercise in consti-
tutional exegesis, which rested on fictions and specious argu-
ments. The current Court has repudiated the premises on which
Miranda was based, but has drawn back from recognizing the
full implications of its decisions. We are left with admittedly
non-constitutional rules that continue to be applied in both fed-
eral and state proceedings, despite a contrary Act of Congress at
the federal level and an admitted lack of supervisory authority
to enforce such rules against the state courts. Fidelity to the
Constitution's plan of government requires that this situation be
corrected.3"
Second, Miranda, by impeding the prosecution of crime, im-
pairs the ability of government to protect the public. Compli-
ance with Miranda markedly reduces the willingness of suspects
to respond to questioning by the police. 1' In a substantial pro-
portion of criminal cases, confessions and other statements from
309. See supra Part II.C.1.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 215-18.
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the defendant are indispensable to a successful prosecution.311
When statements are not obtained in such cases through the op-
eration of Miranda's system, criminals go free. Other damage to
the operation of the criminal justice system includes the need to
expend limited investigative resources in developing cases that
might easily have been made had the suspect cooperated; the
need to accept pleas that are not commensurate with the seri-
ousness of the actual offense, where a case has been weakened
through the unavailability of the defendant's statements; and
the need to expend prosecutorial and judicial resources in liti-
gating questions of compliance with Miranda's formalities.
31 2
Third, Miranda's system is a poorly conceived means of pro-
tecting suspects from coercion and overreaching in police inter-
rogations. Its consequences are to divide suspects into two clas-
ses: those who "stand on their rights," and those who waive their
rights and submit to questioning. The effect of Miranda on sus-
pects in the former class is not to protect them from abusive
questioning, but to enable them to insulate themselves from any
sort of questioning.31 3 In cases in which suspects do waive their
rights, interrogations can be carried out much as they were
before Miranda. In such instances Miranda is, in particular, vir-
tually worthless as a safeguard against the specific interrogation
practices that were characterized as abusive in the Miranda de-
cision and cited as the empirical justification for Miranda's
reforms:
The last laugh in the Miranda episode was not had by its
author, Earl Warren. . . but by Fred E. Inbau and John
E. Reid, the authors of the interrogation manual that he
quoted frequently and with disapproval in the Miranda
decision. To show that secret interrogation was inher-
ently coercive, even without the rubber hose or third de-
gree, Warren exposed the techniques taught in that man-
ual and others, which enable the police to bring
311. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1464-65 (1985);
Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 216, at 15-16 (judgment that confession was probably
necessary to secure conviction in 20 percent of all cases surveyed).
312. See F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 289-96, 298-99; Tucker, True Confessions: The
Long Road Back from Miranda, NAT'L REV. 28, 31 (Oct. 18, 1985).
313. See generally Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 216, at 13 (over 40 percent of
suspects rely on Miranda to prevent all questioning in Pittsburgh study); id. at 13-14
n.37 (data on waiver of rights in Chicago, including information that majority of homi-
cide suspects claim right to remain silent or to counsel); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 215 (59% of arrestees in Philadelphia make no statement to police following
Miranda, up from estimated 10% prior to Miranda and Escobedo); Caplan, supra note
311, at 1466.
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psychological pressures to bear on the suspect to "per-
suade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitu-
tional rights." With this to recommend it, the manual be-
came a best seller among police and a second edition had
to be printed. "All but a few of the interrogation tactics
and techniques presented in our earlier publication are
still valid," the authors purred in their post-Miranda edi-
tion, adding that all that is required is to give the warn-
ings, get a waiver, and proceed.""
The judgment concerning Miranda's inadequacies on this score
is not limited to critics of any particular ideological stripe.
Rather, there has been broad agreement among writers on the
subject that Miranda is an inept means of protecting the rights
of suspects, and a failure in relation to its own premises and
objectives.
3 185
Fourth, Miranda is damaging to public confidence in the law,
and can result in gross injustices to crime victims. Miranda's
rules are completely rigid and formal, in the sense that no show-
ing, however strong, that a suspect's statements were freely
given and truthful is deemed sufficient to excuse non-compli-
ance. Cases accordingly arise in which perpetrators of the most
serious crimes secure the exclusion of their admissions or the re-
versal of their convictions on the basis of technical violations of
Miranda or related decisions that do not cast the slightest doubt
on their guilt. This can result in the freeing of known criminals
or the prolongation of the anguish of crime victims through
years of additional litigation. The perception of such cases by
members of the public must be that the system has become de-
ranged, treating their lives, their security and their deepest sen-
sibilities as pawns in an inscrutable game.316
314. F. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 315-16; see Note, Police Use of Trickery as an
.Interrogation Technique, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1167-68 (1979).
315. See Caplan, supra note 311, at 1425-26 n.47 (compilation of citations to writers
characterizing Miranda as inadequate or ineffective in protecting rights of suspects); F.
GRAHAM, supra note 50, at 182-83; Schlesinger, Witness Against Himself. The Self-In-
crimination Privilege as Public Policy, 3 CLAREMONT J. 55, 78-80 (Spring 1975); Note,
-Police Use of Trickery, supra note 314, at 1167-68, 1213.
316. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (overturning murder convic-
tion, despite compliance with warnings-and-waiver requirement, because questioning oc-
,curred after suspect had requested counsel); People v. Braeseke, 602 P.2d 384 (Cal. 1979)
(reversing conviction for triple murder because waiver of Miranda rights found inade-
quate on review); Letter of James K. Stewart, Director, National Institute of Justice, to
Attorney General Edwin Meese (Dec. 6, 1985) (materials documenting Ronnie Gaspard
case, in which contract murderer of government witness in narcotics case was freed be-
cause officers questioned him after he had been assigned counsel); Memorandum of As-
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Fifth, the Miranda decision has petrified the law of pretrial
interrogation for the past twenty years, foreclosing the possibil-
ity of developing and implementing alternatives that would be of
greater effectiveness both in protecting the public from crime
and in ensuring fair treatment of persons suspected of crime.
The decision immediately stifled the active ferment in the law of
pretrial interrogation that was underway at the time it was
handed down," and nothing much has changed since then.
Nothing is likely to change in the future as long as Miranda re-
mains in effect and perpetuates a perceived risk of invalidation
for any alternative system that departs from it.
On the other side, we see no substantial reasons for retaining
Miranda's system. The argument that it is necessary to guard
against abusive interrogations requires no lengthy discussion.
Miranda is not rationally designed to further that end,31 8 and it
has precluded the development of other approaches that would
avoid its shortcomings in that regard.
A second argument advanced in support of Miranda is that it
serves to promote equity among defendants who might other-
wise have disparate chances of avoiding conviction on account of
differences in their personal circumstances. The Miranda deci-
sion itself invoked this consideration in support of a broad defi-
nition of the right to counsel it created. 9 In the controversy
that followed the Miranda decision, apologists for Miranda also
frequently relied on this point in supporting its warning rules. In
the absence of such warnings, the argument ran, suspects who
happened to know of the rights covered by the warnings would
enjoy an unfair advantage in comparison with those who did not.
However, so long as interrogations are conducted so as to en-
sure that innocent suspects are not coerced into making false
admissions, this argument is without force. It is not unfair to
obtain and use a suspect's statements to convict him for a crime
that he has in fact committed, just because more knowledgeable
criminals are better able to exploit the rules of law to defeat
justice.2 0 As Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach observed:
"I have never understood why the gangster should be made the
sistant Attorney General Lois Haight Herrington to Attorney General Edwin Meese re-
garding Miranda (Oct. 18, 1985) (various cases, and impact on victims). See generally
Tucker, supra note 312, at 31-32.
317. See generally supra Part I.B.3.c & Part II.A.3.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73, 313-15.
319. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
320. See State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240, 250-51 (N.J. 1968); Caplan, supra note
311, at 1456-58; Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitu-
tional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 711 (1968).
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model and all others raised, in the name of equality, to his level
of success in suppressing evidence. This is simply the proposi-
tion that if some can beat the rap, all must beat the rap."32' If
disparities among defendants are to be addressed, the sensible
way to do so is by devising rules of pretrial interrogation that
minimize the potential for obstruction and manipulation by all
defendants.
A third argument offered in support of Miranda is that it pro-
vides "bright line" rules which were not provided by the due
process voluntariness standard. This argument may be taken in
two ways.
First, it may amount to the contention that there is an unac-
ceptable risk that unlawful coercion will take place if the rela-
tively diffuse strictures of the voluntariness standard are not
supplemented by rules providing more definite guidance con-
cerning permissible interrogation practices. It may also involve
the contention that the voluntariness standard is too permissive,
and leaves room for practices that are inhumane or unworthy,
even if not literally unlawful.
We agree that law enforcement officers should be provided
with interrogation rules that are more definite than "thou shalt
not engage in coercion." However, we do not see any merit in the
particular rules that Miranda promulgated for this purpose, and
do not believe that the courts are the appropriate agencies for
developing and enacting such rules.
Second, the "bright line" argument may refer to the concern
that the absence of more definite prophylactic rules would lead
to increased litigation over the occurrence of actual coercion.
The force of this point is limited to some degree by the fact that
Miranda did not supplant the traditional voluntariness stan-
dard, but supplemented it. Defendants who have received the
full Miranda treatment remain free to claim that they were co-
erced anyway, and do so frequently. This point also affords no
reason for preferring Miranda's rules over various other possible
systems of prophylactic rules whose observance would make it
difficult for a defendant to make a credible claim of coercion.
Moreover, Miranda's requirements have given rise to an enor-
mous volume of litigation of a wholly novel character. This in-
cludes litigation relating to the delivery and formulation of the
warnings; the existence of a "custodial" situation requiring
warnings prior to questioning; the adequacy of a defendant's
waiver; compliance with the rules against questioning a defen-
321. Quoted in W. BUCKLEY, FOUR REFORMS-A GUIDE FOR THE SEVENTIES 103 (1973).
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dant who has expressed an unwillingness to talk or requested
counsel; compliance with the rule that a defendant's silence fol-
lowing the receipt of Miranda warnings must be concealed from
the jury at trial; and various other matters. Given Miranda's
status as a major source of litigable issues in its own right, there
is no reason to believe that it has had any effect of reducing the
volume of litigation relating to the admission of pretrial state-
ments by defendants.
A fourth argument is that the Miranda decision has become
institutionalized in police practice to the point where it no
longer exacts any unacceptable costs in terms of lost statements
or evidence. Police training in Miranda's rules and the use of
such props as Miranda cards and printed waiver forms reduce
the likelihood of errors by the police that would jeopardize the
admissibility of a defendant's statements in subsequent pro-
ceedings.
This argument, however, basically misapprehends the nature
of the costs associated with Miranda. While cases continue to
occur in which police officers are tripped up by Miranda's tech-
nicalities and statements are later excluded as a result, the main
cost is the loss of statements which are never obtained to begin
with because compliance with Miranda has enabled suspects to
insulate themselves from inquiry, or has inhibited them from re-
sponding. Since the purpose and effect of Miranda's rules are to
enlarge the opportunities for suspects to remain silent, perfec-
tion in the machinery of compliance can only increase this cost.
Some final points that have been offered in support of Mi-
randa are that it is somehow questionable or undesirable to use
a person's own statements to convict him; that a system which
relies frequently on such statements is likely to be less reliable
and effective overall than one that does not; and that restrictive
interrogation rules improve the quality of police work by requir-
ing the development of greater facility in obtaining other sorts
of evidence.
We see no merit in these arguments. There is nothing wrong
with using a defendant's own statements to convict him, so long
as the Constitution's prohibition of compulsion is not trans-
gressed:
The Constitution is not at all offended when a guilty man
stubs his toe. On the contrary, it is decent to hope that
he will . . . . Thus the Fifth Amendment does not say
that a man shall not be permitted to incriminate himself,
or that he shall not be persuaded to do so. It says no
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more than that a man shall not be "compelled" to give
evidence against himself."' 2
The points relating to the overall effectiveness or reliability of
the criminal justice system are also unpersuasive. So long as co-
ercion is avoided, a suspect's incriminating statements are highly
probative evidence, since innocent people are not prone to make
false admissions that will send them to prison.2 While restric-
tions on obtaining evidence from suspects obviously will result
in increased emphasis on obtaining evidence from other sources,
it is difficult to see how this could be regarded as supporting the
adoption of such restrictions. If any other important type of evi-
dence were excluded or arbitrarily restricted-for example, fin-
gerprint evidence, or documentary evidence, or eyewitness testi-
mony-that would also result in an increased need to develop
other types of evidence for use in criminal cases. No one regards
this as an affirmative reason for adopting rules which would ex-
clude evidence of these types in cases in which it is reliable and
probative. A system that aims at justice will obtain and use
every type of reliable evidence that can be secured by means
that are legally and morally acceptable.
2 4
In sum, we see compelling reasons for attempting to secure an
abrogation of Miranda, and no substantial arguments to the
contrary. The interesting question is not whether Miranda
should go, but how we should facilitate its demise, and what we
should replace it with.
B. Challenging Miranda In Litigation
Under the Supreme Court's current case law, Miranda is vul-
nerable to attack on at least four theories.
First, Miranda should no longer be regarded as controlling be-
cause a statute was enacted in 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which
-overrules Miranda and restores the pre-Miranda voluntariness
,standard for the admission of confessions. Since the Supreme
Court now holds that Miranda's rules are merely prophylactic,
and that the fifth amendment is not violated by the admission of
322. StaLe v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (N.J. 1968).
323. Admissions are also frequently self-validating, in the sense that they often dis-
close knowledge of facts relating to the offense which only the offender would possess, or
lead to other evidence that confirms their.veracity. See Caplan, supra note 311, at 1422-
23 & n.28.
324. See Friendly, supra note 320, at 691; L. MAvERS, supra note 25, at 67-69.
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a defendant's voluntary statements despite non-compliance with
Miranda, a decision by the Court invalidating this statute would
require some extraordinarily imaginative legal theorizing of an
unpredictable nature. The one court of appeals that has ad-
dressed this issue found quite easily that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is
valid under the Supreme Court's current view of Miranda- 5
Second, we can urge the Supreme Court to overrule Miranda,
independent of whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is effective as a direct
overruling of that decision. The essential points in an argument
supporting this result are not difficult to make out: Miranda's
rules are wrong in relation to the original understanding of the
fifth amendment. Virtually every important issue decided by
Miranda had been raised in the Court's pre-Miranda prece-
dents, and had been resolved in a manner inconsistent with Mi-
randa. Miranda's rules and its doctrinal assumptions are incon-
sistent with those recognized in the Court's decisions in every
other fifth amendment context, both before and after
Miranda.26
Miranda has also been seriously eroded by subsequent deci-
sions. Its essential doctrinal premise-that the fifth amendment
is necessarily violated if Miranda's rules or their equivalent are
not observed-has been squarely rejected in later decisions. Its
specific strictures have been eroded in decisions recognizing the
admissibility of statements obtained in violation of Miranda for
impeachment, in the recognition of a "public safety" exception
to Miranda, and in recognizing that evidence derived from state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda can be admitted.27
Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is directly effective as a repeal
of Miranda, it is a relevant factor in deciding whether to over-
rule that decision. In the past, the Supreme Court has been will-
ing to reconsider and overturn constitutional decisions in light of
later Congressional enactments which expressed disagreement
with them.32 s The Congressional findings embodied in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 should also be accorded weight in deciding whether the
time has come to overrule Miranda.
Third, Miranda's continued application in state proceedings
has a decidedly mysterious character, since the Supreme Court
325. See supra text accompanying notes 244-47.
326. See supra Part I.A.I.c, Part I.B.2, & Part II.A.2.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 250-62.
328. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (reconsidering and overruling deci-
sions which held that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
are Article I courts in light of later Congressional enactment declaring them to be Article
III courts).
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now holds that a state court would not violate the fifth amend-
ment by admitting a voluntary statement obtained in violation
of Miranda. If confronted squarely with this issue, the Court
could perpetuate Miranda only by holding that it has supervi-
sory authority over the state courts.2 9
Finally, at least one state has a statute on the books that is
substantially the same as 18 U.S.C. § 3501.30 In cases coming
up from this state, the no-supervisory-authority argument would
be reinforced by the fact that Miranda involves the application
of admittedly non-constitutional rules in the face of a contrary
legislative enactment.
Of these four approaches, the approach based on 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 should be our lead argument, since it relates directly to
federal proceedings and the courts could reject it only by hold-
ing an Act of Congress unconstitutional. However, the conten-
tion that Miranda should be overruled, independent of the di-
rect effectiveness of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, would also be worth
offering when the issue reaches the Supreme Court, since it
would provide an opportunity for setting out a more broadly for-
mulated argument against Miranda. If the Court upheld section
3501, this would dispose of Miranda at the state level as a prac-
tical matter, even though the statute only directly affects federal
and District of Columbia proceedings: States could enact stat-
utes like section 3501, and the validation of the federal statute
would make it clear that any possible doctrinal grounds for ap-
plying Miranda in contravention of such statutes have been re-
jected by the Supreme Court.
C. Administrative Rules For Interrogations By The
Department's Agencies
Our second general recommendation is that the Department
promptly develop a set of rules or guidelines for the components
that carry out interrogations, and implement these rules concur-
rently with our renewal of a litigative challenge to Miranda. Is-
sues that could appropriately be considered in the development
of an interrogation policy for the Department would include the
desirability of requiring that interrogations, where feasible, be
329. See supra text accompanying notes 255-63.
330. See ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3988 (1978). Indiana also enacted provisions
modeled on 18 U.S.C. § 3501, but they were repealed in 1982.
Pretrial Interrogation
Journal of Law Reform
videotaped or recorded;"3 ' the desirability of rules providing ad-
ditional guidance concerning the permissible duration and fre-
quency of interrogations; 3 2 and the desirability of rules restrict-
ing or prohibiting specific deceptive or manipulative practices
that were characterized as abusive in the Miranda decision.33
The principal reasons for this recommendation are:
First, we consider such standards to be desirable as a matter
of institutional responsibility. Currently, the basic rules for cus-
todial interrogations are set by the Miranda decision, and en-
forced by the courts through the exclusion of evidence. If this
form of oversight is to be removed, we should adopt other meas-
ures which ensure that interrogations are carried out in a man-
ner that is fair to suspects, and that does not jeopardize the ad-
missibility or credibility of confessions or other statements in
subsequent judicial proceedings. While the circumstances of the
various agencies will obviously require somewhat different prac-
tices in carrying out interrogations, we see no presumption in
favor of leaving the individual agencies entirely to their own de-
vices in this matter. A general policy can set out standards that
leave room for variations reflecting legitimate differences in the
needs and operations of different components. By way of com-
parison, we now have Department rules or guidelines relating to
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and guidelines have been
issued by the Attorney General relating to the activities of par-
ticular agencies in such areas as undercover operations and the
use of informants.
3 3 4
Second, the existence of an administrative policy of this sort
should be of substantial value in persuading the courts to aban-
don Miranda. The courts are now accustomed to setting the
rules for custodial interrogations, and to enforcing the rules that
they have created in particular cases. It should be easier for
them to relinquish this role if they know that in doing so they
331. See generally Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alas. 1985) (adoption by Su-
preme Court of Alaska of rule that police, where feasible, must record any interrogation
occurring in a place of detention); ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 130.4 (1975) (recording requirement); id. at 345-50 (commentary discussing recording
requirement, with citations to literature).
332. Partial time constraints on interrogations are already provided, in an oblique
way, by the requirement of FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) that an arrested person be brought
before a magistrate without unnecessary delay and by the six-hour rule of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(c).
333. See generally supra text accompanying note 169.
334. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980); ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (Dec. 31, 1980); ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI USE OF INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (Dec. 2, 1980).
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are acceding to a responsible alternative system, rather than
writing a blank check for individual officers or agencies.
Third, the adoption of such rules would provide us with two
additional arguments for abrogating Miranda. The first of these
arguments would be based on the Miranda decision's assertion
that its rules are not the only acceptable means of ensuring com-
pliance with the fifth amendment, and its invitation to develop
"equally effective" alternatives. 335 In light of this invitation, a
reasonably designed administrative policy would provide an ar-
gument for dispensing with Miranda's system even under the
terms of the decision that created it. A second argument to the
same effect could be based on the Supreme Court's decision in
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, s36 which held that the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceed-
ings. In reaching this conclusion, the Court regarded it as signifi-
cant that the INS has an administrative system for preventing
and punishing fourth amendment violations 37 We could argue
similarly that our system of administrative rules and sanctions
provides adequate safeguards against fifth amendment viola-
tions, and justifies dispensing with Miranda's prophylactic
system.
A final point in support of an administrative policy is that it
would enable us to show that replacing the Miranda system with
superior alternative rules offers major advantages in relation to
the legitimate interests of suspects and defendants, as well as
major gains in promoting effective law enforcement. Adopting
publicly articulated standards which avoid the Miranda rules'
manifest shortcomings as a means of ensuring fair treatment of
suspects" would be the most effective way of making this point.
D. After Miranda
The abrogation of Miranda would open the way for a compre-
hensive reconsideration of pretrial interrogation and related ar-
335. Miranda formulated this invitation restrictively, stating that an acceptable al-
ternative must be "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it," 384 U.S. at 467, 490-91.
However, given the Court's prophylactic conception of Miranda's rules in its contempo-
rary case law, see supra Part II.C.l.a, it should be satisfied with any alternative rules
that are equally effective in guarding against actual compulsion in violation of the fifth
amendment.
336. 468 U.S. 1034 (1984).
337. Id. at 1044-45.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73, 313-15.
Pretrial Interrogation
Journal of Law Reform
eas of self-incrimination law. The issues that would merit exami-
nation in this connection include (i) the desirability of
dispensing with warnings, or including material in warnings
which provides an affirmative incentive to suspects to respond to
inquiry, (ii) whether any right to counsel should be recognized in
connection with police interrogation, prior to the suspect's initial
appearance in court, (iii) the propriety of continuing to question
a suspect after he has expressed an unwillingness to talk, and
(iv) the general admissibility of a defendant's pretrial silence at
trial, both for impeachment and for other purposes.
1. Warnings
A first question that would be open to general reconsideration
following an abrogation of Miranda is whether "warnings"
should be given at all to suspects prior to questioning, and, if so,
what their content should be. The most basic point against con-
tinuing the specific warnings now mandated by Miranda is that
they reduce the likelihood that a suspect will talk. Since the
willingness of suspects to respond to official inquiry is conducive
to the discovery of truth, a practice which has this inhibiting
effect is, prima facie, undesirable.
The affirmative grounds supporting a warning policy are not
particularly persuasive. We have already addressed the argu-
ment that warnings are desirable as a means of affording less
knowledgeable suspects the same opportunities for stonewalling
that are available to those who know more.33 9 While a suspect
might believe that he is under a legal obligation to respond to
incriminating questions if not told otherwise, it is not apparent
why the government should go out of its way to disabuse him of
that notion. A failure to do so does not constitute compulsion
under the fifth amendment,3 40 and doing so may entail the loss
of statements which would be helpful in clearing an innocent
person 34 1 or bringing a criminal to justice.
33
The giving of warnings does, however, at least have some
pragmatic value in rebutting claims of coercion by defendants. If
a suspect is told at the start of an interview that he does not
have to say anything, it becomes more difficult for him to argue
339. See supra text accompanying notes 199-204, 319-21.
340. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
341. A suspect's silence may deny the authorities information that would clear others
who have also come under suspicion. See Friendly, supra note 320, at 680-81, 686-87.
342. See Caplan, supra note 311, at 1450-54.
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later on that he was forced to confess.34 s The utility of warnings
on this ground-and the potential detriment from omitting
them-is enhanced by the formulation of the statute that would
govern the admission of pretrial statements after Miranda. Sec-
tion 3501(b) of Title 18 enumerates several specific factors which
the trial judge is to consider on a regular basis in determining
the question of voluntariness. Because a number of these factors
relate to the giving of Miranda-like warnings, or to the suspect's
knowledge of information that is conveyed in such warnings, a
policy of giving no warnings at all could be a distinct disadvan-
tage in litigating questions of voluntariness under this statute.
An intermediate possibility would be to give warnings which,
in substantive content, overlap the Miranda warnings and the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b), but which contain
additional material that offsets their inhibiting effect. For exam-
ple, it could appropriately be pointed out to a suspect that, in
remaining silent, he is foregoing an opportunity to present any
information he may have that would clear himself. Advice to a
suspect that his silence would reflect poorly on the credibility of
any exculpatory story he might offer later on would also provide
a rational incentive for cooperation. s4' As discussed earlier 3 4 an
admonition along these lines may be independently desirable as
a means of avoiding Doyle v. Ohio's prohibition of the use of a
suspect's pretrial silence. With the addition of this type of mate-
rial, a revised set of warnings might run along the following
lines:
(1) You are charged with the commission of [name or
description of offense]. The purpose of this interview is
to obtain information concerning this offense. Anything
you say here may be used as evidence in a court of law.
(2) You are not required to make a statement or to an-
swer questions. However, this interview does give you an
opportunity to provide any information that would show
your innocence or explain your actions. If you choose to
remain silent, that fact may be disclosed in court and
may cast doubt on any story or explanation you give later
on.
343. See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 604 (1944); see also Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 & n.20 (1984).
344. See Caplan, supra note 311, at 1452 & nn.177-78 (support for similar
admonitions).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 273-75.
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Or:
(1) You are under arrest on suspicion of [name or
description of offense]. The purpose of this interview is
to obtain information concerning this offense. Anything
you say here may be used as evidence in a court of law.
(2) You do not have to make a statement or answer ques-
tions. However, if you have anything to say in your de-
fense, we advise you to tell us now. Your failure to talk at
this interview could make it harder for a judge or jury to
believe any story you give later on.
It is not apparent that warnings formulated in these terms
would be less effective than a no-warnings policy in eliciting re-
sponse. They would, however, cover most of the points of infor-
mation that are explicitly identified as relevant to the determi-
nation of voluntariness in the confessions statute.34 ' The
desirability of an admonition relating to a right to counsel is a
more complicated question that merits separate discussion.
2. The Assistance of Counsel
An antecedent question to whether a suspect should be told
that he has a right to counsel in custodial interrogation is
whether such a right should in fact be recognized in custodial
interrogation. Under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, an arrested person must be brought before a magis-
trate without unnecessary delay, and this principle is reinforced
by the six-hour rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). A defendant is, of
course, entitled to counsel when he is brought into court. " The
question remaining is accordingly whether a right to counsel
should be recognized in the limited period of time prior to the
initial appearance before a judicial officer, although there is no
legal right to counsel during that period. 48
346. Section 3501(b) provides in part: "The trial judge in determining the issue of
voluntariness shall take into consideration . . . whether such defendant knew the nature
of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected . . . [and] . . .
whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make
any statement and that any such statement could be used against him."
347. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) & Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules (1966
Amendment); supra Part II.C.3 (current sixth amendment doctrine).
348. See supra Part II.C.3.
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The factors identified in section 3501(b) as relevant to the de-
termination of voluntariness include the presence or absence of
advice to a defendant concerning his right to the assistance of
counsel and whether the defendant was actually without the as-
sistance of counsel. Recognizing a right to counsel and advising
suspects of such a right would accordingly have some value in
establishing that any ensuing statements were voluntarily given.
However, this point should not be overestimated. The inclusion
of these factors in section 3501(b) was not meant to create or
recognize a substantive right to counsel at interrogations, or to
create a presumption in favor of allowing counsel at that stage.
Rather, the statute simply restores the law to its pre-Miranda
state, in which the absence of counsel or a related admonition
are factors of some relevance, along with many others. 49 In the
absence of other indicia of coercion, denial of counsel alone
should not weigh heavily in favor of a finding of
involuntariness.350
Moreover, any value of a right to counsel in establishing vol-
untariness must be weighed against the costs of recognizing such
a right. These costs are substantial and obvious. If a lawyer ap-
pears, he will usually tell his client to say nothing to law enforce-
ment officers, and there will be little point in attempting further
questioning. 51 Even if questioning does subsequently take place,
prior consultation with counsel and the delay associated with it
eliminates the possibility of obtaining an untainted story, and
increases the likelihood of successful fabrication:
If anything has happened and it is important to discover
who is the author of it, the first impulse of the human
mind is to inquire of the person suspected, whether he
349. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
350. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958) (voluntariness clear,
despite denial of counsel, where defendant was advised of right not to talk and was
aware of that right); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 508 (1958) (no coercion despite
denial of counsel); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 60, 62-68 (1951) (confession ob-
tained during lengthy detention without counsel voluntary and admissible).
351. See Caplan, supra note 311, at 1438-41; Note, supra note 218, at 1600-02.
Permitting adverse inferences from a suspect's silence in police custody would reduce
the costs of a right to counsel, since counsel would then have to figure in the risk of such
inferences in deciding whether to advise the suspect to talk or remain silent. However,
cases would remain in which the balance of strategic advantage would favor silence and
counsel would, in effect, obstruct the investigation by advising the suspect to withhold
his knowledge of the offense from the police. Moreover, adverse inferences from silence
would do nothing to meet the problem of delay and the increased risk of false denials
and fabrications that result from prior consultation with counsel. See Kauper, supra
note 31, at 1241, 1247.
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did it, and to cross-examine him as to the circumstances
... . Why is it unjust? If he is not guilty will he not
have the strongest motive for saying so, and, if he is
guilty and seeks to escape liability, will he not use every
effort to make his conduct consistent with his innocence?
Why, then, does it expose the defendant to improper
treatment if an officer of the law at once begins to inter-
rogate him concerning his guilt. But the answer is, he has
the right to consult counsel. He should not be hurried
into statements which he may subsequently desire to re-
tract. In other words, he should be given an opportunity
after he has committed the crime to frame in his mind
some method by which he can escape conviction and
punishment.
3 52
In the Miranda decision itself, the Court predicated the right
to counsel primarily on the fiction of inherent coerciveness.
However, the Court also suggested a number of subsidiary pur-
poses that would be served by introducing defense counsel into
interrogations:
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve
several significant subsidiary functions as well. If the ac-
cused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance
of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness.
With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will
practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is neverthe-
less exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The
presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the
accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and
that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution
at trial. a
The suggestion that a defense attorney will assist his client in
telling a truthful story may be discounted, in light of the much
greater probability that he will prevent him from telling any
story. The other functions identified for defense counsel at this
stage were deterring the police from resorting to coercion, ensur-
ing that the occurrence of coercion could be established in later
judicial proceedings if it did take place, and ensuring that the
government would not misrepresent a defendant's statements in
352. Taft, The Administration of Criminal Law, 15 YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1909); see
Kauper, supra note 31, at 1241, 1247.
353. 384 U.S. at 470.
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subsequent proceedings. These objectives are legitimate, though
how much weight they carry as support for a right to counsel
depends in part on one's assessment of how likely it is that they
would not be realized in the absence of such a right. In any
event, Miranda's right to counsel, like the other features of Mi-
randa's system, does not have any reasonable "fit" in relation to
its stated purposes. If special arrangements are thought neces-
sary to deter coercion and to guard against perjury by the gov-
ernment, it would, for example, seem evident that a regular
practice of videotaping or recording interrogations would be
more effective than a waivable-and frequently waived-right to
have counsel present.
In terms of specific policies, we would see no problem with
advising a suspect that he will be brought promptly before a
magistrate, and that counsel will be made available to him when
he is brought into court. Advice of this sort would have affirma-
tive value in rebutting claims that a suspect was intimidated
into confessing by the prospect of indefinitely prolonged interro-
gation or detention.35" It would not be advisable, however, to tell
a suspect that he has a right to consult with counsel prior to
custodial questioning, or to have counsel present during ques-
tioning. A policy of this sort could be implemented by giving
suspects an admonition along the following lines:
We are required by law to bring you before a judge with-
out unnecessary delay. [Insert more definite information
here concerning the expected time when the suspect will
be brought before a magistrate]. You have a right to be
represented by counsel when you appear in court. If you
cannot afford a lawyer, the judge will appoint one for you
without charge. 55
354. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (confession excluded based on
police threat that defendant would be held incommunicado until he confessed).
355. In conjunction with the revised warnings suggested earlier, see supra text ac-
companying notes 344-46, an admonition of this sort would, subject to the suggested
policy constraints, round out the relationship to the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(b). These include "the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment... if [the
confession] was made after arrest and before arraignment. . . [and] . . . whether or not
such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
,counsel .... "
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3. Questioning Uncooperative Suspects
A third issue that would be open to consideration after Mi-
randa is the propriety of questioning a suspect who indicates
that he does not want to be questioned. Miranda itself estab-
lished nearly absolute rules that a suspect can cut off custodial
interrogation, immediately and permanently, by expressing a re-
luctance to talk or by asking for counsel. As discussed above,"6
these rules are wrong as a matter of history, and more extreme
than those that are presently recognized in other fifth amend-
ment contexts. As a matter of policy, we see no reason why a
reasonable effort should not be made to persuade an uncoopera-
tive suspect to make a statement or answer questions. It should
at least be permissible to present such a suspect with an account
of accusations or other evidence against him, and to ask him
whether he can offer any response or explanation in light of that
information.
3 57
4. The Admission of Pretrial Silence
Miranda's rule prohibiting the admission at trial of a defen-
dant's silence in custodial interrogation was unknown to the
common law, and contrary to the weight of state authority at the
time of the Miranda decision. In historical critiques of self-in-
crimination law, rules barring adverse inferences from silence
have been among the most frequent targets of criticism."' 8 In
other social contexts, questioning a person who is reasonably
suspected of wrongdoing is considered a natural and appropriate
response, and the refusal of a person in that situation to explain
or respond to the evidence against him is rationally regarded as
grounds for heightened suspicion. 59 Legal doctrines which es-
tablish a contrary rule for criminal cases are basically of benefit
to the guilty, since an innocent person is likely to be eager to
clear himself. As the law reformer Jeremy Bentham observed in
relation to a nineteenth century rule barring any "legal pre-
356. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37, 128-31, 189-97.
357. Cf. ALI, supra note 145, § 5.04 & Note (police may confront suspect with new
evidence and ask whether he wishes to answer questions, even after he has indicated
unwillingness to talk).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37, 116-127.
359. See Caplan, supra note 311, at 1451-52.
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sumption" against a defendant based on silence in the face of
incriminating questions:
Let us now consider the case of persons who are inno-
cently accused. Can it be supposed that the rule in ques-
tion has been established with the intention of protecting
them? They are the only persons to whom it can never be
useful. Take an individual of this class; by the supposi-
tion, he is innocent, but, by the same supposition, he is
suspected. What is his highest interest, and his most ar-
dent wish? To dissipate the cloud which surrounds his
conduct, and give every explanation which may set it in
its true light; to provoke questions, to answer them, and
to defy his accusers. This is his object; this is the desire
which animates him. Every detail in the examination is a
link in the chain of evidence which establishes his
innocence.
If all the criminals of every class had assembled, and
framed a system after their own wishes, is not this rule
the very first which they would have established for their
security? Innocence never takes advantage of it; inno-
cence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the
privilege of silence.3 60
The volubility of the critics of rules barring adverse inferences
from silence has frequently been matched by the taciturnity of
their proponents. The Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v.
California, barring adverse comment on silence at trial, and Mi-
randa's footnote which announced a corresponding rule concern-
ing pretrial silence, involved no serious effort at justification,
and did not deign to address the historical and policy arguments
on the other side of the issue."' Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, in such cases as United States v. Hales62 and Doyle v.
Ohio,3 63 have given this issue more serious attention, but fall
considerably short of providing a convincing rationale for any
broad preclusion of the use of pretrial silence at trial.
The case for restricting the use of such evidence has been
based in part on the contention that jurors are likely to overesti-
mate the value of a defendant's silence in police custody as evi-
360. J. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 241 (1825).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27, 205-09.
362. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
363. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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dence of guilt.11 In assessing this contention, any resulting jeop-
ardy to defendants who are in fact guilty may be discounted,
since the guilty should be convicted. The argument accordingly
must be that the admission of pretrial silence would create a
substantial risk of conviction for innocent defendants, and that
this risk is great enough to outweigh the value it would have in
securing the conviction of the guilty.
No evidence has ever been offered in support of this proposi-
tion, and it would not appear to have any intrinsic plausibility to
persons who are not already disposed to believe that a defen-
dant's silence under questioning should be concealed from the
trier of fact. To the extent that it relates to a supposed propen-
sity of jurors to error, it apparently reflects the common conceit
of lawyers and judges that jurors, lacking the sagacity of lawyers
and judges, are likely to go wrong if allowed to know what has
actually happened in a case, and that the way to improve their
thinking is to let them know less.
In concrete terms, the following occurrences would generally
be required for the conviction of an innocent person to result
from the admission of pretrial silence under questioning: (1) The
defendant, though innocent, fails to deny the false charges or
accusations against him when confronted with them by the po-
lice, or otherwise refuses to respond to the evidence against him;
(2) the defendant, though innocent, does not subsequently pre-
sent an exculpatory story to the prosecutor before trial, or if he
does, the jury finds his later willingness to talk inadequate to
mitigate the inference arising from his silence in police custody;
(3) the defendant, though innocent, fails to take the stand at
trial and offer some alternative explanation for his earlier si-
lence, or offers an explanation that is sufficiently implausible
that the jury discounts it, and (4) the jury finds the defendant's
silence sufficiently probative in the context of all the evidence in
the case that it convicts the defendant, though he is innocent,
where it would have acquitted him had his silence been con-
cealed. Proponents of the view that this confluence of improba-
bilities amounts to an undue risk to the innocent would at least
appear to have the burden of proof on this point.
A somewhat different notion supporting the exclusion of pre-
trial silence that has surfaced in the Supreme Court's decisions
is that such silence is inherently ambiguous.365 To the extent
that this refers to the idea that a suspect may have understood
364. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 180.
365. See id. at 176-77; Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 617 & n.8.
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the Miranda warnings as representing that his silence could not
be used against him, the problem could easily be dispelled by
not giving suspects any warnings, or by giving variant warnings
that could not be so understood. To the extent that it merely
refers to the fact that suspects in police custody may remain si-
lent for various reasons, and that a jury would be required to
engage in inferences and make a judgment concerning the actual
reason under the facts of a case, it fails to distinguish a defen-
dant's silence from many other sorts of evidence. For example, a
suspect's flight following the occurrence of an offense is properly
admitted as evidence of guilt, even though there are any number
of reasons, aside from consciousness of guilt, which may moti-
vate a person to leave one place and go to another.
Finally, any "ambiguity" in a suspect's silence could be mini-
mized by suitably framed admonitions. For example, a suspect
might be advised, as suggested earlier, that the interview pro-
vides him with an opportunity to present any information that
would establish his innocence, and that his failure to present
such information will reflect poorly on the credibility of any ex-
culpatory story he might offer later on. A suspect's failure to say
anything in his defense following such advice would suggest that
he had nothing to say. In such circumstances, "a failure to ex-
plain would point to an inability to explain." s 6
As discussed earlier,3 67 some simple changes in the warnings
policy should be sufficient to get around the problem with using
pretrial silence for impeachment under the rule of Doyle v. Ohio.
A problem might remain in federal proceedings under the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Hale, which barred
the admission of a defendant's silence following the receipt of
Miranda warnings as an evidentiary matter. However, that deci-
sion was partially based on the same considerations as Doyle v.
Ohio, and the Court might be willing to reconsider or distinguish
it under a revised warnings policy.368
A final issue that would be ripe for reconsideration following a
general abrogation of Miranda would be the use of pretrial si-
lence as evidence in the government's case in chief. If the re-
moval of Doyle v. Ohio did make pretrial silence freely admissi-
ble to impeach a defendant's trial testimony, there would be
strong policy arguments for admitting such silence in cases in
366. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 56 (1947). See generally supra text accom-
panying notes 80-81, 119-27.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 273, 344-46.
368. See supra note 274.
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which the defendant does not take the stand as well: First, a rule
admitting pretrial silence when the defendant takes the stand
but not otherwise would create a perverse incentive to refrain
from testifying. Since the defendant-whether innocent or
guilty-is normally the person who knows the most about the
truth of the charges against him, it is desirable to have him
available for examination at trial, and detrimental to the discov-
ery of truth if evidentiary rules are so devised as to discourage
him from taking the stand. Second, admitting a defendant's pre-
trial silence only "for impeachment" would make the admissibil-
ity of such silence depend on an artificial distinction that has no
relationship to its probative value, since a defendant's silence
before trial may cast doubt on the credibility of a defense
presented through the testimony of other witnesses to the same
degree as a defense presented through his own testimony.369
CONCLUSION
Miranda v. Arizona was a decision without a past. Its rules
had no basis in history or precedent but reflected, rather, a will-
ful disregard of the authoritative sources of law. In frank terms,
it stood on nothing more substantial than Chief Justice War-
ren's belief that general use of the FBI warnings and other rules
he had devised would be socially beneficial, and on his ability to
persuade four other Justices to go along with him.
Miranda v. Arizona is a decision without a future. The cur-
rent majority of the Supreme Court has rejected the doctrinal
basis of Miranda, and has no personal stake in perpetuating its
particular system of rules. The persistence of Miranda appears
to rest on nothing more than the current Court's reluctance to
unsettle the law, and the fact that it has not yet encountered a
case that has forced the issue of Miranda's validity. While a re-
luctance to rock the boat is, up to a point, understandable, it
cannot be accorded controlling weight in supporting a decision
that not only flies in the face of the principles of constitutional
government, but also impairs the ability of government to safe-
guard "the first right of the individual, the right to be protected
from criminal attack in his home, in his work, and in the
369. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) (prosecutor's use of de-
fendant's silence to impeach insanity defense presented through the testimony of expert
witnesses).
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streets." ' The tragedy of Miranda is compounded by its short-
comings in relation to its own objective of ensuring fair treat-
ment of persons suspected of crime. It is difficult to conceive of a
legislature enacting so peculiar a set of rules, or keeping them in
effect after their deficiencies had been discerned and their ra-
tionale discredited. Yet despite the repudiation of its underlying
premises by the Supreme Court, Miranda drifts on twenty years
later, a derelict on the waters of the law.
There is every reason to believe that an effort to correct this
situation would be successful. We have at our disposal a
uniquely favorable set of circumstances-several recent deci-
sions by the Supreme Court holding, in effect, that Miranda is
unsound in principle, and a statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, that is
,specifically designed to overrule it. It is difficult to see how we
could fail in making our case.
The potential benefits from success in this effort are very
great. A wide range of fundamental issues that have been fore-
closed by Miranda would once again become amenable to study,
debate, negotiation and resolution through the democratic pro-
cess, restoring "the initiative in criminal law reform to those fo-
rums where it truly belongs. 3 71 Beyond the correction of the
specific evils that have resulted from Miranda's system, an abro-
gation of Miranda would be of broader import because of its
symbolic status as the epitome of Warren Court activism in the
criminal law area. We accordingly regard a challenge to Miranda
as essential, not only in overcoming the detrimental impact
caused directly by this decision, but also as a critical step in
moving to repudiate a discredited criminal jurisprudence. Over-
turning Miranda would, accordingly, be among the most impor-
tant achievements of this administration-indeed, of any admin-
istration-in restoring the power of self-government to the
people of the United States in the suppression of crime.
370. State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 52, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (1968).
,371. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 524 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ADDENDUM OF JANUARY 20, 1987, TO THE REPORT TO THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (FEB. 12,
1986)
Subsequent Cases
Since the submission of the Office of Legal Policy's Report to
the Attorney General on the Law of Pretrial Interrogation (the
"Miranda Report"), the Supreme Court has decided two
cases-Moran v. Burbine and Colorado v. Connelly-that pro-
vide additional support for a number of the Report's legal con-
clusions. The relevant features of these cases are as follows:
In Moran v. Burbine,372 the Court considered the effect of a
failure by the police to give an attorney access to a suspect in
custody. The suspect-unaware that an attorney had attempted
to contact him-waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the
murder of a young woman. The admission of the confession was
challenged on both fifth amendment and sixth amendment
grounds.
On the fifth amendment issue, the Court reiterated the famil-
iar proposition that the Miranda rules are not constitutional
rights, but only prophylactic measures designed to reduce the
likelihood of coercion taking place in custodial questioning. 73
The Court rejected the argument that a new rule should be cre-
ated requiring that the police inform suspects of efforts by attor-
neys to reach them. The Court reasoned that a further prophy-
lactic restriction of this sort would upset the balance that
Miranda had struck between society's interest in law enforce-
ment and the interest of defendants in being protected from
fifth amendment violations. It would carry a "substantial cost to
society's legitimate and substantial interest in securing admis-
sions of guilt" without significantly enhancing the protection of
suspects from coercion. 4
On the sixth amendment issue, the Court found the constitu-
tional right to counsel to be inapplicable, on the ground that the
right does not attach prior to the commencement of adversarial
judicial proceedings (the "first formal charging proceeding").37 5
372. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
373. See supra Part II.C.l.a.
374. See 475 U.S. at 424-28.
375. See 475 U.S. at 428-32.
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This confirms the analysis of that issue in the Miranda
Report.376
In Colorado v. Connelly,3 " the Court considered the admissi-
bility of a confession given by a mentally disordered defendant
to the police. The defendant admitted to the murder of a girl,
believing that God had ordered him to confess or commit sui-
cide. The Court rejected the view that the defendant's confes-
sion on the basis of internal psychological pressures would affect
his statements' admissibility, holding that the due process stan-
dard of voluntariness is only a prohibition of coercive practices
by the government, and does not require free will or rational
choice in any broader sense .37  The Court observed similarly
that "[t]he sole concern of the fifth amendment . ..is govern-
mental coercion.
379
376. See supra Part II.C.3.
377. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
378. See 479 U.S. at 163-67.
379. Id. at 170.
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APPENDIX: MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE RESULTING FROM Miranda
AND RELATED DECISIONS
The principal cost of Miranda is the loss of statements that
are never obtained to begin with because suspects invoke Mi-
randa's rules to prevent all questioning by the police or are in-
hibited from responding to such questioning. However, substan-
tial costs are also exacted when police officers are tripped up by
the technicalities of Miranda or related decisions, with the re-
sult that voluntary statements whose truthfulness is not in
doubt are excluded from trial. Confessed criminals may go free
in such cases, and even if retrial is possible, the anguish of crime
victims and their families may be prolonged through years of ad-
ditional litigation. This appendix describes a number of cases il-
lustrating the damage to the criminal justice system that can re-
sult from application of Miranda's exclusionary rule.
1. The Jose Suarez case- The Miranda decision was ap-
plied retroactively to exclude statements obtained from suspects
in interrogations that preceded Miranda, where the cases had
not yet been tried when the Miranda decision was handed down.
This application affected a large body of pending cases, and re-
sulted in egregious and widely publicized incidents in which kill-
ers, rapists and other serious offenders were set free.
One of the most notorious incidents of this sort involved a
Brooklyn resident, Jose Suarez, who confessed to butchering his
wife and five children with a knife. Because his interrogation
preceded Miranda, he was not, of course, given warnings satisfy-
ing its requirements, and his statements became inadmissible.
District Attorney Aaron Koota and the police attempted unsuc-
cessfully for seven months to obtain independent evidence of
Suarez's guilt, but were unable to do so. On releasing Suarez, the
judge stated: "This is a very sad thing. It is so repulsive it makes
one's blood run cold and any decent human being's stomach
turn to let a thing like this out on the street."38
2. The Braeseke case- Barry Braeseke was convicted in the
Superior Court of Alameda County, California, for the first-de-
gree murder of his father, mother and grandfather. Braeseke had
confessed to murdering his family with a .22 caliber rifle, and
had led the police to the spot where he had hidden the weapon.
He later confessed again to a deputy district attorney. Both con-
380. See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, 225-26, 573-74 (1967).
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fessions were tape recorded. There was no suggestion of any co-
ercion or overreaching in obtaining these statements, and the
record of Braeseke's conversations with the police and prosecu-
tor were permeated with repetitive explanations of his rights,
and with his repeated assertions that he understood his rights
and was freely waiving them.
The Supreme Court of California nevertheless suppressed the
confessions and reversed the conviction on the ground that
Braeseke had asked for counsel at one point prior to his first
confession, and that his later initiation of further conversation
by asking to speak to a police officer "off the record" did not
constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. The
court discounted Braeseke's numerous subsequent assertions
that he understood his rights and was willing to talk, and sup-
pressed his second confession as well as the first, on the ground
that the former was derived from the latter. The dissenting jus-
tices in the case observed:
How did the constable blunder? What did the officers
do that they should not have done? What should have
been done that was left undone? . . . As soon as the of-
ficers had reason to suspect defendant of the murders
they fully advised him of his Miranda rights. He re-
sponded that he understood his rights and was willing to
speak to the officers. When defendant subsequently in-
voked his rights and stated he did not wish to talk fur-
ther without an attorney present, the officers immedi-
ately terminated the interview, told defendant they could
not question him further, and advised he would have to
reinitiate communication if he later wished to speak to
them.
Defendant was then arrested. While being booked he
asked to speak with Officer Cervi alone and "off the rec-
ord." This request was granted and when alone, defen-
dant asked Cervi certain hypothetical questions regard-
ing what would happen if he were in fact responsible for
the murders. Cervi told defendant he would have to go to
jail, but that it would be better for him if he gave Cervi a
statement. Cervi then asked defendant if he was willing
to give a tape recorded statement, and defendant agreed
to do so. At commencement of the statement defendant
was reminded he had previously refused to talk further
without an attorney. Defendant acknowledged this was
the case and also admitted he had subsequently asked to
Pretrial Interrogation
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talk further with Cervi. Defendant also stated he was act-
ing voluntarily and was still aware of his right to have an
attorney present ....
A few hours later defendant gave a taped statement to
a deputy district attorney. Defendant was again given the
Miranda admonition and again stated he understood it
and was willing to waive its protection. He acknowledged
he had previously been advised of these rights, had un-
derstood them at that time, had stated he did not wish to
talk without an attorney present and had then been ad-
vised that if he wanted to talk further, he would have to
reinitiate discussion with the officers. Defendant affirmed
he had later told Officer Cervi he wished to speak to him,
that he had acted voluntarily in reinitiating communica-
tion with the officer, and he had done so with his Mi-
randa rights in mind. Defendant was again asked
whether he was willing to waive his Miranda rights,
stated he was and again gave a full description of his
crimes.
It would be difficult to imagine more compelling evi-
dence of waiver of one's privilege to sit silent. Conversely,
defendant's desire to describe his conduct to those
charged with its solution is clear and should not be frus-
trated by our court.
Defendant's conviction for these grave crimes-cold-
blooded murder of his father, mother and grandfather to
secure his inheritance-should be affirmed. 81
3. Edwards v. Arizona- Edwards was arrested for partici-
pating in a robbery of a bar which resulted in the death of the
proprietor. He was given Miranda warnings, waived his rights,
and made exculpatory statements in response to questioning.
However, he then expressed an interest in making a deal. Fol-
lowing an unproductive discussion of this possibility with the
county attorney, he stated that he wanted an attorney before
making a deal. He did not indicate that he wanted an attorney
prior to further interrogation; nevertheless, questioning was not
resumed at that point and Edwards was taken to the county jail.
On the following day, Edwards was visited by two police
detectives who were not aware that he had made a statement
about an attorney. They explained his Miranda rights to him,
and he said that he was willing to talk if he could first hear an
381. See People v. Braeseke, 23 Cal.3d 691, 602 P.2d 384, 159 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979).
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accomplice's tape recorded statement that he had been told
about the preceding day. After hearing the accomplice's state-
ment, Edwards made a statement inculpating himself in the fa-
tal robbery. Edwards was subsequently convicted of robbery,
burglary, and first degree murder, and the conviction was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of Arizona on appeal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding
that a normal waiver of Miranda rights following a suspect's re-
quest for counsel is inadequate. In such cases, said the Court,
further questioning is permitted only if the suspect himself initi-
ates further communication with the police.
382
4. The Ronnie Gaspard case- Ronnie Gaspard was a mem-
ber of the Bandidos motorcycle gang who admitted to carrying
out a contract murder of a woman who had served as a govern-
ment witness in a narcotics prosecution of gang members. Fol-
lowing his arrest in 1984, Gaspard was informed of his Miranda
rights, waived his rights, and made a full confession to the
crime. However, his confession and evidence derived from it
were suppressed on the ground that he had routinely been as-
signed counsel on his initial entry into jail. The district judge
apparently believed that suppression of his statements under
these circumstances was required by Edwards v. Arizona, not-
withstanding compliance with the warnings requirement and de-
spite Gaspard's waiver of his rights, including the right to coun-
sel. Without this evidence there was no case, and Gaspard was
,set free. A newspaper account described this ostensible vindica-
tion of Gaspard's rights as follows:
Two years ago, a Fort Worth woman was shot to death
execution-style after she agreed to testify in a drug trial
against members of a motorcycle gang.
Soon afterward, Bandidos gang member Ronnie Dale
Gaspard was charged with killing Diane Hubbard Sand-
ers, 23, after he led officers to the crime scene and signed
a statement admitting the crime.
But Tuesday. . . a judge in Fort Worth threw out his
statement on a legal technicality. Without the statement,
Tarrant County prosecutors said they had no case. The
charges were dismissed and Gaspard was set free.
Gaspard, 37, ... walked out of the courtroom
grinning.
382. See State v. Edwards, 122 Ariz. 206, 594 P.2d 72 (1979); Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981).
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Another article reported:
Gordon and Geraldine Hubbard had urged their 23-
year-old daughter to testify against members of a Fort
Worth motorcycle gang because "it was the right thing to
do."
Now they aren't so sure.
Denise Hubbard Sanders was killed for cooperating
with authorities nearly two years ago. And Tuesday, the
man who said he shot her in the head was freed on a
legal technicality . . . . What hurt most, the Hubbards
said, was seeing Ronnie Dale Gaspard, a 37-year-old
member of the Bandidos motorcycle gang, walk out of a
Fort Worth courtroom with a "big smirky grin" on his
face.
"That stinks," Gordon Hubbard said. "The guy sits
there and admits it and then just walks out."
State District Court Judge Charles Dickens ruled that
even though Gaspard had been read his rights, his state-
ment to police was inadmissible as evidence because of a
1981 U.S. Supreme Court ruling.
That ruling states that defendants who have lawyers
can confess to crimes only when they offer to talk and
not when police question them, said Gaspard's attorney,
William 0. Wuester. To the Hubbards, it is the kind of
quirk in the law that protects only the criminals.
"Look, we are the kind of people that stop for red
lights at four in the morning when no one else is around,"
said Geraldine Hubbard as she sat in her kitchen. "We
believe in law and order. But when something like this
happens, you lose faith."
Geraldine Hubbard described her daughter as a naive
and easygoing woman who was a good mother to her now
4-year-old daughter."'
383. See Letter of James K. Stewart, Director, National Institute of Justice, to Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese (Dec. 6, 1985)(with attachments documenting Gaspard case)
(on file with U. MICH J. L. REF.).
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